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ABSTRACT 
OF THE THESIS ENTITLED 
"TEXTUAL AND SEMANTIC STUDIES 
IN CLASSICAL YOGA" 
by G-.A. Peuerstein 
Notwithstanding that the Yoga-Sutra of B a t a n j a l i has received more 
scholar3y attention than any other yogic scripture* with the notable 
exception of the Bhagavad-G-Ita, the e x i s t i n g translations and accounts 
of the Yoga-Sutra are marred by serious misinterpretations. I t i s argued 
that these misapprehensions are due to (a) an almost naive reliance on 
the Sanskrit exegetists and (b) the want of a c r i t i c a l , in-depth analysis 
of both the textual structure of Ratafijali's work and h i s conceptual and 
doctrinal e d i f i c e * 
The present t h e s i s represents an attempt to meet these desiderata 
by way of a s t r i c t l y system-immanent interpretation of the teachings of 
P a t a n j a l i , founded on textual o r i t i c i s m . The data are arranged into two 
major parts. The f i r s t part (chapters 2-4) consists i n a stringent 
examination of the textual structure of the Yoga-Sutra on the basis of 
an e x p l i c i t methodology postulating, i n conscious contrast to the a p r i o r i 
assumptions of previous researchers, the i n t r i n s i c homogeneity of the text 
This approach proved generative of s i g n i f i c a n t new perspectives. Above*all 
i t established that the Yoga-Sutra i s a composite of two sets of t r a d i t i o n 
v i z . Kriyayoga and Astangayoga, the l a t t e r being represented by a s e r i e s 
of aphorisms which appear to be 'quoted* i n the main text rather than 
a r b i t r a r i l y interpolated. 
This c r u c i a l finding furnished the starting-?point for the c r i t i c a l 
a n a l y s i s , attempted i n the second part of the th e s i s (chapters 5-7 )> 
of the conceptual framework of C l a s s i c a l Yoga as embodied i n the 
Yoga-Sutra i t s e l f . I t was possible to cast new l i g h t on several key 
concepts - philosophical, psychological and p r a c t i c a l - of PataHjali 
system of thought. These analyses c l e a r l y evinced the f u l l autonomy 
of Bataffjalayoga as a d i s t i n c t darsana, thus correcting the popular 
misconception that C l a s s i c a l Yoga i s merely C l a s s i c a l Samkhya 
transmogrified along t h e i s t i c lines*. 
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F A R T O N E 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
2 
CHAPTER ONE 
A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF 'TOGA* 
I t seems apposite to offer, at the very outset of this 
study, a preliminary definition of the subject-matter, viz* Toga. 
In the past several tentative definitions or, more accurately, 
descriptions have been proposed. These were either far too 
specific or else too imprecise* What does i t mean to speak of 
Toga as a 'way of l i f e * , •philosophy1, •Indian psychotherapy', 
'religious union' or 'mysticism'? These concepts are themselves 
extremely vague, i f not loaded, and hence quite inadequate as 
definitional tools* The rationale of a formal definition i s the 
formulation of a set of propositions which are unconditionally 
valid* This means that only those components of the concept 
which are constant are to be singled out and logically related 
to each, other within the specifio semantic domain of that 
concept* The definition i s expected to be both consistent and 
as complete as possible without at the same time violating the 
law of parsimony. Keeping these factors i n mind I would suggest 
the following definition. 
Toga i s a specifically Indian tradition consisting ] 
of sets of varyingly; codified and/or systematized 
ideas, methods and techniques primarily intended to 
induce a transformation of consciousness in the 
3 
practitioner (yogin) and transmitted from one / 
teacher to one or more disciples in a more or less \ 
formal setting. 
By 'specifically Indian* I mean that Yoga i s a part of the. 
socio-cultural f i e l d of so-called Hinduism and i t s margins.' This 
includes some of the neighbouring countries, especially Tibet 
and Kashmir, but excludes a l l other regions which cannot be 
said to have had more than a negligible cultural contact with 
Hinduism and i t s two great socio-cultural cousin configurations 
Buddhism and Jainism. Thus i t would be misleading to talk of an 
•Akkadian Toga' or 'Hebrew Yoga* as did W.J.FLAGG (1898), but 
the designations'Buddhist Yoga', 'Jaina Toga* or 'Tibetan Yoga' 
are f u l l y j u s t i f i e d . 
I n view of the fact that Yoga i s by no means a uniform 
tradition i t i s necessary to qualify the definition by speaking 
of 'sets' which, again, may be more or less complex according 
to the degree of codification and systematisation. By 'ideas' I 
mean simple concepts, fundamental suppositions, doctrines and 
even full-fledged' ideological superstructures. I t i s assumed 
that the goal of a l l forms and schools of Yoga i s the breakthrough 
onto a different level of cognition. This automatically excludes 
magic with i t s central concern for the acquisition and mani-
pulation of 'power'• Yoga proper can be said to be primarily 
orientated towards gnosis, although i t cannot be denied that some 
of the variants of Yoga display a more or less pronounced interest 
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in 'magic power* (siddhi. vibhuti). 
Since there i s no unanimity about the actual nature of 
the ultimate target of Toga, as i s evident from the contrasting 
definitions of kaivalya, brahma-nirvana. nirvana etc.. i t 
seems advisable to speak merely i n general terms of a * trans-
formation of consciousness*. This takes also into account the 
extraordinarily multiform experiences encountered i n the course 
of the various yogio programmes, e.g. the multifarious types 
of meditative absorption and samadhi. The 'teacher' who may or 
may not be a f u l l y qualified adept must also be regarded as an 
essential feature of,a complete yogic setting. His role i s 
obviously analogous to that of the therapist or analyst i n 
contemporary therapeutio procedures* 
The 'setting' i n whioh the tradition of Toga i s transmitted 
from guru to aisya can be as formal as the customary pupilage 
of upaniaadic times, where the.student lived i n the teacher's 
hermitage (asrama). or as informal as the occasional congregations 
of like-minded devotees of, say, Krsna in medieval India. 
Specifications about the mode of transmission of the traditional 
knowledge remain outside the orbit of the definition, since 
there are far too many variables. For instance in i t i a t i o n by 
which a person i s accepted into the teaching structure. can be. 
enacted on various levels of elaboration and formality. I t may 
simply take the form of the teacher's s i l e n t consent, or else i t 
can find r i t u a l i s t i c expression as i n certain schools of Tantrism. 
The standards of selection differ greatly and particularly i n 
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the more popular Toga movements, suoh as the medieval bhakti-
marga, the threshold of tolerance can be unexpectedly -loW* 
One more important point c a l l s for consideration i n 
connection with the present definition of Yoga. I t is. often 
maintained that Toga i s primarily, perhaps even exclusively, 
practice of one kind or another, and to be s t r i c t l y distinguished 
from the various theoretical accretions* But such a distinction 
i s fallacious* Theory and practice are not separable categories; 
they mutually inform each other. Nowhere has this in t r i n s i c 
reciprocity of theory and practice/experiment been brought out 
more vividly than i n the recent studies i n the philosophy of 
science*' 
I t i s misleading to dichotomise the Gestalt of Toga by 
identifying i t either with the 'pure1 practice of certain 
techniques of consciousness transformation or with a specific 
body of theorems* Thus, for instanoe, E* CGNZE's rough-and-ready 
2 
definition of Toga as "a series of technical practices" which 
i n the course of history received various ideological under-
pinnings, leaves much to be desired* Though useful as a convenient 
analytical device, the clear-cut distinction between 'technical 
substructure 1 and 'ideological superstructure' — again E. COHZE's 
wording — must not be confounded with the actual data: Toga 
i s more properly characterised as a theory-practice continuum. 
1 See e.g* T.S. KDHET (1970 , 33) 
2 E. CONZE (1962, 18f.) 
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This point has been vaguely appreciated by G.J. LARSON (1969. 
124) who, i n a footnote (l17n)» makes the following observation: 
" I t should be noted, however, that Yoga i s never just action or 
'doing'• I t has associated with i t a number of doctrines which, 
clearly distinguish, i t and give i t an identity which goes beyond 
sheer 'doing'." These considerations are not of course meant 
to disclaim the fact that within the yogic tradition great 
emphasis i s placed on fi/4 practical application i n the form of 
personal commitment and daring experimentation* 
I t may be argued that the above definition i s s t i l l not 
specifio enough, so as to permit a f u l l y adequate demarcation of 
Yoga from cognate trends i n India* But i t must be remembered 
that Yoga i s a highly polymorphous phenomenon which does not 
readily lend i t s e l f to formal analysis* As M. ELIADE (1973"5,. 50) 
aptly remarks: " I f 'yoga' means many things, that i s because 
Yoga i s many things." . „ 
Finally, I wish, to delimit the preoise connotation of the 
concept 'Classical Yoga1 as used in the t i t l e and throughput the 
main body of this study* By this term I mean to refer to that 
particular school.and type of Yoga whioh i s associated with 
the name of Patanjali and i s codified in his famous Yoga-Sutra* 
By way of- extension I include i n this concept also the sub-
sequent commentarial tradition initiated as far as we know by. 
Vyasa's Yoga-Bhasya and continued through a long though not 
perfectly,continuous chain of sub-commentaries and glosses* 
Thus 'Classical Yoga'.does not so much mark a specific chrono-
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logical event than constitute a particular genre of Yoga. Implicit 
in this i s the idea that far from embodying a uniform tradition, 
Classioal Yoga comprises a series of traditions which have as 
their common denominator a formal dependence on the Yoga-Sutra. 
RJA E I TWO 
T E X T U A L P R O B L E M S 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE YOGA-SUTRA IN THE LIGHT OF THE CLASSICAL EXEGETISTS 
Patanjall's work, as i s evident from i t s regular Sanskrit 
3 — t i t l e , belongs to the so-called sutra-literature which 
emerged as a distinct genre of Indian li t e r a r y history in.the 
centuries before the r i s e of Christianity* According to M. 
MULLER (1916*, 4) these systematic works "must be considered as 
the l a s t outcome of a long continued philosophical activity 
carried on by memory only". The word sutra means l i t e r a l l y 
'thread*, and i n the present context refers to what S.DASGUPTA 
(1963^, I , 62) c a l l s "short and pregnant half-sentences 1 1 which 
"did not elaborate the subject i n detail, but served only to 
hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate, 
disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted". 
He continues: " I t seems, therefore, that these pithy half-
sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had 
had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject." 
I t i s exactly this extreme brevity and conciseness which 
renders the sutras almost unintelligible to the uninitiated. 
On the other hand, this same condensation and obscurity guaranteed 
the great degree of f l e x i b i l i t y witnessed i n the diverse tradi-
tions, since doctrinal matter could easily be developed and 
3 I say 'regular t i t l e ' because according to the Yoga-Bhasya, 
Patalfjali's work i s also known as S&ykhya-Pravacana. 
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even reinterpreted on the basis of the sutraa. I.K* TAIHHI frUfcv •' i y*: 
(1965 • x) writes: "The language i n which the Sutras are 
constructed i s an ancient one which, though extraordinarily 
effective i n the expression of philosophical ideas, can lend 
i t s e l f to an extraordinary'variety of interpretations•" This 
remarkable feature i s best exemplified i n the Vedanta 
literature which spawned around the Brahma-Sutra ascribed to 
Badarayana (?200 A.D.).^ The unequivocal sanction of this 
treatise was claimed with equal emphasis and conviction by 
5 6 
non-dualists , dualists and the propagators of other inter-
7 
mediary religious and philosophical positions. 
This enormous elas t i c i t y of the sutra was recognised by 
vacaspatisMisra i n his celebrated BhamatI (1*1.1) where he 
points out that a sutra i s so called "because of the 
communication of wide meaning" (bahv-artha-sucanat)* / j 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s which the sutra style entails for 
the translator are immediately apodictic* He i s not only faced 
with a frequently highly enigmatic original text but also an 
extensive t r a i l of commentaries upon commentaries which, in 
seeking to plumb the purport of the sutraa. offer a wealth of 
differing, often even hostile and mutually exclusive interpreta-
4 See S. EADHAKRISHNAN (1960) (A'"*™-- ^~'->*) 
5 See Sankara*s Bhasya 
6 See Itedhva1s theistic commentary 
7 See e.g. KamSnuja's SrI-Bhasya 
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tionso Of course, not each and every aphorism i s obscure. Nor 
are the classical exegetists permanently vying for recognition, 
or totally unhelpful i n their explanations. Very often they 
supply useful cues and valuable background information which 
i n a way compensate for their misleading, fanciful, dubious or ^ 
simply irrelevanSstatements* ^ 
Fortunately, the autra style of PataKjaii fs composition i s 
not as recondite and impenetrable as for instance certain portions 
of the Brahma-Sutra, and the general purport of most of i t s 
aphorisms can be grasped without the aid of the Sanskrit 
commentaries* Whereas the author of the Brahma-Sutra shows a 
distinct predilection for extreme terseness of statement — many 
of his aphorisms consist of a single word or a compound of two 
or three members only — the Yoga-Sutra has an average of ca. 
six words per sutra. The shortest aphorism i s 1.23 (vdth two 
words, provided that IsVara-pranidhana i s counted as one) and 
the lengthiest i s 11*34 (with nineteen words). 
The comparative tangibility of the sutras of Patanjali's 
vade-mecum does of course not signify that the meaning of each 
and every aphorism i s crystal clear, or else there would be l i t t l e 
justification for the present study* The truth i s that there i s 
s t i l l an abundance of concepts which await more detailed analysis 
than was afforded to them by past researchers* Above a l l , i t i s 
8 Sutra 1*23 runs: Isvara-pranidhanad-va; 11*34 reads: vitarka 
himsg-Sdayah. krta-karita^anumodit5 lobha-krodha-moha-purvakg 
mr^u-madhva-^dhimittrg duhkto^.1na!na-ananta-phal5 i t i pratinaksa-
bhHvanam. 
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my contention that l i t t l e progress has been made as regards 
the exposure of the dynamics of Yoga, i n particular our under-
standing of the subtle interplay between the conceptual framework 
and the r i t u a l ( i . e . practical) aspect. 
Even though the Yoga-Sutra has received more scholarly 
attention than any other scripture of Toga — with the notable 
exception of the Bhagavad-GltB —- i t s t i l l represents a vast 
terra incognita. In a certain sense the position of the researcher 
on Classical Yoga i s analogous to the position of those among 
the early Tedicists who, upon the discovery of Sayana's comment-
ary on the Raveda. were perfectly convinced that this explanatory 
text would solve a l l their exegetical problems. For, in their 
interpretation of the Yoga-Sutra the previous researchers have 
gone l i t t l e farther than Tyasa, the author of the oldest extant 
scholium. As a matter of fact they cannot even fee.said to have 
fathomed out the f u l l depth of Vyasa's commentary. As J.H. WOODS 
(1966^, ix) observes: "Even after a dozen readings the import 
of some paragraphs i s not quite.clear, such for example as the 
f i r s t half of the Bhasya on i i i . 1 4 . S t i l l more intractable are 
the single technical terms, even i f the general significance of 
the word, superficially analysed, i s d ear. This irreducible 
residuum i s unavoidable so long as one cannot feel at home i n 
that type of emotional thinking which culminates i n a super-
sensuous object of aesthetic contemplation." 
In a way Vyasa; a b r i l l i a n t scholiast, has kept previous 
scholars off a c r i t i c a l and sufficiently independent analysis 
13 
of the Yoga-Sutra, just as he has exerted a strong influence 
on a l l subsequent native commentators* Evan Bhoja, supposedly 
the most self-reliant glossist, who oriticises i n his Ra.ia-
Martanda a l l his predecessors proudly dubbing them "distorters 
of the real meaning" (vastu-viplava-krtah). re l i e s heavily on 
Vyasa'a work and consequently also commits the very same 
ezegetical blunders* 
Hence the f i r s t step towards a competent study of the Yoga-
Sutra would appear to consist in a c r i t i c a l assessment of the 
ezegetical literature* The f i r s t scholar to.pay some attention 
at least to this important question was J.W. HAUER (1958). He 
recognised what any detailed examination w i l l but confirm and 
amplify: There are marked discrepancies between.the Yoga-Sutra 
and the interpretations of the exegetists* In J.W. HAUER's (1958,265) 
own words: "The commentaries subsequent to Vyasa, even already 
Vyasa himself, instead of presenting the genuine philosophy of j 
Yoga often foist on Yoga the philosophy.of Samkbya. For this 
reason they are to be used with caution*" 
Some of these divergencies are quite obviously conceptual 
differences, others are of a terminological nature* They arise 
from the simple fact that between the composition of the original 
sutras and the compilation of the commentaries there elapsed a 
considerable period of time during which many shifts of emphasis 
in both language and thought must have occurred* At any rate* none 
of the long line of exegetists can be said to be a proper 
representative of Patanjali's school of thought. This naturally 
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does not challenge the fact that they constitute authoritative 
traditions i n their own righto Yet i t does impair their value 
as research implements. Perhaps i t i s just tenable to say that 
their r e l i a b i l i t y as exegetical sources decreases i n proportion 
to their chronological remoteness from the Yoga-Sutra. 
Thus clearly the most important commentary i s the Yoga-
Bhasya which i s most proximate to the Yoga-Sutra. The exact date 
of this scholium i s s t i l l uncertain, but i t cannot be later 
q _ than ca. 650 A.D. L i t t l e i s known about Vyasa himself whom 
tradition identifies with the legendary Vedavyasa who compiled 
the Samhitas, the Mahabharata and the Pur anas. Since the 
Samkhya teacher Varsaganya i s quoted i n the Yoga-Bhasya ( i l l . 5 3 ; 
17.13), who was i n a l l likelihood a contemporary of Vasubandhu 
(probably 270-350 A.D.) 1 0. Vyasa cannot have lived before 350 A.D. 
Thus the Yoga-Bhasya must be assigned to the period between 
350-650 A.D. I f the Yoga-Sutra was composed i n i t s present form 
i n the second or third century A.D., as i s assumed here, 1* the 
Yoga-Bhasya must be assigned to a date sufficiently removed from 
9 See J.Ho WOODS (19663, xx-xxi). Strangely enough J.H. WOODS, after 
correctly assessing the evidence of MSgha's SiiupBlavadha (IV.55) 
which refers to YS 1*33 and apparently the Bhgsya thereon, makes 
the mistake of saying that " I f this i s trustworthy evidence, the 
Comment cannot be earlier than A.D. 650", whereas i t should be 
"cannot be later than". This s l i p was already noticed by J.W* 
BAUER (1958, 472. fn.34). For a detailed discussion of the 
evidence of the Siswaalavadha see E. HULTZSCH (1927, 78-83). 
10 See J.H. WOODS (1966 5, xx)). Cf. E. FHAUWALLNER (1961, 125f.). 
11 Patanjali's date i s notoriously problematic. For a discussion 
of some of the evidence see J.H. WOODS (19663, xii- x i x ) who places 
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that of the Yoga-Sutra i n order to account for the many mis-
understandings. For this reason J.W.HAUER (1958, 266) favours 
the end of the f i f t h or the beginning of the sixth century as 
a l i k e l y date for the Yoga-Bhasya. The aforementioned discrepancies 
also led J.W. HAUER to query whether Tyasa really was a yogia 
who had access to the highest experiences, but this argument i s 
invalid. J.W. HAUER also pointed out that Vyasa's viewpoint 
i s very much akin to the earlier theistic Yoga tradition as i t 
i s embodied, for instance, i n the S*veta^vatara-Upanigad, where 
the lord (lavara) i s identified with Rudra-s'iva. J.W. HAUER 
deduced this from the opening stanza of the Yoga-Bhasya which runs: 
yaa-tyaktva rupam-adyam prabhavati .jagato'nekadha-
anugrahaya prakslna-kles^rarfir-visama-viga-dharo 1 
neka-vaktrah subhogl. Barva-.1nana-prasutir-bhu.1aga-
parikarah prltaye yasya nityam devo'hi-Isah sa vo1 
vyat-sita-vimala-tanur-yogado yoga-yuktah. 
This may be rendered as follows: 
[May He] who, having abandoned the primal form, [and 
who^ arises to favour the world in many ways, [ ? e j , 
the bearer of deadly poison, with many mouths and 
beautifully hooded, [who] destroys the mass of 
(fn. 11 otd.) 
the Yoga-Sutra i n the period between 300-500 A.D., which i s 
accepted by J.W. HAUER (1958, 266). However, in view of the fact 
that the terminus ad quern of vyasa's work i s 650 A.D. and very 
l i k e l y much earlier, the Yoga-Sutra may justifiably be placed 
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the causes-of -affliction, to whose delight the 
multitude of serpents eternally brings forth a l l 
knowledge — may He, the divine lord of serpents, 
protect you with His white, stainless body, J^HeJ the 
giver of Toga [who] i s [Himself I yoked i n Toga. 
i s valid. S t i l l , as S. DASGUITA (1930, 55) observes: "The adoration 
hymn of Vyasa (...) i s considered to be an interpolation even by 
orthodox scholars." This seems to be confirmed by the fact that 
Vyasa shows, to my knowledge, no sectarian bias i n his commentary, 
even though there would have been ample opportunity for expressing 
personal convictions especially i n connection.with the sutras 
1*23-28 which deal with the concept of Is*vara. 
Vyasa's precise intellectual home i s d i f f i c u l t to determine* 
According to P. CHAKRAVARTI (1951, 72, fn.1, I38f.) the author of 
the Toga-Bhasya represents the Samkhya school of Varsaganya. 0 
Discrediting Vaoaspati tfis'ra's testimony, P. CHAKRAVARTI suggests 
that most of the quotations i n the Bhasya are not from Pancasikha 
but from Varsaganya. "a distinguished teacher of Samkhya" (p135) who 
"re-wrote the original Sastitantra of Pancas'ikha" (p136) and also 
was the teacher of Vindhyavasa (seep338). This valuable hypothesis 
i s indirectly confirmed by K.B.R. RAO (1966, 375) who points out 
— i n 
that both Vyasa (see TBh 11.19) and Varsaganya subscribe to the 
(fn. 11 ctd.) 
about 300 A.D. or possibly somewhat earl i e r . Terminological consider-
ations would seem to confirm thi s . 
12 This i s according to the Yukti-DIpika, commenting on Sagkhya-
KBrikS 25; the text reads: eka-rwini tanmatrani-ity-anye. 
eka-uttarap varsaganyah. 
Admittedly, J.W. HAUER's proposed equation of ahi-Isa with s'iva 
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so-called eka-uttara-('increasing by one')theory. This i s an 
ontogenetic model operating on the principle of progressive 
inclusion. Thus, i n contrast with other schools of thought, 
every tanmatra or sensory potential has not merely one character-
i s t i c , but rather each subsequent tanmatra entails the character-
i s t i c s of a l l previous tanmatras. This view can be tabulated 
13 
as follows: 
(1) sabda-tanmatra , = aabda 
(2) sparsa-tanmatra = sparsa + sabda 
(3) rupa-taomatra = rupa + sparsa + sabda 
(4) raaa-tanmatra = rasa + rupa + sparsa + sabda 
(5) gandha-tanmatra = gandha + rasa + rupa -4- spar6a + sabda 
Both the single characteristic theory and, as P. DEUSSEN (l92o',If67f.) 
c a l l s i t , the 'accumulation theory' are expounded in the Haha-
bharata. The former notion i s probably the older one. In K.B.R. 
RAO's opinion the eka-uttara doctrine i s also accepted by fsvara 
Krsna, but P. DEUSSEN (l92cf,I,446) denies that i t can be found in the 
S|amkhya^Karika. 
Be this as i t may, i t i s clear from what has been said so far 
that Vyasa must be located somewhere i n the ramifying tradition of 
Sajgkhya. This i s strikingly evident from the colophons of his 
commentary according to which his work i s an exposition of Samkhya. 
13 For an explanation of the concept of tanmatra see below pp. 163f. 
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Notwithstanding that Vyasa cannot be considered as belonging to 
pataKjala-yoga proper, his commentary nevertheless does also not 
display the marks of bold innovation as i s the case, for instance, 
with Safikara's Bhaaya to the Brahma-Sutra» Vyasa writes as a scholar 
with much insight and possibly a good deal of first-hand knowledge 
of yogic practice. 
On a s t i l l more sophisticated level than the Yoga-Bhasya i s 
the famous jJk5 by Vacaspati Hisra, entitled Tattva-Yaiaaradl. 
Vacaspati, who can safely be placed i n the ninth century A.D., was 
a scholar of great repute. As C. BULCKE (1947, 3) puts i t : "He 
i s a very remarkable figure in the history of Indian philosophy 
and fully deserves the t i t l e of sarvatantra-svatantra. 'master 
of a l l systems but reliant on no one of them i n particular'..." 
The author of seven major ezegetical Sanskrit works on Nyaya, 
Samkhya, Yoga, MSmamsa and Vedanta, he was a master of the philo-
sophical style* the beauty and lucidity of which greatly impressed 
many a western savant (see e.g. M.WINTEHNITZ, 1922, I I I , 454). 
His Tattva-VaisaradI i s invaluable for understanding the more 
elusive passages of the Yoga-Bhasya. and i t i s a mine of inter-
esting philological data. However, i t s expositions! value i s low* 
Vacaspati, ostensibly, was no authority on Yoga; he approached his 
subject-matter with great candour and sympathy but not from within 
the yogic tradition. This i s corroborated by his whole style and 
his preoccupation with philological and epistemological matters 
as well as his anxious dependence on Vyasa. I t i s furthermore 
illustrated by the following story current in pandita c i r c l e s , 
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as related by S.S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI & C.E. RAJA (1933, x): 
In those days (as even today i n part of Upper India), 
i t would appear to have been customary to hold learned 
discussions on such occasions as marriages* Vacaspati, 
who listened to such a discussion on the occasion of 
his own marriage, was so struck by the vagaries of 
dialecticians that he resolved straightaway to devote 
himself to the task of setting forth authoritative 
expositions of a l l the darsanas* So great was his zeal, 
So mighty the task and such the patient and tireless 
devotion of his wife that the couple had grown old 
before vacaspati could write f i n i s to his labours* Then 
alone did vacaspati realise the magnitude both of his 
neglect of his wife and of his wife's self-sacrifice; 
and as a tardy measure of reparation, he gave her name 
to the last and greatest of his works, so that she could 
l i v e on perpetually i n the Bnamatl* though not in the 
bodies of ohildren born of her* The story i s so picturesque, 
so typical of the scholar's neglect and the true scholarly 
recompense, that i t deserves to be true* 
Commenting on the BhamatI, undoubtedly Vaoaspati's magnum 
opus, S. DASGUPTA (1965*, I I , 108) remarks that this great scholar 
"always t r i e s to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping 
himself In the background and directing his great knowledge of the 
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subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise 
from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of 
thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred 
to i n the text 1 1* This, mutatis mutandis, i s true of his Tattva-
Vaisaradl as well* I t i s this uncommon impartiality which makes 
i t so d i f f i c u l t to get a rounded picture of his personal philosophy, 
though his own viewpoint i s most likely that expressed in the 
Ehamatl. 
In the eleventh century Bhoja, ruler of Shara, composed a much 
acclaimed commentary to the Yoga-Sutra, known as the Ba.1a-Martanda 
or Bhoja-Vrtti. Although the royal author contributes many original 
interpretations, his work i s largely moulded on the Yoga-Bhagya and 
perhaps not quite as independent as he himself appears to have 
believed* J.W. HAUER (1958, 268) concedes to the possibility that 
Bhoja was a practising yogin, but this i s pure conjecture. I t i s 
clear, though, from the introductory verse of his composition that 
he was a follower of Saivism and a devout the i s t* 
' 14 
Easily the most self-reliant and fascinating of a l l the extant 
commentaries i s the Yoga-Varttika by Vijnana Bhiksu* who lived some 
time i n the sixteenth/seventeenth century i n Bengal. An abstract, of 
this voluminous scholium i s the Yoga-Sara-Samgraha by the same author* 
14 I t i s possible that Vyasa was i n fact not the f i r s t to comment on 
the Yoga-Sutra. Thus according to J.W. BAUER (1958, 268f.) the 
Persian traveller al-BIrunS (973-1048 A.D.) apparently based his 
translation of the Yoga-Sutra into Arabic on a commentary which does 
not appear to be either the Bhasya or the Tattva-Vaiaaradl. 
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VijSana fihiksu ranks among the great philosophical geniuses of 
India 6 Rejecting the non-dualist interpretation of reality which 
formed the dominant philsophical paradigm of the post-Sankara period, 
he developed i n his Vi.1nana-Amrta-Bhasya (to the Brahma-Sutra)and 
i n his other works a type of theistic Samkhya not dissimilar to the 
Samkhya-Yoga-Vedanta tradition of the Mahabharata. As M. HULLER 
(1916*» 450) remarks, Vijnana Bhiksu was "a philosopher of consider-
able grasp" who "while f u l l y recognising the difference between 
the s i x systems of philosophy, tried to discover a common truth 
behind them a l l , and to point out how they can be studied together, 
or rather in succession, and how a l l of them are meant to lead honest 
students into the way of truth"* 
He was a p r o l i f i c writer and, i n addition to the abovementioned 
treatises, also authored the SamlAva-Pravacana-Bhasya» Samkhya-Sara. 
Upadesa-Katnamala and a commentary on the Isvara-Glta (= Kurma-
Purana II.1-11). He has the delightful habit of commenting on points 
which other exegetists conveniently ignore. For instance, he i s the 
f i r s t to offer a comprehensive theory of the gunas. His statements 
are generally clear, and he makes no attempt to conceal the fact that 
his interpretations are simultaneously reinterpretat ions* 
Roughly contemporary with Vijnana Bhikgu i s Ramananda, the author 
of a commentary entitled Maninrabha which i s a work of l i t t l e origin-
a l i t y but which can be commended as a useful abstract of the leading 
ideas of the Yoga-Sutra and Vyasa's Bhagya. In this respect 
Ramananda's work i s typical of most of the later scholia which 
on the whole contain l i t t l e that i s new or particularly insightful. 
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A rare exception i s Harihara's Bhasvatl. a late nineteenth century 
composition. He also composed the so-called Yoga-Karika and a 
Sanskrit tract on PaScas'ikha and other sages which was edited and 
translated by J . GHOSH (1934)* 
To sum up: There i s not only a considerable gap of several 
centuries between the oldest known commentary and Patanjali's Sutra. 
but also an equally real and profound ideological interstice* As 
the chronological distance increased and the Yoga-Sutra became more 
and more removed, the intervening commentaries f i l l e d i n the blanks 
with new material and, as layer upon layer of secondary exposition 
was added, the original became successfully obscured. Although i t i s 
in most cases not possible to determine the exact outlook or bias 
of a commentator, there can be no question that any of the extant 
glosses and sub-glosses can claim unfeigned authenticity i n their 
exposition of the Yoga-Sutra. The 'distortions' of the Yoga-Bhasya 
have proved exceedingly re s i l i e n t , and there i s no certainty even 
that those commentators who offer more self-reliant interpretations 
are any more correct than their less original congeners. Even a 
cursory reading of the commentatorial literature evinces i t s 
basically impaired r e l i a b i l i t y . I do not think i t necessary at 
this stage to introduce evidential details, since some of the data 
w i l l be effectively dealt with in the analytical part and a complete 
documentation l i e s outside the scope of this study. I merely wish 
to observe that the evidence can be grouped under four headings: 
(1) Contradictions within the same text; 
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(2) discrepancies between one text and another; 
(3) the silence of the commentators on v i t a l issues; 
(4) the striking contrasts between the traditional 
expositions and a 'purged* interpretation of the 
Yoga-Sutra on the basis of a text-immanent study 
of i t . 
From what has been said so far i t i s clear that the commentaries, 
however indispensable they may be, have to be taken cum grano s a l i s , 
and that for an adequate comprehension of the Yoga-Sutra i t i s 
imperative to concentrate on the information and cues contained 
i n the Sutra i t s e l f . This i s precisely what F. DEUSSEN (1920*1,510) 
recommended long ago and what f i n a l l y J.W. BAUER (1958) carried out 
i 
more rigorously than any other translator. Despite a l l these misgivings, 
the intrinsic value of the majority of the commentaries i s beyond 
question* Whatever their interpretational credibility may be, they 
were instrumental i n the historical development of the yoga-darsana. 
I n order to be able to detect and assess their individual contri-
bution i t i s essential to study the Yoga-Sutra on i t s own and 
carefully distinguish between the actual data of Patanjali's work 
as brought out by a c r i t i c a l analysis of i t and the material in the 
commentaries. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE YOGA-SUTRA 
The conspicuous chronological and conceptual gap which 
exists between the commentators and Patanjali (or whoever may 
have been responsible for the fi n a l editing of the Yoga-Sutra). 
evidently cancels the very possibility of arriving at an 
authentic understanding of the Yoga-Sutra purely on the basis 
of the exegetical Sanskrit literature. Hence the only way of 
decoding the conceptual edifice of Patanjali.is by means of a 
c r i t i c a l immanent interpretation of his text. In P. DEUSSEN's 
(1920*1,510) words: "We adhere to the principle of gaining a l l 
information as far as possible from the sutras themselves and 
seek the aid of the later expositions only where they f a i l us." 
However, like most translators before and after him, he did not 
really pursue his own strategy with sufficient consistency and 
consequently remained under the powerful influence of Vyasa's 
scholium. P. DEUSSEN hoped to achieve his target with the help 
of textual criticism. Whilst most Indian scholars tended to 
emphasise the coherent architecture of Patanjali's manual, he 
questioned the inner unity of the Yoga-Sutra. regarding i t as 
a composite of several existent texts patched together rather 
, randomly. This he deduced from the contents and i t s peculiar 
arrangement. 
I 
! Thus P. DEUSSEN postulated a number of sutra-texts 
i 
j i 
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which, as he envisioned i t , served contemporaneous schools as vade-
mecums and which were then drawn together by the compiler of the 
vulgate as we know i t * He tentatively suggested the following 
stratigraphy: 
text A 
text B 
text C 
text D 
text E 
1.1 -
I . 17 -
I I . 1 -
11.28 -
IV.1 -
1.16 
I . 51 
I I . 27 
I I I . 55 
15 
IV. 33 5 
p. DEUSSEN's conclusions were renewedly investigated and 
restated by J.W* HAUER (1958) who undertook the most stringent 
analysis of the textual corpus of the Yoga-Sutra hitherto* J.W* 
HAUER i n fact f e l t that already the native Sanskrit exegetists 
had been very much aware of the problematic nature of the composi-
tion of Patanjali's treatise. In this connection he drew attention 
to Vacaspati Misra's opening words to aphorism 11*1: 
nanu prathama-padena-eva sa-upayah sa-avantara-
prabhedah sa-phalo yoga uktas-tat-kim-aparam--, 
avislgyate yad-artham dvitiya-pactah, prarabhveta- ^ ^  
ity-ata aha udrstaMti. abhyasa-vairagye hi yoga-
upayau prathame pada uktau. na ca tau vyutthitasya 
drag-ity-eva sambhavata i t i dvitT^a-pada-upadesyaa-
aVupayan-apeksate sattva-^uddhy-artham. 
15 According to most editions, there are 34 sutras i n chapter IV* 
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This may be translated as follows: 
Objection: The f i r s t chapter £of the Yoga-Sutra J 
having described Yoga with i t s means* subdivisions and 
results, what reason.does there remain for.a second 
chapter to be commenced? Reply: He {"i.e. Vyasa^ answers: 
" I t has been stated |in the f i r s t chapter what Yoga i s 
for one whose mind i s concentrated^." For i n the f i r s t 
chapter practice and diepassion were stated to be the 
two means of Yoga. And since these two do not come into 
being at once for one who i s of out-going mind, he 
requires the means taught in the second chapter i n order 
to purify, the sattva. 
There are similar introductory remarks to the third and fourth pada. 
I f Vacaspati would have entertained any real doubts about the 
authenticity of the various chapters, as J.W. BAUER seems to imply, 
he would certainly have expressed them i n his prologue to the fourth 
chapter which prima facie appears to i n i t i a t e a natural break i n the 
textual continuity.^ Yet Vacaspati accepts the traditional division 
without even the slightest hesitation. 
Admittedly, even a cursory reading of the Yoga-Sutra convinces 
one of the fact that i t cannot possibly be an entirely homogeneous 
composition. As S. DASGUPTA (1930, 51) observes: "An analytic 
16 This i s i n fact not confirmed by an in-depth study of the text. 
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study of the sutras also brings convic t ion that they do not 
show any o r i g i n a l attempt but are a masterly and systematic 
compilat ion, supplemented wi th ce r t a in o r i g i n a l cont r ibu t ions . " 
He i so la tes f o u r fac tors which i n his opinion seem to prove the 
compilatory nature of the t e x t , v i z . 
the Yoga-Sutra i s divided i n t o chapters (pada) 
rather than in to books (adhyaya) and lessons 
(ahnika); 
the highly systematic character o f the f i r s t three 
chapters wi th t h e i r precise d e f i n i t i o n s ; 
the absence of any missionary zeal or polemics; 
the f a c t that a t the end of the t h i r d chapter 
the author wr i tes ' f i n i s * ( i t i ) which i s repeated 
a t the conclusion of the f o u r t h chapter. 
Va l id as these points are i n themselves, they do not amount 
to primary evidence. The most remarkable feature i n favour of the 
hypothet ical compilatory nature of the Yoga-Sutra are the apparent 
d i scon t inu i t i e s i n the t ex tua l arrangement which s t r ike the eye of 
even the most casual reader* But granted that Pa t an j a l i ' s work 
i s a compilat ion of extant aphorisms, how must one proceed to be 
able to separate the various assumed sut ra-uni ts from the accretions 
o f the f i n a l edi tor? I do not th ink that t h i s question has ever 
been faced properly , since none of the previous scholars bothered 
17 
to j u s t i f y his pa r t i cu la r methodology of tex tua l c r i t i c i s m . ' 
17 For the technical aspects o f t ex tua l c r i t i c i s m see J . MACKIE (1947, 
55-80) and also J . WHATHOUGH (1954, 441-446). 
(D 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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Fast scholars, on the whole, proceeded from the assumption 
that the Yoga-Sutra cannot possibly be a s ing le homogeneous t ex tua l 
e n t i t y owing to i t s apparent disorganisation* I n the f o l l o w i n g I 
sha l l commence from the opposite end as i t were by presupposing 
the per fec t homogeneity of the t e x t . I n other words, I s h a l l look 
f o r points which seem to contradic t , or at leas t ser iously challenge, 
t h i s basic working hypothesis. I n t h i s way I hope to avoid the 
f a l l a c y common to a l l attempts of tex tua l c r i t i c i s m so f a r , namely 
to cut more and more s l i ces from the cake u n t i l i t simply vanishes 
out o f sight and nothing but disconnected fragments — quite meaning-
less i n themselves — are l e f t behind* 
Instances of t h i s k ind o f procedure are legend i n Indology. I t 
has been applied to the Bhagavad-Cflta. the Hahabharata and w i t h 
especial success to the Katha-Upanisad which.P* WELLER (1953) 
managed to dissect i n to up to f i f t e e n layers* The contradictory 
resu l t s of t h i s approach are i n d i c a t i v e of i t s i m p l i c i t f a l l a c y * 
i 
I t has, therefore , j u s t l y been questioned by some scholars* For 
instance, B. GONZE (1967, 168) sounds th i s warning: " . . . such 
a n a l y t i c a l studies o f ancient wr i t ings are tedious to compose and 
unat t rac t ive to read, and when car r ied too f a r they threaten t o 
shatter and pulverize the very t e x t which they set out to examine, 
i 
as we have seen i n the case of Homer and the New Testament. n 
i 
Speaking s p e c i f i c a l l y of the Yoga-Sutra* E. FRAD¥AIMER 
(1953* I , 4-39 ) makes t h i s p e r f e c t l y v a l i d po in t : " . . . one 
proceeded wi th the analysis as i f the d i f f e r e n t parts were merely 
strung together and as i f i t would s u f f i c e f o r t he i r separation 
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to simply ascertain the j o i n t s * But things are not as simple 
as t ha t . I n add i t i on to the f a c t that i n such cases the various 
component parts o f t e n had a long h i s to ry of t he i r own and. also 
had undergone considerable a l t e r a t i o n before they were f i n a l l y 
put together, they moreover were subjected to adjustments and 
approximations i n the very process of e d i t i n g . For, the ed i to rs 
were surely not obl ivious t o the many di f ferences and contra-
d ic t ions of the diverse t ex t s , and they t r i e d to remove these 
and thus create a r e a l t ex tua l u n i t y . I t i s t h i s which must be 
taken, in to account i n any genuine analys is . I t i s important 
to recognise these e d i t o r i a l in tervent ions and to grasp the 
o r i g i n a l form of the miscellaneous doctr ines ." 
S t i l l , past t ex tua l c r i t i c i s m has not been completely wasted, 
since i t s ingled out a l l those points which could possibly be 
regarded as r ea l breaks i n the s t ructure of the t e x t . I n the 
f o l l o w i n g I s h a l l re-examine a l l these.proposed ' f i s s u r e ' points 
whi le at the same time keeping a l e r t to other possible j o i n t s 
previously overlooked. Although i t i s f a i r to assume tha t there 
are few Sanskrit t ex t s which have escaped in terpola t ions and 
a l t e ra t ions al together , especial ly i f they belong to an ear ly 
per iod , i t nonetheless seems f u t i l e to consider every sentence 
as suspect. I t must be remembered that the ora l t r a d i t i o n s of Ind ia 
and t h e i r subsequent embodiment i n the shape of actual texts are 
astonishingly r e l i a b l e . The Indians ' healthy respect f o r t r a d i t i o n 
i s w e l l known. 
Thus before one contrives d i s t o r t i o n s , in terpola t ions e t c . , 
30 
one must ask oneself ser iously whether what seems to be. ' c o r r u p t 1 , 
'confused' or 'patched together' i s not merely the resu l t o f 
an unwarranted demand f o r absolute l o g i c a l consistency and r a t i o n a l 
c l a r i t y * symptomatic of our spec i f i c thought pa t t e rn . Our need f o r 
'o rder ' i n the sense of l o g i c a l neatness i s not necessarily shared 
by non-western cultures* That t h i s i s i n f a c t the case has been 
amply demonstrated, 1 th ink , by Social Anthropology, Cross-cultural 
18 
Psychology and cognate d i sc ip l ines* I n other words, what to 
us i s b l a t an t ly incongruous may s t i l l be qui te consistent w i t h i n 
the cogni t ive framework o f the Indians . Especially archaic thought 
operates.far less w i t h dualisms and hence f i n d s i t much easier 
to reconcile contradictions and to uphold paradoxes. Fast t e x t u a l 
c r i t i c i s m has been remarkably b l ind t o t h i s a l l - important i n s i g h t , 
or else i t could not possibly have in s i s t ed on applying the r i g i d 
standards of Ar is to t lean l o g i c so uncompromisingly as to w h i t t l e 
away whole t e x t s . 
I s h a l l now attempt to i d e n t i f y and s ingle put those parts 
of the Yoga-Sutra which d e f i n i t e l y defy the assumed homogeneity 
of t h i s t e x t . I t seem per t inent to base t h i s re-examination of 
the archi tecture of Pa taSja l i ' s composition on a c r i t i q u e o f 
previous endeavours of t ex tua l c r i t i c i s m , and f o r t h i s purpose 
J.W. HAUER's deta i led analysis i s , I t h i n k , the optimum point of 
departure. 
J.W. HAUER (1958, 2 2 1 f f . ) s t a r t s from the premise that the 
p a r a l l e l and divergent treatment of c e r t a i n topics i n the d i f f e r e n t 
18 See, f o r instance, G. MTRDAL (1973, 89-99). 
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chapters i s denotative of the composite character of t h i s work. 
He suggests that the vulgate i s a compendium of several independent 
sutra- texts belonging to various schools which f lou r i shed i n 
diverse h i s t o r i c a l periods. He accordingly divides the vulgate i n t o 
f i v e d i s t i n c t t ex t t r a d i t i o n s : 
(1) nirodha-text : 1.1 1.22 
(2) Isvara-pranidhana-text : I .?3 - 1.51 
(3) kriya-yofia-1ext : 11,1 - 11.27 
(4) yoga-anga-text : 11,28 - I I I . 5 5 
(5) n i rmana-ci t ta- text 3 IV.1 - IV.34 
J.W. HAUER regards the yoga-anga section as the oldest por t ion 
of the Yoga-Sutra and a t t r ibu tes i t to the grammarian P a t a n j a l i . 
He o f f e r s two reasons f o r assigning t h i s section to such an early 
date. The f i r s t i s that the yoga-aflga t e x t contains several important 
features i n nuce as i t were which were l a t e r on elaborated i n the 
other sections (e .g . the item of Isvara-pranidhana and the klesa 
doc t r i ne ) . The second reason i s that unl ike the other (a l legedly 
l a t e r ) sections, the yoga-anga por t ion does not show any buddhist 
in f luence . Here one may argue that i t also contains hardly any 
theore t ica l mater ia l on which one could study the possible impact 
of Buddhism. J.W. HAUERS's a sc r ip t ion of t h i s section to the grammarian 
M . 1 Q 
Pa tan ja l i i s possible but u n l i k e l y . 
19 On p . 238 J.W. HAUER strangely contradicts himself: " I ch glaube 
die Verfasserschaft des Grammatikers Pa tan ja l i f u r den yoganga-Text 
des TS kommt nach den vorausgehenden Darlegungen e m s t l i c h i n Frage.. 
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Since, according to J.W* HAUER, the yoga-anga text does not 
consider ce r t a in s i g n i f i c a n t aspects of Yoga, f u r t h e r sutras were 
added to supplement i t , such as the Tsvara-pranidhana section 
belonging, i n his view, to the Rudra-s 'iva-Visnu adherents* 
the kri.va-.yoga section per ta in ing to those groups of vogins 
who were more i n c l i n e d to the brahmanioal t r a d i t i o n , and s t i l l 
l a t e r the nirmana-ci t ta t e x t . These were then assembled and supplied 
w i t h a preface, the so-called nirodha t e x t . As J.W. BAUER sees i t , 
t h i s f i n a l ed i t i ng occurred some time i n the fou r th century A.D. 
This h i s t o r i c a l reconstruction i s almost too neat t o be convincing, 
and i n f a c t J.W. HAUER lacks: the mater ia l evidence to back up 
his inferences. 
I t i s t rue tha t the Yoga-Sutra displays a cer ta in lack of 
methodical treatment. But must t h i s necessarily point to a many-
layered composition of the nature J .W. HAUER advocates? A more 
candid and less reduc t ion i s t i c reading of the t ex t evinces that 
the d i f f e r e n t sections are f a r too coordinated to allow the 
deduction that they are of completely independent o r i g i n s . Rather 
i t seems tha t the apparent incongrui t ies are due to the f a c t tha t 
the Yoga-Sutra leans on already ex i s t ing yogio t r ad i t i ons and 
p a r t l y incorporates the ideas and terminology of these e a r l i e r 
creat ions . J.W. BAUER'S so lu t ion i s also imperfect insofa r as i t 
does not provide a sa t i s fac tory answer to the question, posed by 
J.W.HAUER himself , as to why a 'superior Yoga guru ' should have 
arranged these independent texts i n such an haphazard manner. 
I n J.W. BAUER'S opinion, the f i r s t pada i s a composite of 
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two distinct units* The f irst twenty-two aphorisms are, according 
to him. some kind of an introduction to the vulgate and originally 
had the function of defining certain psychological and philosophical 
termini, the central concept being nirodha. He takes this to be 
the key concept of these prefatory sutraa* and wrongly identifies 
_ 20 
nirodha with the terminal type of samadhi* As will be shown in 
the semantic analysis of this important concept* nirodha has several 
levels of application* and the definition "Yoga is the restriction 
of the consciousness fluctuations'1 (l*2; yogas-citta-vrtti-nirodhah) j 
must be understood as a preliminary one* 
J*W. HAUER thinks that the editor of the vulgate, whom he also 
holds responsible for the composition of the nirodha section, used 
the isVara-nranidhana material as his starting-point precisely because 
he could not find any better text in which the central term of his 
own contribution, viz* nirodha. had a more decisive position: sutra 
r*51 equates sarva-nirodha or 'total restriction1 with nixbl.la-
samadhi or 'seedless enstasy'• J.W* BAUER's reasoning holds good f 
only as long as (a) there is merely one type of nirodha, namely sarva-
nirodha. and (b) sutra 1*23 really stands in no immediate relation to 
the preceding aphorism* He is wrong on both counts* As I will set 
forth in the semantic part nirodha has three strata, which leaves 
the second point for consideration* 
Even though J.W* HAUER quite correctly recognises the intrinsic 
theistic nature of Yoga, he somehow fails to utilise tills momentous 
20 See J.W. HAUER ( 1 9 5 8 , 463, fn.1)-
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f i n d i n g i n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Yoga-Sutra. The pract ice of 
T^vara-pranidhana i s mentioned f o u r times i n the t ez t ( l .23, I I . 1 , 
11.32 and 11.45). Thus, f o l l o w i n g J.W. HAUER's segmentation, i t 
appears once i n the Isvara-pranidhana sect ion, once i n the kriya-yoga 
par t and twice i n the yoga-anga t e x t . 
I n the last-mentioned section i t i s counted as a const i tuent 
of niyama and i s defined i n 11.45 as conducive to samadhi-siddhi. 
J.W. HAUER, misunderstanding t h i s c r u c i a l compound, translates i t 1-, 
w i t h 'Vollkommenheit der E infa l tung ' (per fec t ion o f enstasy). \ 
J .H. WOODS (1966 J) and G. JHA (1907) have s imi l a r renderings, v i z . • 
' p e r f ec t i on of concentration' and 'accomplishment of meditat ion ' 
respect ively . The term siddhi i s thus given the meaning of ' p e r f e c t i o n ' , 
but i t can also be taken i n the sense o f ' a t ta inment ' , as f o r example, 
R. ERASADA (1912) and SHREE FURORTT SWAMI (1938) f u l l y r ea l i s ed . 
As a matter of f a c t t h i s appears to be the more credible rendering. 
As i s borne out by the h i s to ry of Yoga, a t least i n i t s hindu 
form, Is*vara always played a s ighal r o l e i n yogic contexts . The 
yogins experienced him as a powerful e n t i t y whose 'grace' (anugraha) 
was an absolute prerequis i te f o r obtaining samadhi. Hence the 
organic i n t e r r e l a t i o n of meditative absorption and prayer i n pre-
c l a s s i ca l Yoga. Even i n contemporary Yoga, which i s h igh ly inf luenced 
by the non-dualist branch of Vedanta, devotion to a personi f ied 
supreme being i s regarded as a x i a l to the attainment of samadhi. 
- 21 Bamana Maharsi's a t t i t u d e on t h i s issue i s paradigmatic. 
21 See also the in t e re s t ing footnote by A.K. MAJUMDAR (1968, 85, f n . 5 ) : 
"Commenting on Yoga-SHtra 1.24 the Emperor Cking Bhoja"] wr i t e s 
prakrti-puruaa-aaijiyoga-viyogayor-I^vara-iccha vyatirekena-anupapatteb 
(etc!.) 
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With the r e a l i s a t i o n of the c e n t r a l i t y of the b e l i e f i n 
Isvara , much of the s t rength of J.W. HAUER'a conclusions about the 
so-called Is'vara-pranidhana section i s dispersed. Granted tha t 
'devotion to the l o r d ' was already a t the time of the a l legedly 
older yoga-anga section regarded as categorical to the 
a t t a i n m e n t o f samadhi and that therefore i t d id not 
(as J.W. HAUER supposes) stand i n t h i s t e x t i n a subordinate place, 
i t i s not r e a l l y convincing that the Isvara-pranidhana t e x t should 
cons t i tu te the 'manifesto ' o f an independent school of Yoga which 
emphasised proper 'devotion to the l o r d ' . 
J.W. HAUER's i n t e rp re t a t i on i s opposed by yet another import-
ant f a c t . To j u s t i f y the assumed independence.of the Isvara-
pranidhana sect ion, he has to l i n k up antra 1*23 w i th 1.12 and t o 
put 'devotion to the l o r d ' on a par w i th abhyasa and vairagya by 
conjectur ing that the word ya o f 1.25 r e f e r s back to nirodha. But 
t h i s l ink -up of 1.25 w i t h 1.12 has been re jec ted already by D. 
LAUENSTEIN (1943), though J.W. HAUER (1958, 462, f n . 1 l ) r ebuf f s his 
objections without however supplying sound reasons f o r i t . J.W. 
HAUER translates 1.23 thus: "Or [n i rodha^ can be achieved by 
devotion to the l o r d . " Yet to put t h i s important gnostic pract ice 
on the same l e v e l w i th abhyasa and vairagya i s t o t a l l y misleading, 
f o r these two concepts r e fe r to the dual axis of any type of Yoga, 
as w i l l be made d e a r i n the semantic p a r t . 
( f n . 21 c t d . ) 
( . . ^ A c c o r d i n g to the ed i to r fR.S.Bhattacharya] , the Emperor was wrong 
i n h is estimation of I svara ' s power ( in t roduc t ion , p .16) , but l a t e Mr. 
Kalipada Guha Roy, a famous Yogin, assured me tha t the Emperor was 
qui te r i g h t . " 
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Rather i t appears that IsNrara-pranidhana must be understood 
as one of the elements of abhyasa or 'practice*,. the pos i t ive axis 
of the b i -po l a r path of Yoga* I t may now be asked i n what.connection 
1*23 r e a l l y stands to the preceding aphorisms* One o f J.W. HAUER's 
reasons f o r connecting 1*23 w i t h 1.12 i s that the l a t t e r sut ra 
can explain the ab la t ive employed i n the former* But there i s no 
compelling grammatical reason f o r th i s* Besides, there i s also 
an ab la t ive i n 1*17. As a ca re fu l examination of the aphorisms 
immediately preceding 1*23 bears out , T 3 vara-pranidhaaa has to be 
re la ted t o 1.17-1*20* I n 1.17 the f o u r forms of samprajaata-aamadhi 
are mentioned; 1.18 i s a reference to aaampra.inata-samadhi. 
J.W* HAUER completely misinterprets the l a t t e r sutrat "The 
other k ind of con t ro l j ~ i . e . nirodfaaj has as i t s precondition the 
exercise of the idea of cessation and has only an ac t iva to r residuum. 
As i t stands t h i s t rans la t ion i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . The compound virama-
pratrava-abhvaW-purvah i s preferably to be rendered as "the. 
cessation of [jail] presented-ideas i n the former pract ice j ^ i . e . 
i n samprajnata-samadhil1 1 * This aphorism has. i n c i d e n t a l l y , also not 
been qui te understood by Vyasa, whose usage of s a r v a - v r t t i implies 
that he equates pratyaya wi th v r t t i , which i s incor rec t . Vacaspati 
of course makes the same mistake, but Harihara in te rpre t s co r r ec t ly : 
viramasya aarva-pratvaya-hinatayah. 
1.17-1*20 are references to various means of reaching the 
22 J.W* HAUER's own words, are: "Me andere A r t der Bewaltigung hat 
zur Vbraussetzung das Uben in .der Vorstel lung vom Aufhoren und hat 
nur noch einen Bewirker-Rest." 
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condit ion o f samadhi ( i n i t s several grades and types) . 1.23 
makes out 'devotion to the l o r d ' as one of these implements* I t s 
superior pos i t ion among these means i s apparent f rom the d e f i n i t i o n 
of Isvara by which i t i s followed* This whole complex is.succeeded 
by the enunciation of a series of other s imi l a r methods f o r e f f e c t i n g 
the state o f inner calm (citta-nrasadana), such as the regula t ion 
of exhalation and the f i x a t i o n of the mind, etc . When a l l 
psychomental o sc i l l a t i ons have come to a perfec t s t a n d s t i l l , 
the ground i s prepared f o r the experience of samapatti or 'coincidence' 
This process w i l l be examined separately* 
On the basis of the above considerations, J.W* HAUER's 
proposi t ion o f the compound nature of the f i r s t chapter must be 
abandoned* The evidence adduced so f a r points rather to the 
unimpaired organic un i ty of the series of sutras 1*1-1*55* I f there 
are any in te rpo la t ions a t a l l , i t must f r a n k l y be admitted that 
these can no longer be ascertained* 
The main problems inherent i n the f i r s t pada were also studied 
i n some d e t a i l by the Czech scholar A. J A N I C E K ( 1 9 5 4 * 7 0 f f . ) , whose 
p r i n c i p a l arguments and hypotheses w i l l be dealt w i t h presently* 
A f t e r g iv ing a b r i e f account of p rev ious . e f fo r t s in .deciphering 
the t ex tua l pa t te rn of the Yoga-Sutra. A . JANX£EK poses the f o l l o w i n g 
question: "The isvarapranidhana tex t i s supposed to be a s e l f -
contained w r i t i n g o f one Yoga movement* The questions that remain 
3 t i l l unsolved are: Where does th i s t e x t ac tua l ly s t a r t a t , what 
was the manner i n which the Buddhist sraddha etc*, m a i t r i e t c . , 
became par t of the t e x t , what i s the true f u n c t i o n of the 
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i B* var apranidhana mot hod i n the t e x t , and a host of other 
23 
problems.. ." 
Although A . JANICIEK remonstrates against his predecessors' 
method of breaking the t e x t up in to so many ' o r i g i n a l ' texts on 
the strength of mere tex tua l analysis and although he instead 
prefers to asoertain f i r s t the nature, type and character of the 
diverse Yoga schools which may be represented i n the Yoga-Sutra, 
he nonetheless p r a c t i c a l l y commits the same error, as those who 
went before him when he states that "the tex t o f 1.23 t i l l 1.29.(and 
may be t i l l 1.31) discusses completely one whole Yoga school" 2 ^. 
Furthermore, h i s endeavour to "keep i n focus" the aphorisms 
I .20-1.22 (wi th t he i r leading terms samvega and sraddha-vlrya-
smrti-samadhi-pra.ina) does not add more power of convict ion to t h i s 
renewed fragmentation of the t e x t . 
Leaving aside f o r the moment the arguments l a i d down above 
against such a d i v i s i o n and also the f a c t of the extreme brev i ty 
of the thus i so la ted u n i t , A. J A N J & E K ' S proposed Isvara-TMranidhana 
t e x t lacks the most important ingredient of any t r ea t i se on Yoga 
which could possibly claim to be self -contained, v i z . a pronouncement 
regarding the goal of the pa r t i cu la r yogic path which i t represents. 
For, surely, the aphorism 1.28 can hardly be taken as a 
statement o f the ul t imate terminus of the path out l ined i n the 
preceding sutras. p a r t i c u l a r l y since 1.29 states qui te unequivocally 
23 A. JAJfACBK (1954, 78) 
24 A. JAMGEK (1954, 79 ) . The author, f o r obvious reasons, wavers 
considerably i n f i x i n g the prec i se length of t h i s sect ion. 
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"Thence [ r e s u l t s J the attainment of the in- turned consciousness and 
also the disappearance of the obstacles", which aphorism A* JANACEK 
himself s t i l l counts to the Ss'vara-pranidhana section* I t i s 
obvious from th i s sutra that the attainment of which i t speaks 
i s but a t r a n s i t i o n a l stage i n the protracted process of yogic 
i n v o l u t i o n . 
This may be an opportune point to glance at the term bhavana 
occurring i n 1.28. As A. JANACEK a p t l y observes t h i s technical word 
appears i n the Yoga-Sutra inva r i ab ly i n the immediate v i c i n i t y of 
the compound Ssvara-pranidhana, and hence i t seems a f a i r assumption 
that i t should have a consistent meaning i n a l l four oases. I t 
occurs i n the shape of the f o l l o w i n g compounds: 
tad-artha-bhavanam (l*28) 
aamadhi-bhavana-0 ( l i . 2 ) 
pratipaksa-bhavanam (11*33, 11*34) 
I t can be taken to s i g n i f y the idea of ' r e a l i s a t i o n , c u l t i v a t i o n , 
e f f e c t i n g ' throughout. vacaspati Hisra (on 1*28) explains the term 
bhavana as the "entering [or settling-down]] again and again i n t o 
the mind" (bhavanam punah punas-citte nivesanam). A. JANACEK para-
phrases t h i s concept by "quantiat ive increase, i n other words a 
25 
•gradation o f i n t e n s i t y ' " J — a t y p i c a l example of his d i a l e c t i c a l 
approach and terminology which he i s keen to apply wherever possible* 
Vacaspati*s i n t e rp re t a t i on i s corroborated by Vyasa who makes i t 
25 See A . J A N J I C E K (1954, 82) 
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p l a i n that the r"|apa and bhavana of om combined lead to the one-
point edness of the mind and not to kaivalya s t ra igh t away. A. 
JAKACEK's i n t e rp re t a t i on of bhavana as an instance of abhyaaa, which 
he defines as ' e f f o r t ' (yatna) or 'a manifestat ion of v o l i t i o n * 7 ( i o c h a , 
v l r y a , utsaha), i s qui te sound. Yet his emphasis on the 1 volun ta r -
i s t i c ' feature of Tsvara-pranidhana and nirodha i s exaggerated. 
Moreover, i t makes l i t t l e sense to s p l i t the t ex t between 1.28 
and 1.29 or even between 1*31 and 1.32 as he does, f o r the l i n e of 
thought i n t h i s passage i s absolutely continuous. One may possibly 
concede to the f a c t that the aphorisms I.23-1.32 const i tute a u n i t 
of t h e i r own without , however, assuming tha t t h i s must of necessity 
be of the nature of a separate tex t a l together . Clear ly , i f one 
i n s i s t s on a r i g i d l y t i g h t concatenation of ideas i n the presentation 
of the subject-matter, the Yoga-Sutra, l i k e any other piece of w r i t i n g 
— wi th the possible exception of some rigorous works on log i c or 
mathematics — could be divided in to any number of sub-texts . 
Although scholars l i k e J.W.HAUER (1958) and A. JANA^EK (1954) — 
tr iggered o f f by the word va o f 1.23 — are preoccupied wi th f i g u r i n g 
out the nature of the re la t ionship between section I.23-1.31 and the 
so-called nirodha t ex t ( I .1 -1 . 22 ) , they take no notice of the 
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aphorisms sueceding 1.31. Or else they would rea l i se that section 
I.34-1.40 delineates various ways of s t a b i l i s i n g the inner world , i . e . 
of achieving the r e s t r i c t i o n (nirodha) of the f l uc tua t i ons of the mind. 
There are also connective pa r t i c l e s ( i . e . va ' o r ' ) i n 1.34, 1.35, 1*36, 
1*37, 1*38 and 1.39. Applying the yards t ick of previous researchers, 
these sutras should a l l have the status of independent t ex t s ! Also, 
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the argument that the section on I^vara-pranidhana (I.23-1.32) 
i s more e x p l i c i t does not warrant the conclusion tha t i t must 
therefore be an i n t e r p o l a t i o n . Rather i t seems preferable and 
wholly consistent to regard i t as conclusive evidence of the 
paramount importance of Isvara i n Classical Yoga. 
F i n a l l y , A. JANA&EK inadvertent ly re inforces the present 
argumentation when he advances his hypothesis of the common basis 
of the so-cal led nirodha tex t and the Isvara^pranidhana sec t ion . 
Both passages, he points out, have abhyasa and nirodha as t he i r 
cent ra l terms. He considers the type of Yoga out l ined i n the 
nirodha par t as a reform of the Isvara school of Yoga under the 
pressure of buddhist thought. This assumption i s f a l l a c i o u s , f o r 
A. JAlticEK thereby means to imply that there can be a Yoga without 
renunciation or vairagya, namely h is ' v o l u n t a r i s t i c type* as 
represented i n the Isvara-pranidhana sect ion. I am not aware of 
any scr ip ture w i t h i n the f o l d of Hinduism which would not emphasise 
the f a c t that without dispassion or renunciation ( i n t e r n a l or 
external) the goal of Yoga i s unattainable. 
I n another paper, A. JANA&EK (1958, 88-100), a f t e r a c r i t i c a l 
comparison of the vocabulary o f the various ' t e x t s ' of the Yoga-
Sutra, introduces the idea that the nirodha sect ion i s a pre-
requ i s i t e f o r the t h i r d chapter and tha t therefore the nirodha-yoga 
26 
and the e i g h t f o l d path (asta-a&ga-yoga) are 'interdependent' • Yet 
despite envisaging ce r ta in basic connections between the nirodha 
26 See A. JANACEK (1958, 98) 
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sect ion, the Isvara-pranidhana part and the asta-aftga-yoga t ex t s , 
he nonetheless a l igns himself w i th J.W. HAUER (1958), F . DEUSSEN 
(l920^l)and others i n maintaining a p r i o r i the separateness of these 
por t ions . Consequently i t i s not su rpr i s ing to f i n d that much of 
what A. JANACEK adduces as supporting his own views i s ac tua l ly 
only a travesty of the f a o t s . 
A good example of t h i s k ind of unconscious misreading o f the 
Yoga-Sutra i s his not ion o f the various ' s t a r t i n g poin ts ' of these 
supposedly independent schools of Yoga represented "by the three 
sections mentioned above. Thus according to him the concept of v i t a r k a 
or 'unwholesome de l i be ra t i on ' provides the s t a r t i ng point of the 
yoga-anga sect ion, whi l s t the doctrine of klesa f u l f i l l s the same 
f u n c t i o n i n the kriya-yoga t e x t , and i n the Isvara-oranidhana part 
i t i s the concept of antaraya or 'hindrance' which serves as 
a sui table t r i g g e r . I n the nirodha t e x t , one must add, the not ion of 
v r t t i appears to have an analogous pos i t i on , provided of course that 
A. JANACEK'a reasoning were sound. 
But t h i s neat arrangement i s only apparently consistent wi th the 
data. Looked at more c lose ly , i t becomes evident that he disregards 
ce r ta in important aspects. F i r s t of a l l , his c l a s s i f i c a t i o n does not 
take in to account that the 'hindrances' mentioned i n I .29-1.30 are 
ac tua l ly in t ima te ly l i nked wi th the process of d i s c i p l i n i n g the 
mental f l uc tua t ions ( v r t t i ) . Sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, 
s l o t h , d i s s ipa t ion , f a l s e v i s i o n , non-attainment of the stages of 
meditat ive absorption and i n s t a b i l i t y on these stages — a l l forms 
of antaraya — are most c losely associated wi th any yogio path 
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and can only really be understood i n their function with regard 
to the control of the mental oscillations* On what grounds should 
the l i s t of 'obstacles' (I.29-1.30) be regarded as giving out a 
system of categories entirely unique to the Tsvara-pranidhana 
school? I t seems to me that the items cited i n these aphorisms 
must be considered as recognised symptoms of fa i l u r e within 
the framework of any yogic path. Conversely, i t i s unlikely that 
they should have been selected and turned into full-fledged 
doctrines by the protagonists of the Tavara-pranidhana school of 
Yoga. 
I t i s also not patent why the concept of ant aray a should 
parallel that of vitarka. Whereas the 'obstacles' are connected 
with the yogin's subjective endeavour to pacify his mind, the 
'unwholesome deliberations' pertain to his moral behaviour. The 
aphorism 11.34 leaves no doubt about this when i t associates 
vitarka with the opposite of non-harming, truthfulness, non-
stealing, chastity and greedlessness. 
J.W. BAUER (1958) i s on t h i s issue at least one step ahead 
of A. JANACEK (1958), for his version of the Ssvara-pranidhana 
text does not abruptly terminate with 1*32, but extends to the 
end of the f i r s t chapter. Ear from forming an insular entity the 
complex of aphorisms on T^vara-pranidhana i s closely connected 
with the remainder of the f i r s t pada. Thus the expression c i t t a -
prasadana (l . 2 3 ) can safely be taken as a synonym of nirodha, and 
the subsequent aphorisms expound various alternative means of 
steadying the mind. Finally, I.42-1.51 definitely refer back to, 
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and constitute a detailed exposition of, the sutras I.17-1.18. 
These findings point a l l i n the same direction. They demand 
the recognition of the f i r s t chapter as a consistent and self-
contained thematic unit* I t s traditional t i t l e , sajaadhi^pada, i s 
perhaps not quite as arbitrary as one might be tempted to think. 
I t can be said to give a reasonably complete and satisfactorily 
clear outline of the principal mechanisms of Yoga, specifically 
the nirodha state. 
The second chapter opens with a definition of kriya-yoga 
which previous scholars have taken to be the commencement of an 
entirely new and independent treatise and not merely as the 
beginning of a new chapter. Following the lead of P. DEUSSEtT (1920® , l ) 
both J.W. BAUER (1958) and A. JjftA&K (1954) assign to.this, 
allegedly autonomous text the series of sutras from I I .1-11.27. 
According to them, these aphorisms expound a different kind of 
conceptual tradition and consequently also employ a vocabulary 
which i s distinct from that of the preceding sutras. However, 
assuming the unmitigated homogeneity of the Yoga-Sutra as demanded 
by the c r i t e r i a specified i n the present methodological programme, 
how much weight do these arguments bear? Is the vocabulary and 
the conceptual milieu of the kriya-yoga text really independent 
from the f i r s t pada? For the time being I am not concerned with 
the v a l i d i t y of the hypothetical terminal point of this 'text' 
(viz. 11.27), but I propose to accept i t pro tempore i n order to 
develop my counter-arguments against such a division. 
Probably the most striking point that can be, and indeed has 
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been, cited i n favour of the autonomy of the kriya-yoga section is 
the fact that sutra I I . 1 constitutes what appears to be an 
independent definition of a particular type of Toga which i s i n 
contrast with the definition given i n sutra 1.2. But this carries 
far less weight than appears prima facie. One would expect a new 
chapter to commence with a suitable introductory statement epitomising 
the material to be proffered to the reader. I n the present case 
this consists i n a concise typological definition of the Yoga under 
discussion* The question i s whether this definitional statement i s 
i n dissonance with the definition of Yoga as submitted i n 1.2, or 
whether both.definitions have to be regarded as interrelated 
declarations* 
The l a t t e r explanation i s the more viable one, for the follow-
ing reasons. As I have pointed out already the definition of 1.2 
cannot be deemed more than a prefatory statement of the i n i t i a l 
function of yogic practice, and I have also drawn.attention to the 
multi-level application of the concept of nirodha. This i n i t s e l f 
would seem to vindicate the view that (a) the nirodha 'text' (1.1-
1*23) is Incomplete and that (b) there i s every j u s t i f i c a t i o n for 
further definitions, which either may be more comprehensive than the 
f i r s t one or else concern a different aspect of the path. The f i r s t 
point has been dealt with already. S t i l l , the argument can be modified 
i f one accepts the homogeneity of the f i r s t chapter* In that case 
i t could be argued that the quasi-definition of 1.2 finds i t s 
completion i n 1.51 where the expression sarva-nirodha i s found. 
This objection can only be answered i n connection with the 
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second point. For, even though the outline of Yoga provided i n the 
f i r s t chapter i s i n i t s e l f sufficient, i t treats merely of a specific 
aspect of the.yogic path but cannot be said to represent a f u l l 
picture of i t * The aamadhi-pada makes every impression of being 
an introduction only. There i s an important formal difference 
between the definition of 1.2 and that of I I . 1 . Whereas 1.2 entails 
a functional statement concerning the (preliminary) purpose of 
Yoga, I I . 1 i s a statement about the componential features of the 
yogic path by which the purpose stated i n the immediately following 
aphorism (viz. II.2) can be realised. Thus from purely formal 
considerations, 1.2 and I I . 2 belong to the same category, while.— 
as w i l l be shown i n detail — I I . 1 i s of the same type as 11.28-
11.29. In contrast with 1.2 which defines the preliminary goal — 
i.e. the pacification of the quivering mind —» I I . 2 concerns the 
subtle mechanisms underlying this operation, viz. the 'attenuation 
of the causes-of-affliction 1 (klela-tanukarana) which has as i t s 
overt correlate the 'realisation of enstasy* (samadhi-bhavana). 
Thus, rather than deeming the definitions of 1.2 and 11.1-11.2 
as mutually exclusive, one i s led to the conclusion that they are 
i n fact complementary enunciations. This demolishes one of the 
points advanced i n support of the alleged independence of the kriya-
yoga section. 
The second point, which asserts the autonomy of the vocabulary 
employed i n this part, stands on equally shaky foundations. For, 
what appear* to be terminological divergencies can readily be 
explained by the simple fact that the subject-matter i s bound to 
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determine to a certain extent the vocabulary i n which i t i s 
embedded. And there can be l i t t l e doubt that the topics discussed 
i n the second chapter are not only different from those of the 
f i r s t chapter but are also more complex and hence demand a select 
phraseology. This very obvious circumstance does not seem to 
have occurred to past researchers, who were remarkably oblivious 
to such evidence as contradicted their pet theory about the composite 
nature of the Yoga-Sutra. As might be expected, they f a i l to 
qualify their summary statements about the peculiarity of the 
terminology of this 'text* i n relation to the vocabulary used i n 
the f i r s t pada. No specific instances are given.which one could 
examine and pass judgement on. Their arguments can safely be 
assigned to the realm of impressionistic speculation. 
On the other hand, there are certain points of contact which 
evince the intimate l i n k between the f i r s t chapter and the so-called 
kriya-yoga section of the second chapter* This l i n k i s not merely 
an accidental one, resulting from a thoughtful juxtaposition and 
matching of two independent texts possibly by eliminating blatant 
contradictions at the hand of a clever editor. On the contrary, i t 
reveals a fundamental structural coherence which simply could not 
have been thus •manufactured'• 
These significant points of contact are the following: 
(1) The. central concept of the krjya-yoga section, viz* 
klesa. i s clearly implied i n 1*5 which uses the 
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perfect passive participle of the verbal root 
A/kits' »to be a f f l i c t e d ' , both i n the affirmative 
and the negative sense, as k l i s t a and akliata. 
Also, i n 1*24 the term klesa i t s e l f i s found. 
Asmita. one of the klesas according to I I . 3 » i s 
mentioned already i n 1.17 as one of the component 
features of samprarinata-samadhi. 
Another key concept of the kriya-yoga section i s 
duhkha (see I I . 5 , I I . 8 , II.15-11.16) which makes i t s 
appearance also i n 1.31 and 1.33. Especially I I . 5 and 
1.33 i n v i t e comparison. 
The concept of drastr. f i r s t referred to i n 1.3, i s 
also to be met with i n 11.17 and 11.20. 
The concept of raga appears both i n I I . 3 , I I . 7 and i n 
1.37. 
The important aphorism 11.11 i n a way qualifies the 
definition of Yoga given i n 1.2. 
The a f f i l i a t e d concepts of karman. vipaka and asaya 
which hold a prominent place i n the kriya-yoga text 
are clearly present i n 1.24; their appearance i n 11.12 
etc. can be interpreted as being due to the desire 
of the author to develop these important concepts. 
Likewise, the term samskara is used already i n 1.18 and 
1.50. 
The term pratyaya occurs f i r s t i n 1.10, 1.18-1.19 and 
then again i n 11.20. 
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(10) The term prajna offers another l i n k . I t appears 
i n 1=20, I.48-1.49 and then i n 11.27. Especially 
1.48 and 11.27 seem to be olosely associated. 
These findings permit the conclusion that the so-called kriya-
yoga text i s i n fact a continuation of the f i r s t chapter. I t 
elaborates certain ideas and concepts which are implied i n the 
f i r s t pada but for obvious reasons are not treated i n depth. 
That i n the course of this further exposition the author should have 
introduced several new terms and concepts i s but natural. Among 
these newcomers are terms l i k e sakti ( I I . 6 ) , pratiprasava ( l l . 1 0 ) , 
narinama ( l l . l 5 ) f drsya (II.17, 11.18, 11.21), samyoga (II.17, 11.23, 
11.25), the rare word bhoga (II.18), vifega, avisesa (ll.19)» 
-linga-matra (II.19), ali&ga ( l l . 1 9 ) t drsi-matra ( I I . 2 0 ) , sya, svami 
( I I . 2 3 ) , viveka-khyati (11.26). However, none of these terminological 
novelties contradicts any of the previous conceptual elaborations. 
Most of them are synonyms of terms introduced already i n the f i r s t 
chapter. The rest can be understood as a linear continuation of the 
material of the f i r s t pada. 
This overwhelming evidence allows but one conclusion, namely 
that far from being an interpolated piece, the kriya-yoga section 
is consistent with the thought and language.of the f i r s t chapter and 
hence i s an integral part of the Yoga-Sutra. 
I t must now be asked i n what manner the kriya-yoga section, which 
for the sake of the argument was taken to end with 11.27, i s related 
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to the subsequent body of aphorisms. This brings us to the 
consideration of the so-called yoga-aftga text. 
Previous interpreters are i n unanimous agreement i n two 
respects, namely that (a) the continuity of the text matter comes 
to an abrupt end after 11.27 and that (b) 11.28 i n i t i a t e s an 
entirely self-contained text, the so-called yoga-anga section. 
One may easily concede to both points. For, 11.28 does i n fact 
disrupt the hitherto f a i r l y homogeneous and consistent textual 
presentation. Nor can i t be denied that the relevant complex 
of aphorisms drawn together under the heading of yoga-anga i s 
not only from the viewpoint of the content but also from purely 
terminological considerations incongruent with the preceding 
material. 
As I have intimated above, the sutras II.28-11.29 offer 
a quasi-definition of Yoga which is formally akin to the definition 
found at the outset of the second chapter where the constituents 
of kriya-yoga are named (see I I . 1 - I I . 2 ) . I t appears highly 
unlikely that i n a continuously written text one would fi n d such 
an obvious break i n the treatment of the subject-matter, and one 
could expect a far smoother transition from one topic to the other. 
11.28 entails three interrelated semantic units, viz. (a) yoga-
anga-anusthana. (b) asuddhi-ksaya and (c) jnarta-dlpti. to which 
must be added a fourth unit which, on closer analysis, i s evidently 
a later addition: (d) a viveka-khyati. These four units stand i n 
a causal relation to each other. From (a) the performance of the 
various members of Yoga results (b) the dwindling of the impurities 
which, i n turn, occasions (c) a flash of gnosis which leads (d) 
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up to the level of the vision of discernment. From thi s emerge 
at least three conspicuous points: 
('1) The use of the word anusfhana rather than abhyasa; 
(2) the use of the term d l p t i nowhere else employed i n 
the Yoga-Sutra; 
(3) the rare use of the connective particle a meaning 
•up to'• 
I t i s indeed rather surprising that none of the past researchers 
has remarked on the strange position of the.phrase a viveka-khyati 
which i s certainly suspect i n this aphorism. 
The term .iflana occurs i n 1.8 (mithya- 0), 1.9 (|abda-°), 1.38 
(svapna-nidra-0), 1.42 (sabda-artha-°) i n the straight forward sense 
of 'knowledge' without any gnostic implications. On the other hand, 
the term pra.lna definitely stands for 'gnosis', e.g. in 1.20 
(samadhi-0). I.48 (rtam-bhara-0), 11.27 (pranta-bhumi-0) and even 
i n 1.49 (sruta-anumana-0). Yet i n the compound .jnaha-dlpti, the 
word .Tnana unquestionably has a gnostic significance. I t may 
be objected that this i s purely coincidental and that i n one other 
case at least (vivekafcjnana: I I I . 5 2 , III. 5 4 ) .1nana i s given a gnostic 
slant, but this isolated usage can be explained from the fact that 
•inana i s used extensively i n this particular stretch of the text 
(e.g. I I I . 1 6 - I I I . 1 9 t I I I . 2 2 , in.25-in.28, 111.35) i n the sense of 
'knowledge'. 
The reason for the editor's addition of the phrase a viveka-
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khyati i s not far too seek. For, he uses this core concept last ' 
. 2 7 i n 11.26. I t i s significant that i n the yoga-anga section proper 
neither the term viveka nor the term khyati occurs other than i n 
11.28. This very simple addition ingeniously bridges the consider-
able gap between the yoga-anga section (whatever i t s exact length 
may be) and the preceding portion of the Yoga-Sutra. 
11.28 and 11.29 belong together. Whilst the former i s a 
functional definition similar to 1.2 (prefatory) and I I . 2 (advanced), 
the l a t t e r i s a componential definition similar to I I . 1 • The 
self-containedness of the yoga-anga section i s , moreover, borne out 
by the fact that the three components of kriya-yoga — viz. tanas, 
svadhyaya and Is'vara-prarddhana — are a l l l isted i n the yoga-anga 
text (see 11*32) as members of niyama. There they are mentioned 
together with sauca and samtosa. This series i s evidently i n contrast 
with the enumeration of I I . 1 . Furthermore, there is also the 
circumstance of the absence of any reference to klesa but the 
definite mention of lob ha, krodha and moha i n 11.34. 
Essentially the yoga-anga section consists of definitions of 
the eight components of aata-anga-yoga and their sub-divisions. 
I n other words, i t i s a purely technical section with v i r t u a l l y no 
philosophical matter, unless one agrees with J.W. HAUER's (1958) 
and A. JANA&EK's (1954) versions of this 'text' which, according to 
them, extends right to the end of the t h i r d chapter. No adequate 
27 I add 'proper' because this interpolated section i s , as I intend 
to show, much shorter than J.W. BAUER (1958) and A. JANA^ EK (1954) 
propose. In i t s main body i t does not extend beyond I I I . 3 . 
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reasons are supplied by either scholar, and i t i s doubtful that 
this text continues much beyond the f i r s t few aphorisms of the 
th i r d chapter* 
This calls f or a more detailed examination* That one can expect 
certain inconsistencies i n the t h i r d pada i s foreboded by the faot 
that the actual topics discussed i n i t do not f u l l y coincide with 
the traditional t i t l e of vibhuti-pada. The 'supranatural' powers 
(vibhuti) with which i t i s supposed to deal are not at a l l mentioned 
before III . 1 6 * The a r t i f i c i a l i t y of the division between the second 
and the t h i r d chapter i s quite blatant; 11.55 and I I I . 1 are 
practically continuous. 
Even a cursory glance at the exposition of the eightfold yogic 
path (ll«28ff.) bears out that the material is absolutely homogeneous 
u n t i l 111*3 and perhaps even up to I I I . 8 . From I I I . 9 on, however, 
the text swings from the simple definitions to a number of somewhat 
enigmatic aphorisms i n which the term narinama figures prominently* 
This term occurs, significantly, only once before, namely i n the 
kriyafeyoga section at 11.15* This on i t s own does of course not 
warrant a connecting up of the passage I I I * 9 f f • with the kriya-yoga 
portion. But there is ample evidence which makes such a link-up not 
only possible but inevitable* 
(1) The passage I I I * 9 f f . contains one of the nuclear 
terms of kriya-yoga. viz. samskara, nowhere to be found 
i n the yoga-anga section. 
(2) In III.13 the compound bhuta-indriya is used, which 
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occurs only at one other place and that is i n the 
kriya-yoga section at 11.18 as bhuta-indriya-atmaka 
" i n the form of elements and sense-organs". Thus i s 
ptjtk described drsya. 'the seen' , i.e. the empirical r e a l i t y 
or pr a k r t i . In I I I . 1 3 the compound i s actually employed 
i n the locative plural as bhuta-indriyesu which 
J.W. HATTER (1958) translates with " i n the element-
b u i l t organs" thus giving another reading of this 
dvandva. Vyasa, however, confirms the former inter-
pretation: the 'seen' i s s p l i t into elements, of 
coarse and subtle form, and into sense-organs by which 
the elements can be perceived. The compound bhuta-
indriya clearly refers back to the drsya of the kriya-
yoga text. 
(3) I I I . 1 0 contains the compound prasanta-vahita or 'calm 
flow', the second member of which i s reminiscent of 
the word vihin or 'flowing on' i n sva-rasa-vahl of I I . 9 . 
Although i t could be argued that the context necessit-
ated the same word i n both cases, but in reply to this 
one may say that the author could just as well have 
chosen another synonym (such as e.g. Jsru). His not 
doing so could well be explained as a possible 
instance of his personal preference within the boundaries 
of his active vocabulary. 
These findings beyond doubt demand that one should a l l o t the 
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passage 111.9-111*16 to the kriya-yoga text. The question now arises 
whether the subsequent aphorisms ( l l l . 1 7 f f . ) belong to this section, 
as well or whether they are a continuation of the yoga-anga section* 
One has to bear i n mind that the yoga-anga part ( I I . 2 8 - I I I . 3 or I I I . 8 ) 
does not make mention of the f i n a l goal, and unless one assumes 
a p r i o r i that this portion is a l l that is l e f t of the text which 
expounds the eightfold path, one must look for the concluding 
part of i t elsewhere i n the Yoga-Sutra. 
From I I I . 1 7 on, the aphorisms deal mainly with the outcome of 
samyama or 'constraint' i n the shape of the supranatural powers and 
certain higher ens tat ic processes. I f one regards the aphorisms 
I I I . 4 - I I I . 8 , defining samyama. as s t i l l belonging to the yoga-anga 
section, this litany of descriptions of yogic powers should also 
r i g h t l y be counted as part of i t v B u t i t i s not yet settled whether 
III.4-111.8 pertain to the yoga-anga text or not. One fact may be 
thought of speaking i n favour of this: The yoga-anga section, after 
defining the miscellaneous practices of the _eightfold path also 
describes their results. Thus the sutras 11*35-11*45 state the f r u i t 
of the application of the disciplines of yama and niyama..11*48 that 
of the practice of asana, 11*52-11.53 of pranayama and 11*55 of 
pratyahara. Only i n the case of dbarana, dhyana and samadhi are the 
results not specifically stated. The reason for this may be that they 
are drawn together i n the practice of samyama whose multiple results 
are l i s t e d i n the th i r d chapter. 
However, i n view of the fact that this enumeration of the effects 
of samyama on a wide range of topics i s quite out of proportion i n 
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comparison with the yoga-anga section one is forced to query 
the authenticity of this l i s t . One must be prepared, therefore, 
to accept that the text from III.17 on to the end of the t h i r d 
chapter belongs only part i a l l y and perhaps only to a negligible 
extent to the yoga-anga material. The nature of these aphorisms 
on samyama i s such that their number could be greatly increased 
without any d i f f i c u l t y — and this i s probably what has happened: 
copyists and editors have added and presumably also altered to the 
best of their knowledge. 
Returning to the question as to whether or not the complex 
of sutras III.4-111*8 i s an integral part of the yoga-anga section, 
there i s one piece of evidence which would seem to gainsay t h i s . 
For, i n I I I .5 the compound pra.ina-aloka occurs which can be taken 
as a synonym of .inana-dTpti as found i n II.28. The term prarina does 
not occur i n the yoga-anga section at a l l , but significantly enough 
i t appears at 11.27. Even more remarkable is the fact that I I I . 6 
seems to refer back to 11.27. This indicates, I propose, that the 
kriya-yoga text which was l e f t off at 11.27 is resumed at I I I . 5 , i f 
not at I I I . 4 * J.W. HAUER (1958) and others have thought that the 
kriya-yoga text, as outlined above, was complete and that II.26-11.27 
represent a description of the f i n a l goal of this particular school. 
This i s not confirmed by the present findings; the kriyaWoga section 
i s fragmentary. For, whatever the Sanskrit commentators make 11.27 
out to mean, this aphorism would be a very meagre and unsatisfactory 
statement of the ultimate target of this type of Toga. 
Thus one i s confronted with two equally loose-ended sections. 
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However, as I have demonstrated one need not be satisfied with 
either J.W. HAUER's (1958) or A. JANASEK'S version of the kriva-yoga 
text. There i s weighty evidence that the kriya-yoga section continues 
after I I I . 3 . In fact the transition from the yoga-anga material back 
to the kriya-yoga material i s considerably smoother than.the transition 
from 11.27 to 11.28. The treatment of samyama ( I I I . 4 - I I I . 8 ) proves 
a very convenient means of effacing the edges of the interpolated 
or rather 'quoted' yoga-anga text. I t remains next to establish the 
exact extent of this section. 
Here, I think, i t can hardly be denied that on the whole the 
aphorisms I I I . 1 7 f f display a distinct uniformity which i n terminology 
and style suggests their intimate belonging to the f i r s t half of the 
kriya-yoga section. There are a number of easily recognisable common 
denominators, such as the occurrence of samskara ( i l l . 1 8 ; cf. 1.18, 
I . 50, 11 .15), pratyaya ( i l l . 1 9 , 111.35; cf. 1.10, 1.18, 1.19, 11.20), 
l a k t i ( i l l . 2 1 ; cf. I I . 6 , 11 .23), asamyoga ( i l l . 2 1 ; cf. samyoga 11.17, 
I I . 23, 11.25), maitrl ( i l l . 2 3 ; c f . 1.33), aloka (111.25; c f . I I I . 5 ) , 
asamkTrna ( i l l . 3 5 ; cf. samklrna 1.42), grahya ( i l l . 2 1 ; cf. 1 .41) , 
bhoga ( i l l . 3 5 ; c f. II.13* 11.18). I n addition, at least one other 
concept emphasises the discontinuity between the yoga-anga and the 
kriya-yoga material, namely the term kaya-sampat ( i l l . 4 5 , III.46) 
which I understand as a synonym of kaya-indriya-siddhi (II.43)* 
This calls for an examination of the vocabulary of the yoga-anga 
section i n relation to those aphorisms which have been identified as 
pertaining to the kriya-yoga text. There are a number of conspicuous 
parallels which need to be explained. The following deserve special 
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attention: 
(1) mrdu-madhya-adhiinatra: 11*34 and 1.22; 
(2) saumanasya: II.4 1; i t s antonym daurmanasya i s 
used i n I.31; 
(3) anabhighata: 11.48 and 111.45;. 
(4) praka&a-avarana: 11.52 and I I I . 4 3 ; 
(5) artha-matra-nirbhasa; I I I . 3 and 1*43; 
(6) sva-rupa-sunya: 111*3 and 1*43; 
(7) saithilva: III.38 and 11.47: 
(8) special use of samapatti: 11*47 and 111*42; 
These remarkable agreements between the yoga-anga section and the 
kriya-yoga material can be interpreted i n two ways. One may either take 
them as evidence i n support of the claim that- the author of the 
kriya-yoga text and the author of the yoga-anga text are one and 
the same person, which would leave us with the question as to why 
the, yoga-anga section should appear so highly self-contained. Alternat-
ively, and this seems to be far more probable, these parallels can be 
explained as unconscious 'resoundings' of the phraseology of the 
older yoga-anga material which the author of the vulgate had before 
him. 
Accepting this second possibility, the following questions remain 
to be answered: Why would the author of the vulgate want to insert the 
yoga-anga section after 11.27 i n particular? Did he have a complete 
text i n front of him, or was i t merely fragmentary material which was 
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available to him? Furthermore, how much of i t did he actually 
incorporate i n his own work? 
With II*27 the t r a i n of thought that provides the aphorisms 
dealing with the klesas etc* with their overt coherence comes to an 
abrupt stop* S t i l l , as I mentioned earlier, the 'sevenfold gnosis' 
(aaptadha-Tara.jna) of 11*27 i s by no means a description of the ultimate 
destination of kriva-yoga* The editor of the vulgate had thus the 
opportunity of prefixing his next topic, viz* the treatment of 
the vibhutis, with the useful series of definitions of the eight 
members of Toga as given out i n the yoga-aftga text. Sutra 111*3 
then enabled him to switch over to the topic of samyama as the 
technique for producing the various types of vibhuti. 
Although i t seems l i k e l y that the yoga-aftga aphorisms belong to, 
or constitute a textual unit of their own, no conclusions can be drawn 
from the available data as to the extent to which the author of 
the yulgate incorporated them into his own compilation, or even as 
to whether or not he took them over verbatim* The fact that he 
retained 11.23 without adjusting i t to his own material distinctly 
favours the conclusion that he did not adulterate the interpolated 
part too severely* The several intrinsic contradictions i n the material 
between the two textual units also makes i t improbable that he was 
responsible for the authorship of the yoga-afiga text as.well. The 
extreme brevity of this text would furthermore seem to speak against 
the notion that i t i s complete i n i t s e l f * Host important, i t lacks a 
proper"definition of the yogic goal as conceived by the propounder 
of the eightfold path, for surely samadhi ( i l l . 3 ) refers merely to a 
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technical category of asta-anga-yoga. 
The question which springs to mind i s this: Could i t be that 
the vulgate contains further fragments of this yoga-anga text? This 
seems more than l i k e l y . As I mentioned previously, some of the 
aphorisms subsequent to III.17 strike a somewhat dissonant note, 
and i t i s quite possible that some of them at least originally 
belonged to the yoga-anaa material, or at any rate are an echo of i t . 
Thus, for instance, the second half of III.43 (...tatah praka^a-avarana-
ksayah) i s suspect not only because i t constitutes a perfect semantic 
and syntactic unit of i t s own (to the extent that i t could figure as 
an independent sutra). but also because the phrase prakasa-avarana i s 
to be met with i n the yoga-anga text at 11.52. Linguistically the only 
difference between 11.52 and 111.43^ i s that whilst the former aphorism 
employs the root J k s i i n i t s verbal form as kalyate, the l a t t e r uses 
i t as a noun. The other 'odd' aphorism i s the concluding sutra of the 
third chapter ( I I I . 5 5 ) . 
This aphorism i s essentially a definition of kaivalya; sattva-
purusayoh suddhi-samye kaivalyam-iti. Ostensibly consistent with the 
preceding couple of sutras, this aphorism i s nevertheless remarkable 
i n that i t is.the second reference to kaivalya towards the end of the 
thi r d chapter. The f i r s t occasion is at III.50: tad-vairagyad-api 
dosa-bl.ia-ksaye kaivalyam. Admittedly, these two references about 
the ultimate goal are i n no way contradictory, but the second instance 
( i l l . 5 5 ) does not appear to be essential to the treatment, especially 
when one considers that the author of the vulgate deals with the emanci-
pation processes i n the fourth pada (which as w i l l be shown is also an 
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integral part of the kriya-yoga t e x t ) . The line of thought from 
111*49-111*54 strikes one as. adequately homogeneous to argue the 
case for the superfluousness of 111*55 i n this context. Thus in 
III.49 anyata-khyati — a favourite concept of the author of the 
vulgate — i s said to bring about omnipotence and omnipresence* But 
this i s not the f i n a l stage of the yogic path of transformation as i s 
evident from the qualifying statement of aphorism 111*50 which 
declares that the yogin must detach himself even from this elevated 
condition; the- precise word i s vairagya or 'dispassipn* with j i ^ t f 
which we are already familiar from sutras 1*12 and 1*15* 
This f i n a l act of detachment causes the seeds of the defects 
(which lead to the externalisation of consciousness) to dwindle and 
thi3, i n turn, 'transports' the yogin to kaivalya. I t must be noted that 
this i s not a definition of emancipation, but a summary description 
of the process leading up to i t * Hence the next aphorism ( i l l . 5 1 ) i s 
not really discontinuous. I t contains a warning: The yogin must not 
le t himself be tempted by higher beings to abandon his quest^jd at this 
point for some pseudo-heaven* After this negative statement follows 
a positive advice ( i l l . 5 2 ) which prescribes a way of actualising 
the gnosis born of discernment or viveka-.1a-.inana. 111*53 i s a further 
specification. And, f i n a l l y , 111*54 i s a definition of viveka-.ia-
.inana which conducts the yogin across the stream, of phenomenal 
existence to the Unconditioned* Then follows 111,55 which seems 
rather superfluous i n this entire exposition* The conclusion suggests 
i t s e l f that this terminating sutra does not belong to the kriya-yoga 
material but i s part of the ypga-anga text* 
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This i s evidenced by two important facts. F i r s t , the phrase 
sattva-purusayoh suddM-samye is strongly reminiscent of the yoga-aftga 
phraseology which operates a great deal with the concept of 'purity* 
or 'purification' as can be seen from 11*28 (as^uddhi-ksaye). 11*40 
(saucat), 11.41 (sattva-suddhi) and 11.43 (a&iddhi-ksayat). By way of 
contrast, the kriya-yoga material i s couched more i n terms of 
'discernment' (viveka, aawta-khyati etc.). The second point i s the 
occurrence of the word i t i or ' f i n i s ' at the end of 111.55. This has 
been taken by J.W. BAUER (1958) and S. DASGUPTA (1930) as indicative 
of the fact that originally the Yoga-Sutra ended at t h i s point and 
that consequently the fourth chapter must be a later addition. However, 
as this hypothesis w i l l be shown to be unsound, another explanation 
must, be found. Could i t not be that 111.55 belongs to the yoga-anga 
section and that the word i t i originally demarcated the end of this 
text and not of the third chapter of the vulgate? An alternative 
explanation would be that the author of the vulgate employed the word 
i t i to denote the end of his quotation from the yoga-anga material, but 
this would imply that the yoga-anga text extends from 11.28 to 111.55 
which seems unlikely unless one presupposes massive interpolations. 
One possible objection which could be raised against this 
reconstruction is that 111.50 does not pertain to the kriya-yoga 
text and that therefore there i s no question of duplicate statements 
about the goal, because of the use of the term dosa and not i t s expected 
synonym klesa. But this argument carries l i t t l e weight, since the 
employment of the word kle£a i n the kriya-yoga text does not exclude 
the simultaneous use of the term dosa. There i s no evidence that 
» 
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both are i n fact synonyms. I think J.W. HAUER (1958, 238), following 
H. JACOBI (1929, 594), i s mistaken i n his belief that whilst kleaa 
is a genuine Yoga term dosa belongs essentially to the Nyaya tradition. 
Both terms are found concurrently i n the Nyaya-Sutra. and they also 
occur together i n other philosophical texts; i n this case one term 
usually has a more precise meaning than the other. I suggest that 
this i s the case i n the Yoga-Sutra as well* Whereas klesa has a 
definite technical meaning, dosa i s used i n I I I . 5 0 i n the more general 
sense of 'defect' or 'blemish' without any philosophical overtones* 
To summarise the above findings concerning the vibhuti-pada; I t 
has been shown that this chapter i s in essence a continuation of the 
kriya-yoga exposition of the f i r s t and second pada. with a lengthy 
interpolation, or rather quotation, extending from 11*28-111.3 (?) 
which demonstrably influenced the conceptual and linguistic medium 
of the third chapter* 
Turning to the fourth and f i n a l pada of the Yoga-Sutra there i s 
ample evidence to suggest that i t i s also an integral part of the 
kriya-yoga material* This conclusion runs counter to J.W. HAUER's 
(1958) and S. DASGUPTA's (1930) assertion that the kaivalya-pada 
is a subsequent appendage* Especially the former scholar has given 
the fourth chapter much ingenious thought (1931» 122-133). He regards 
i t as an attempt to present a systematic outline of the metaphysics 
of this school of Yoga. According to him, the central concept of this 
pada i s nirmana-citta or 'created mind', and the cla r i f i c a t i o n of this 
important notion must be regarded as J.W. HAUER's single most i$>H$Hl& 
outstanding contribution to the study of the Yoga-Sutra. 
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However, his speculations about the independent origin of 
the kaivalya-pada (= nirmana-citta text) are untenable* There 
i s no drastic change i n style as claimed by S. DASGUPTA (1930) 
and endorsed by J.W. BAUER (1958). Quite on the contrary, the 
technical vocabulary i s i n remarkable consonance with the 
preceding kriya-yoga material, and also the general trend of 
ideas i s adequately continuous. The l i n k existing between the 
kaivalya-uada and the kriya-yoga text i s borne out by the 
following terminological agreements: parinama (lV.2, 14, 32, 33i 
c f . 11.15; HI.9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16), asmita (lV.4. 5, 15, 16, .18, 
21, 23; cf. 1.17; I I . 3 , 6; 111.47), an-asaya (lV.6: cf. asaya 1.24: 
11.12), vyavahita (lV.9; cf. 111.25), viveka (lV.26, 29; cf. 11.26, 
28; I I I . 5 2 , 54), pratyaya (lV.27: cf, 1.10,.18, 19; 11.20; 111.12, 
17, 19, 35), klesa (lV.28, 39; cf. 1.24; I I . 2 , 3, 12), khyati 
(IV.29; cf. 1.16; 11.26; 111.49), ksana (lV.33; cf. HI.9, 52), 
Sakti (IV.34; cf. I I . 6 , 23; .111,21), nratiprasava (lV.34; cf. 11.10), 
drastr-drsya (lV.23; cf. 11.17). 
These linguistic parallels do not constitute the only evidence 
for the present hypothesis. I t i s , furthermore, supported by the 
obvious conceptual continuity between the kalvalya-pada and the 
kriya-yoga section. For instance, the exposition of the higher 
processes of Yoga terminating i n emancipation would be inconceivable 
without the preceding klesa theory. In fact this original doctrine 
i s further developed and explained i n the kaivalya-pada. I t i s also 
significant that i n the fourth chapter the main emphasis i s not on 
purification but on discernment or viveka which is i n keeping with 
the tenor of the kriya-yoga section. In IV.12 there i s a reference 
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to the dharma-dharmin speculation of 111,13-III.16. In this connection 
the parinama concept reappars (lT.14) which was f i r s t mentioned 
i n I I I , 9 f f , In addition, IV.28 is clearly a reference to the 
kriya-yoga text* i t reads: hanam-esam klea'a vad-uktam ("Their 
removal i s l i k e [that o f j the causes-of-affliction [as already] 
described.11) The author obviously has i n mind sutra 11.10,'IT,8. 
f i n a l l y , speaks of the Self's apperception of the mental fluctuations, 
which is an echo of 11.20 where the 'seer' i s defined as 'pure seeing' 
(dr&i-matra). 
The fourth chapter.contains yet one more definition of the 
yogic goal. However, IV.34 i s not merely an unnecessary replication; 
i t forms an indispensable corollary of the whole set of aphorisms 
defining the f i n a l phases of the path of involution. Nor i s i t 
i n dissonance with III.50 which simply states that the omnipotence 
resulting from sattva-purusa-anyata-kligati must be renounced as well 
before the yogin can 'enter' kaivalya. 
These findings unequivocally demonstrate, I think, that the 
fourth chapter i s neither a reservoir of Patanjali's personal 
philosophy joined to the body of aphorisms extant before him, as 
proposed by S. DASGUPTA (1930, 52f.), nor a collection of fragments 
appended to the f i r s t three padas, as asserted by P. DEUSSEN (1920,1, 
535), nor the resume* of an independent Yoga school as maintained 
by J.W. HAUER (1958, 230). The distinct philosophical tone of this 
section i s more economically explained as the result of the natural 
development of the subject-matter. 
Nonetheless, J.W. HAUER's analysis i s an invaluable piece of 
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research. By freeing himself from the stereotypes of the classical 
commentators and relying on a s t r i c t l y immanent interpretation of 
the Yoga-Sutra, he succeeded i n correcting an unfortunate and 
long-standing misconception about the intended purpose of the 
i n i t i a l aphorisms of the fourth pada. He was thus able to cast 
fresh light on this entire section, and his conclusions indirectly 
confirm the present hypothesis of the textual continuity between 
the t h i r d and the fourth chapter. 
His crucial rectification concerns the key concept of nirmana-
o i t t a . This compound was interpreted by the classical exegetists 
i n the sense of 'created mind1 or a r t i f i c i a l l y produced mental 
vehicle used by the yogin as a dumping-ground for his karmic deeds 
i n order to avoid the f r u i t i o n of moral retribution. J.W. HAUER 
(1958) convincingly shows that this interpretation completely 
ignores the highly philosophical tenor of the subsequent aphorisms. 
He also raises philological objections against the usual 
translation of .iaty-antara-parinama (lV.2) with "creating other beings 
This profound misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of the fourth 
chapter also led, according to J.W. HAUER, to the f a t a l interpolation 
of IV. 1 which, i n turn, managed to dupe a l l later commentators. Indeed 
IV.1 i s entirely out of tune with the remainder of the kaivalya-pada 
which does not treat of any of the siddhis at a l l . Their proper place 
i s i n the third chapter. 
In this connection I wish to draw attention to C. PENSA's (1973; 
thoughtful observations on the concept of siddhi. Though primarily 
concerned with showing, that both i n Yoga and i n Buddhism this concept 
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did not receive a persistently negative evaluation but often also 
a positive one. he has some remarks about I I I . 3 7 which are pertinent 
to the present study. Usually this sutra i s explained as a total 
condemnation of the siddhis, yet as C. PEKSA (1975^ 13) points out 
originally i t may not have had this wide scope at a l l . He thinks 
i t possible that the word te ('these') most l i k e l y refers only to 
the f i v e supranormal sensory acti v i t i e s and to pratibha mentioned 
i n the immediately preceding aphorism ( i l l . 3 6 ) . However, he does 
not seem to be j u s t i f i e d i n his implicit assumption that the term 
siddhi i s used i n the Yoga-Sutra i n a technical sense. This word 
i s also used as 'perfection' (II . 4 3 ) and 'attainment' ( l l « 4 5 ) , and 
unless one regards the chapter headings of the vulgate as spurious 
(which i s probably right) the proper technical term for the 'powers' 
is vibhuti. But this does not alter C. PKNSA's main argument. 
I f a l l the vibhutis were int r i n s i c impediments to the state of 
transformed consciousness (samadhi), a l l those aphorisms which 
describe samyama and i t s magical results would have to be considered 
as outright falsifications. 
In his attempt to determine the content of the concept nirmana, 
J.W. HAUER (1958) observes that the rootjma combined with the prefix 
nis-° has been employed since epic times to convey the notion of 
'constructing' or 'creating'• He refers to a quotation i n the Yoga-
Ehasya (i.25) which, according to Vacaspati Maira, stems from PaSIcas'ikha; 
i t reads: adi-vidvan-nirma^-cittam-adMsthaya karunyad-bhagavan 
parama-rsir-asuraye .ii.inasamanaya t ant ram provaca, "The f i r s t knower 
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£i.e. KapilaJ, assuming an earthly mind out of compassion, the 
exalted, supreme seer unto Asuri who desired to know declared the 
doctrine. 1 1 J.W. HAUBR (1958) i s certain that here nirmana i s 
used i n the sense of 'earthly 1 rather than ' a r t i f i c i a l l y created'. 
He gives the same interpretation to the compound nirmana-kaya 
employed by Vacaspati Hisra ( i l l . 1 8 ) to explain the phrase tanu-dhara 
or 'wearing a body' occurring i n the Yoga-Bhasya. The buddhist usage 
of the term nirmana seems to confirm J.W. HAUER's interpretation. 
He himself mentions especially the Lankavatara-Sutra which must be 
placed i n chronological proximity to the Yoga-Sutra. 
Thus nirmana-oitta denotes nothing else but the individualised 
consciousness complex as i t appears i n the t e r r e s t r i a l world. The 
one c i t t a from which the many individualised cittas are said to derive 
(see 17.5) reminds one of the 'mind only' conception i n the idealist 
schools of Mahayana Buddhism. J.W. HAUER likens i t i n fact to the 
dharma-buddha. Of course, the 'one mind* of the Yoga-Sutra cannot be 
equated with the 'mind only' of a Vasubandhu or Asanga. The eka-citta 
i s none other than aamita-matra. This i s clear from IV.16 which 
contains a refutation of the idealist position, according to which 
the objective world i s non-existent. Patanjali affirms the ontological 
r e a l i t y of the world and denies that i t i s merely a product of mentation. 
There i s , however, no evidence to' bear out J.W. HAUER's suggestion 
that IV.16 is a direct attack on Vasubandhu's and Asanga's schools of 
thought. I t could just as well refer to an earlier idealist school. 
28 J.W. HAUER (1958) wrongly prints vi.inasamanaya instead of jijnasamanaya. 
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Having c l a r i f i e d the objective of the f i r s t few sutras 
of the fourth chapter, the subsequent aphorisms present no 
further d i f f i c u l t i e s . They are s t r i c t l y sequential and evince 
the thematic unity of the kaivalya-pada. P. DEUSSEN's (l92o',l) 
assumption about the composite character of this chapter i s thus 
shown to be entirely unfounded. 
I w i l l next turn to the important contributions by 
E. PRAUWALLNER (l953,I,427ff.) and G. OBERHAMMER (1965 , 98ff.) 
who approach the Yoga-Sutra from the angle of Gestalt analysis. 
Both scholars contend that there are two different "types of Yoga 
present i n Patanjali's work and that the main defect of the 
existing presentations of Classical Yoga is.the lack of 
differentiation between these two Gestalten. This gives rise to 
an a r t i f i c i a l unity which, they argue, is absent i n the original. 
According to E. FRAUWALLNER (I953,l)the well-known eightfold path 
forms the nucleus of the work which, as we have seen, i s also 
J.W. HAUER's (1958) contention. "In i t widely held views are brought 
into a f i n a l shape, and therefore i t is l i t t l e surprising that this 
form of the yogic path should not be confined exclusively to the 
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classical system of Yoga.*1 The exposition of the eightfold 
Yoga was then prefixed with some preliminary techniques drawn 
together under the name of kriya-yoga. 
E. FRAUWALLNER correctly recognises the homogeneity of the 
asfra-aftga-yoga type, but i s mistaken i n imputing to i t a far greater 
significance within the Yoga-Sutra than to the kriya-yoga material. 
29 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953J,427). 
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He contrasts the asta-anga type' with the nirodha type expounded i n the 
f i r s t chapter, argu^ing that the conception of both path and goal of 
this nirodha-yoga i s i n stark oontrast with that of the asta-anga type* 
V/hile i n the former emphasis is l a i d upon the cessation of a l l mental 
ac t i v i t y i n order for the Self to abide i n transcendental purity, 
the l a t t e r form of Yoga focuses on the distinction betw^een Self 
and non-Self, as a higher kind of cognition by which emancipation i s 
obtained* In E. FRAUWALLNER's opinion what is attempted here is an 
intensification of cognition rather than the reverse* From a textual 
angle he appears to isolate three distinct units: 
(1) pada I : nirodha-yoga 
(2) pada I I - I I I : asta-anga-yoga prefixed by kriya-yoga 
(3) pada IV : later appendage^ 
He considers the Yoga-Sutra as an attempt to assimilate and integrate 
both types of Yoga* These conjectures about the architecture of the 
Yoga-Sutra need no special refutation at this stage of the present 
analysis; the intimate relation that exists between the nirodha section 
and the subsequent aphorisms has been demonstrated already as also 
the precise length of the asta-anga-yoga part. Of additional interest 
i s here A. JANACEK's (1958, 98f.) paper i n which he considers the 
linguistic interdependence between the nirodha-yoga and the asta-anga-
yoga on the basis of a s t a t i s t i c a l analysis of the vocabulary of these 
30 E. FRAUWALLUER (1953,1), strangely enough, says nothing definite 
about the kaivalya-pada and i t s relation to the remainder of the 
Yoga-Sutra* 
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sections. However, E. FRAUWALLNER1 s (1953,?)typology i s not only 
n o t supported by the text, i t i s also unconvincing i n other 
respects. For, practically speaking, nirodha i s a pre-condition 
of a l l higher yogic states. Samadhi cannot occur u n t i l the 
externalising tendency of the mind has been brought under control 
i n meditative-absorption whose function i t i s to achieve nirodha. 
For precisely this reason the term nirodha i s not confined to the 
f i r s t chapter but also appears i n an important aphorism i n the third 
pacta (via, I I I . 9 ) which E. FRAUWALLNER counts to the asfo-anga material. 
He quite evidently neglects to correlate his ideal typology with 
the actual textual r e a l i t y . 
Nevertheless, his distinction between what one might c a l l 
a 'cognition-restrictive' and a 'cognition-affirmative' type of 
Yoga may possibly pay o f f i n other areas of Yoga research. As 
regards the Yoga-Sutra the most that can be said is that the 
kriya-yoga school of Patanjali operates with the concept of nirodha 
without belonging to the conjectural 'cognition-restrictive' type. 
A further puzzling point i s that although E. FRAUWALLNER equates 
the asta-anga tradition with the above •cognition-affirmative' form 
of Yoga, he nonetheless regards the goal of this Yoga (see the 
concluding aphorisms of the t h i r d chapter) as perfectly consistent 
with his interpretation. This i s unintelligible unless he reads 
these sutras (III . 4 9 - 5 0 ) differently, for they clearly imply that 
there occurs a discontinuation of cognition prior to the actualisation 
of kaivalya, which i n this event must be understood as a meta-cognitive 
attainment. Unfortunately, E. FRAUWALLNER does not document his 
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inferences which would allow one to retrace his argumentation* 
None of the above counter-arguments are raised by G. OBERHAMER 
(1965) who accepts E. FRAUWALWER's (1953$hypothetical typology 
ex cathedra and seeks to vindicate i t i n a detailed examination 
of the structure of meditation i n Classical Toga. He isolates 
three groups of statements dealing with mediation, namely 
I.2-1.18, I.41-1.50 and II. 5 4 - 1 I I . 7 . The f i r s t and second set 
correspond with the two types of Yoga as determined by E. FRAU-
WALLETER. The third group i s considered by G. OBERHAMER-as 
being identical with the second group, for which assumption he 
advances the following reasons: 
(1) The equation of samapatti with samprajnata-samadhi, 
as favoured by the classical exegetists, must be 
rejected as improbable. The four stages of sam-
pra.inata-samadhi (viz, savitarka. savicara. ananda, 
asmita) of 1.17 must be placed against the four 
stages of samapatti (viz. savitarka, nirvitarka. 
savicara, nirvlcara) of 1.42-1*44* As an example 
of the difference between these two meditation 
schemata, G. OBERHAMER states that i n the case of 
samapatti the highest meditational content i s alifiga 
(see 1*44), whereas i n the case of aamprajnata-
samadhi i t i s 1 the unity-consciousness of I-ness 
(asmita)•^. 
31 Qi. OBERHAMER (1965, 103, fn . 1 l ) 
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(2) According to G. OBERHAMMER (1965) the 'dynamics1 
of samapatti i s essentially different from that 
of aamprajnata-aamadhi of the second group (l«41-
1.50) hut i s cognate with that of the th i r d group 
( I I . 5 4 - I I I . 7 ) . He draws attention to the Yoga-
Bhasya which looks upon samapatti and the samadhi 
of the third group as formally identical ( i . e . 
interprets both as sva-rupa-^unva-iva-artha-matra). 
He then argues that the fourth stage of sampra.inata-
samadhi (second group) cannot be defined i n these 
terms, since i t s content i s only 'the unity-
consciousness of I-ness*• Quite consistently 
he also contends that the dynamics of samapatti 
and of the samadhi of the third group i s i n no way 
geared towards aaampra.lnata-samadhi. 
How valid are these rather bewildering arguments? The answer 
to this must be that interesting as they are they simply lack 
the factual evidence to back them up. A different solution of the 
problem at issue i s not only possible, but as w i l l be seen also 
far more probable and economic. Thus, the reading of 1.17 i s 
perfectly plain: vitarka-vicara-ananda-asmita-rupa-anugamat-
sampra.Tnatah, which l i t e r a l l y translated means " ^The enstasy 
resulting from nirodha i s j 'cognitive* on account of £the occurrence 
of such I phenomena Fas! cogitation, reflexion, joy [andJ I-am-ness." 
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There i s no positive indication i n this aphorism that the four 
'phenomena1 (rupa) l i s t e d are necessarily sequential and specific 
to certain levels of attainment i n the enstatic involution process, 
though this assumption i s implicit i n G. OBERHAMMER's (1965) thesis. 
This is of course also the view of the Sanskrit exegetists. However, 
considering the available data on the phenomenology of enstatic 
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experiences within and outside the purview of Yoga and also 
paying due respect to the parinama doctrine, i t seems /^commendable 
not to in s i s t on too watertight a compartmentalisation of these 
four rupas. 
1.42, then, turns out to be a qualification of the.term vitarka 
and 1.44 of the term vicara, which is commonly accepted. The fact 
that the second group of statements mentioned by G. OBERHAMMER 
employs the feminine forms vitarka and vicara (as required because 
of samapatti i n 1.41), prefixing these with the positive particle j 
and the negative particle nis-° respectively, can quite simply 
be explained as a contextual requirement. That ananda and asmita 
are not mentioned separately would seem to confirm the above-made 
suggestion that they do not constitute segregated high-level 
experiences i n samadhi. Perhaps they are symptomatic of a l l object-
dependent forms of enstasy, that i s , they constitute constant values 
i n every type of sampra.inata-samadhi. This interpretation immediately 
confutes G. OBERHAMER's contention that samapatti has as i t s highest 
content the uncreate matrix of a l l physico-mental existence, viz. 
32 See e.g. M. LASKI (1965 ). Further references are supplied i n 
connection with the semantic analysis of the various degrees of 
samgdhi. 
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aliAsa, whereas i n the case of samprajnata-samadhi i t i s asmita. 
The arbitrariness of such a distinction i s self-evident* G. OBER-
HAKHER (1965) manifestly confounds the objective stimulus of 
the ens tat ic a c t — commonly known as alambana or 'support' — 
with the subjective response ( i . e . vitarka, vicara etc.). 
Nor i s his second point, concerning the inn^Ler dynamics of 
samapatti and samprajnSta-samadhi. particularly cogent. Since 
his insistence that asmita (of 1*17) represents the 'content' of a 
specific stage of aamadhi has been exposed as entirely unfounded, 
his argumentation that one cannot possibly describe this particular 
enstatic stage i n terms of artha-matra and sva-rupa-sunya i s also 
completely erroneous. I n consequence of these fundamental 
misinterpretations G. OBERHAMMER's remaining pronouncements about 
the tiro types of Yoga allegedly traceable i n the Yoga-Sutra must 
similarly be regarded as invalid. 
On the foregoing pages an attempt was made to examine the 
pros and cons of proposed interpretations from as many sides as 
possible (semantically, structurally, formally) and to weigh the 
various and often contrasting views against eaoh other and also to 
grope for new explanations — a l l the while scrutinising the findings 
i n the l i g h t of the i n i t i a l hypothesis that the structure of 
the Yoga-Sutra i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y homogeneous. The complementary 
hypothesis of the above methodological standard demanded that by 
reason of the manifest chronological and also ideological gap between 
the Yoga-Sutra and the exegetical lit e r a t u r e , a l l material evidence 
should be based on a text-immanent interpretation of Patanjali's 
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treatise. By applying these two c r i t e r i a with the appropriate 
consistency, i t was possible to disclose that the text of , 
the Yoga-Sutra i s by far more self-contained and integrated than 
previous scholars were prepared to concede. 
In conclusion of this re-examination the following precis of 
the key findings can be given: In contradistinction to those of 
my predecessors who have disassembled the Yoga-Sutra into so many 
variant traditions or textual layers, the present study has 
established that the vulgate i s a composite of merely two sets of 
sutras apparently representing two independent though overlapping 
traditions* Linguistic, conceptual and textual considerations 
demand that the material should be regarded as adequately continuous 
from I.1-11.27• At this point the author of the vulgate' seems to 
have introduced a series of aphorisms into the main body of his 
work which contain useful and succinct definitions of some important 
components of Yoga. This 'quotation* led conveniently oyer to the 
extensive discussion of samyama and i t s magical results. The 
exact length of this insert could not be fixed conclusively, though 
there is some evidence that i t does not extend beyond the f i r s t three 
aphorisms of the third chapter, i f I I I . 3 ( i n view of i t s definitional 
similarity with 1.43) does not already l i e outside the boundary of 
this interpolated piece. The following aphorisms ( l l l . 3 / 4 f f . ) have 
been shown to belong i n style and content to the sutras 1.1-II.27. 
However, i t has been granted that this second half of the vulgate 
may contain some sporadic quotes from the interpolated section, but 
only i n one instance could a sufficiently convincing identification 
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be made (viz. 111,55)• There are several other occasions where the 
author of the vulgate appears to have, i f not quoted, so perhaps, 
paraphrased some of the (no longer extant?) aphorisms before him. 
Except for these two fissure points (viz. 11.28 and III.2/3 
respectively), caused by the insertion of the yoga-anga material, 
a l l other stops i n the text must be understood as thematic pauses. 
Although the possibility of further later interpolations cannot be 
excluded, only one instance (viz. IV.1) could be ascertained as a 
subsequent addition which was based, on a serious misunderstanding of 
the fourth chapter and also caused considerable confusion among 
the exegetists. 
Diagrammatically, the stratigraphy of the vulgate looks as 
follows: 
KRIYA-YOGA TEXT (PART 1) 
1. Introduction: nirodha section (i.1-1.51) 
2. Outline of the important features of kriya-yoga 
(II.1-II.27) 
ASTA-AflGA-YOGA TEXT (= quotation, II.2 8 - I I I . 2 or I I I . 3 ) 
KRIYA-YOGA TEXT (PART 2) 
1. Discussion of samyama and vibhuti ( i l l . 3 or 111*4-
111.54) 
A§TA-A3JGA-YOGA FRAGMENT. (I l l . 5 5 ) 
LATER INTERPOLATION (lV.1) 
KRIYA-YOGA TEXT (PART 2) ctd. 
2. Philosophical postscript (lV.2-IV.34) 
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How does this reconstruction relate to the traditional 
division of the Yoga-Sutra into four chapters? Surprisingly, 
the pattern disclosed by the present exercise i n textual 
criticism more or less confirms the arrangpnent of the vulgate 
into the well-known four padas. Only the transition from 11.27 
to the quoted yoga-a&ga text and then back to the kriya-yoga 
material at the beginning of the th i r d chapter i s somewhat clumsy* 
Bat this problematic point can be resolved i f one moves the 
beginning of the vibhuti-pada forward to 11.28. This slight 
re-arrangement would give rise to the following picture: 
pada I 
pada I I 
pada I I I 
pada IV 
1*1-1*5! = 51 aphorisms 
II . 1-II.27 = 27 aphorisms 
II .28- in .55 = 83 aphorisms 
IV.1-IV.34 = 34 aphorisms 
The awkwardness of the existing pada division i s probably due to 
the fact that at one stage an attempt was made to create chapters 
of f a i r l y equal length. The correction proposed above best explains 
the otherwise inexplicable fact as to why the t h i r d chapter should 
disrupt the systematic treatment of the 'eight members' of asta-afiga-
yoga. 
Thus the Yoga-Sutra displays a marked tectonic coherence 
which cancels any suggestion that i t is merely a hotchpotch of 
extant aphorisms badly patched together and furnished with a few 
personal remarks of the editor. 
One last point, of a methodological nature, remains to be 
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sorted out. This is the possible objection that the above 
conclusions are really contingent on the presuppositional 
framework put to the test during the course of the present 
investigation. In other words, i t could be argued that the 
results confirm merely what has been postulated at the outset. 
The correlation between the original premise that the text i s 
homogeneous and the research findings cannot be denied. But 
this must not be construed to mean a selective bias i n the 
examination of the data. This danger was far more prominent i n 
the previous studies which failed to employ a s t r i c t l y defined 
methodology. 
I n addition, I have naturally also t r i e d to minimise any 
possibility of an unconscious carrying-over of the i n i t i a l 
hypothesis by rigorously applying the procedural c r i t e r i a irrespective 
of whether or not the findings were positive or negative i n terms 
of the assumed homogeneity of the material. I t i s of course one of 
the drawbacks of analytical models of the kind u t i l i s e d i n the 
present study that they do establish a predeterminate selective 
pattern which on the one hand greatly f a c i l i t a t e s the scanning of 
the data but on the other hand i s functional only within i t s defined 
l i m i t s . S t i l l , i t i s preferable to operate with a clearly specified 
model which i s then consistently applied than with some a -priori 
assumption which i s neither appropriate nor competently tested. 
I t i s on these grounds that one must reject any textual criticism 
which assumes a text to be 'patched together', 'contaminated' or 
'defective' etc. without any legitimate reason. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
KRIYA-YOGA AMD ASTA-A&GA-YOGA : A COMPARISON 
In the previous chapter I have shown that the Yoga-Sutra 
i s a composite of two blocks of traditions; one is the.so-called 
lcriya-yoga and the other the well-known asta-anga-yoga. I now 
propose to determine both traditions typologically and also to 
t r y to skeletonise their locus within the larger ethico-religious 
context of Indian thought. This w i l l prepare the ground for the 
subsequent semantic studies. 
I shall begin with the asta-anga tradition whose eight-phase 
model exercised a far greater impact on the other gnostic schools 
of India than did the kriya-yoga, although the l a t t e r i s theoretically 
of superlative significance. According to P. DEUSSEN (l9203fI,523) the 
asta-anga section of the Yoga-Sutra extends from II.28-III.55, and 
i n his opinion i s not the most valuable of the several tracts 
present i n the vulgate. He rates the kriya-yoga exposition ( l l . 1 -
11.27) as the most important. For J.Y/. HAUER (1958 , 234), on the 
other hand, the yoga-anga part (lI.28-III.55) represents the most 
complete systematic sutra compilation i n Patanjali's work. He 
maintains that this section treats the entire Yoga with exhaustive 
completeness. He also considers this portion as the oldest since i t 
does not mention either the klesas or any other terms reminiscent of 
buddhist thought as active i n the f i r s t centuries A.D. 
E. FRAUWALLNER (1953> I» 427), similarly, seems to regard the 
81 
delineation of the eightfold path (lI.28-III.55) as the nucleus 
of the vulgate. He looks .upon this tradition as a variant of a 
basic conception of Yoga which i s also represented by Buddhism, 
and contrasts this with the nirodha tradition as expounded i n the 
f i r s t chapter of the Yoga-Sutra: 
V/ith i t s doctrine of the eightfold Yoga the system 
of Yoga has not created anything essentially new, 
but has recast old elements i n an extraordinarily happy 
form, whose clear classification and systematic 
numerical arrangement best suited the Indian mentality. 
No wonder that this form of Yoga quickly gained 
33 
popularity and diffusion. 
Of typological relevance i s the fact that the yoga-aftga material 
is conspicuous by virtue of i t s non-philosophical but s t r i c t l y 
practice-oriented tone. Granted that the yoga-aftga aphorisms quoted 
i n the vulgate constitute a more or less complete 'text', i t i s 
necessary to explain this eight-phase model historically. First of 
a l l , the present thesis that there existed once a Yoga text which came 
to be incorporated into the vulgate has a logical consequence. This is 
that the yoga-anga tract as a separate whole i s anterior to the vulgate. 
I t would, however, be erroneous to assume that therefore the t o t a l 
conceptual content of this text must also precede that of the kriya-yoga 
text into which i t was inserted. For, as I have pointed out before, 
Patanjali (as the hypothetical author of the vulgate) did not erect 
33 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I . 444-45) 
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his philosophical structure i n an absolute vacuum. Rather his 
elaborate treatment was based on subjacent layers of philosophical 
formulation and systematisation, though i t proves near impossible 
to disentangle the many strands of thought which led up to 
the creation of Classical Yoga. 
J.W. HA.UER (1958) suggests that asta-anga-yoga must be 
placed i n the proximity of the Nyaya school of thought. This i s 
certainly an imaginative attempt to resolve the d i f f i c u l t i e s but 
one which i s not substantiated by the tenuous evidence supplied 
by him. On the other hand, a comparison between the asta-anga 
tradition and the sad-anga-yoga seems more promising. The latte r 
made i t s f i r s t appearance i n the Maitrayanlya-Upanisad and thus 
incontrovertibly precedes the classical eightfold model. The 
relevant reference i s VI.18: tatha tat-prayoga-kalpah pranayamah 
pratyaharo dhyanam dharana tarkah samadhih gad-anga-ity-ucyate yogah. 
In translation: "The standard for effecting this [unity of the Onej is 
this: control of the life-force, sense-withdrawal, meditative-
absorption, concentration, tarka, enstasy — this i s jwhat i s j called 
the Yoga of six members." 
A juxtaposition of this schema with the well-known eightfold 
model of the yoga-anga text shows up the differences and similarities 
between both systematisations: 
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SA^ -AflGA-YOGA ASTA-AftGA-YOGA 
pranayama <• 
yama 
niyama 
asana 
• pranayama 
pratyahara « » pratyahara 
dhyana 
dhyana 
gamadhi 
samadhi 
samyama 
The most striking distinction between these two schemata i s (a) 
the absence of yama, niyama and asana i n the sad-anga-yoga, (b)-
the reversal of the categories of dharana and dhyana and (c) the 
appearance of a new element called tarka. Although the f i r s t three 
members of the classical eightfold path are missing i n the six-
phase model, they nonetheless are present i n the Maitrayanxya-
Upanisad i n a pre-systematic form. The transposition of dhyana and 
dharana can easily be explained by the intimate relation which 
exists between these two yogic processes. This leaves the category 
34 
of tarka to be explained. 
J.W. HAUBR (1958) f u l l y recognises the importance of tarka i n 
this series, and he relates i t to the buddhist vitarka-dhyana which 
he holds to be a development of the upanisadic tarka. s. DASGUPTA 
34 The popular notion that these angas are 'stages' or 'rungs' on a 
ladder i s evidently wrong. 
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(1930) also seems to subscribe to the view that tarka i s of hindu 
origin. He seeks to circumscribe this term i n the following way: 
Now, from the account of the sixty-two heresies given 
i n the Brahmajalasutta» we know that there were people 
who either from meditation of three degrees or, fourthly, 
through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both 
the external world as a whole and individual souls were 
eternal. From the association of this last mentioned 
logical school with the concentration (samadhi) or 
meditation (dhyana) school as belonging to one class of 
thinkers professing eternalism (sas*vatavada) and from the 
inclusion of tarka as an accessory (aftga) i n concentration 
(samadhi), we can f a i r l y assume that the l i s t of the 
accessories (afiga) given i n the Maitrayana Upanishad 
represents the oldest l i s t of the Toga doctrine when the 
Sankhya and the Yoga were i n a process of being grafted 
upon each other and when the Sankhya method of discussion 
had not stood as a method independent of the Yoga. The 
substitution of postures (asana) for thinking (tarka) 
i n the l i s t of Patafljali shows that the Yoga method had now 
— 35 
grown into a method separate from the Sankhya. 
Aside objections of a historical nature which one may raise against 
S. DASGUPTA's pronouncements, i t i s also highly improbable that 
35 S. DAS GUPTA (1930, 65-66) 
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i n the above-cited verse from the Maitrayaniya-Upanisad, the term 
tarka has the meaning of ' thinking*. I can also not agree with 
M. BLIADE's (19735» 125) rendering of this word with •reflection' 
and 'strength of judgment'. However, he i s correct i n stating 
that this is a rare term i n yogic texts. He quotes, interestingly 
enough, a stanza from the Amrtabindu-Upanisad (16) where tarka 
i s defined as 'meditation that i s not contrary to the Jastra'. 
I think this traditional explanation i s far more i n keeping with 
the original core meaning of this concept as employed i n yogic 
contexts. This appears to have been on R. DAVIDS' (1936, 136) mind 
when explaining tarka as 'intellectual a c t i v i t y ' with the added 
proviso: "...that tarka counted for much i n yoga was not true. The 
mental act i v i t y which we are tending today to c a l l i n t u i t i o n , an 
attitude the reverse of intellectual, i.e. analytical a c t i v i t y , i s 
more akin to yoga." 
This whole question has been opened up again by A. ZIGHUND-
CERHU (1963, 128-34) and more recently by C. PENSA (1973? 9-24). 
In C. PENSA's (1973^ opinion, the sad-anga-yoga i s prior to the 
asta-anga path, although i t was by no means only the l a t t e r which 
came to be widely accepted. Various versions of the sad-anga model 
were preserved and kept alive i n later traditions, particularly 
i n the krama system of KasmlrZ Saivism. According to C. PENSA 
(1973» 11) this type of Yoga "must have had a place of the greatest 
36 Upon checking I discovered that the quotation i s not from the 
Amrtabindu- but from the Amrtanadabindu-Upanisad and reads: 
agamasya-avirodhena uhanam'tarka ucyate. See A.M. MAHADEVA SASTRI's 
edition of the text (1968^, 17). 
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importance i n later periods, within the Tantric, Hindu and 
Buddhist speculation and practice". He draws special attention 
to the central role which tarka plays i n these northern schools 
emphasising that i t does not mean, as commonly held, 'logic* or 
'reasoning', but that i t i s defined as the equivalent of bhavana 
or suddha-vidya, that i s , the supreme realisation or enlightenment. 
I t also has a seoond meaning, v i z . 'reflection' technically known 
as cintamaya (see e.g. Malinlvi.jaya IV.28), being a propedeutic 
exercise conducive to bhavana. Thus in the KasmirT schools at any 
rate, tarka denotes both the supreme illumination and the means 
thereto'. I t is suggested that i n the Maitrayanlya-Upanisad, tarka / 
i s used i n the instrumental sense, otherwise VI.20 would be / 
unintelligible. 
There appears to be a certain continuity between the sad-anga 
tradition of the Maitrayanlya-Upanisad and later hindu and buddhist 
schools. However, this six-phase model never achieved the same -
f i x i t y as did the eightfold schema of asta-anga-yoga which i s 
obviously an elaboration of the former type. Yet while the classical 
eightfold path was being formulated, other schools notably i n 
Buddhism continued to favour sixfold models. I t i s not clear why 
tarka was dropped i n the formulation of the eightfold path. But 
the most l i k e l y explanation i s that i t never has been a typical 
feature of hindu Yoga but rather.should be seen as belonging to 
the doctrinal sphere of Buddhism, J.W. BAUER's (1958, 102) 
conjecture that the buddhist term vitarkaMhyana i s modelled on 
the tarka of the Maitrayaniya-Upanisad puts the cart before the horse. 
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The buddhist influence on this scripture i s beyond dispute. 
As concerns the yoga-anga section, nothing can be said about 
any buddhist bias i n i t . I t s semblance with the Buddha's doctrine 
does not go beyond the hardly significant fact that formally 
both asta-anga-yoga and Hinayana Buddhism subscribe to an eightfold 
classification system. The appalling lack of data makes i t 
impossible to ascertain the exact place of the asta-anga tradition 
within the context of ancient Indian soteriological speculation. 
Somewhat less enigmatic, albeit by no means perfectly manifest, 
are the connections between the kriya-yoga and the ramifying network 
of contemporaneous ethico-religious traditions. P. DEUSSEN (1920,1, 
561), l i k e so many other scholars, f a i l s to appreciate the 
significance of the kriya-yoga tradition i n the Yoga-Sutra. He 
wrongly deems i t to be a preparatory stage, out of which evolved 
the later hatha-yoga. He also seems to entertain the strange notion 
that this tradition i s dealt with only i n the f i r s t two aphorisms 
57 -of the second chapter. The fanciful equation of kriya-yoga with 
hafrha-yoga is also accepted by M. MU1LER (1916*, 344f.) who likewise 
does not appear to be aware of the philosophical import of the 
sutras commencing with I I . 1 . 
G. JHA (1907, x - x i ) , again, translates the.compound kriya-yoga 
with 'disciplinary Yoga', argu^ing that i t i s suited for the yxft.iana. 
i.e. the second of the three stages of yogic accomplishment, whereas 
the asta-anga-yoga is allegedly for the beginner or aruruksu. This 
37 See P. DEUSSEN (1920J,509) 
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far-fetched explanation seems to be according to Vijnana Bhiksu's 
Yoga-Sara-Samgraha (p»3)» edited by G. JHA (1933 )• Also 
E. ERAUWALLNER (1953» I » 427) subscribes to the view that kriya-
yoga leads up to asta-afiga-yoga. M. ELIADE's (1973^> 39) standpoint 
i s not evident. Only J.W. BAUER (1958, 236) and A. JANASEK (1954) 
recognise the independence of the kriya-yoga tradition, though 
both again are mistaken about the extent of the kriya-yoga 
»section1 i n the Yoga-Sutra. 
With the exception of those aphorisms which deal with the 
eight 'members', the whole of Fatanjali's work can be said to be 
an exposition of kriya-yoga. Not only i s kriya-yoga not a prepara-
tory stage to asta-a&ga-yoga. but i t i s a type of Yoga i n i t s own 
right, and one which i s theoretically far more advanced than 
the asta-anga tradition. The wide-spread misconception about 
this kriya-yoga and the consequent over-evaluation of the asta-anga 
model is tentatively criticised i n a paper by S. TAKAGI (1966, 451ff.). 
He examines the three components of kriya-yoga, viz. tapas. svadhyaya 
and Isvara-pranidhana. i n their historical eontext. Although his 
paper is basically a review of previous research and not too 
c r i t i c a l , the author r i g h t l y concludes that the kriya-yoga "was 
not a mere arrangement on the part of the author, but that such had 
existed as an independent form of religious practice"^. He further-
more makes the valuable observation that there are some striking 
parallels between the kriya-yoga tradition i n the Yoga-Sutra and 
38 S. TAKAGI (1966, 442) 
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the Mahabharata. However, i n the end he adopts E. FRAWALLNER's 
(l953$nonsensical distinction between nirodha-yoga and asta-
anga-yoga. 
The term kriya^-yoga i s an interesting one. According to 
G.A. JACOB (1891) the word kriya i s not to be met with i n the 
earlier upanisadic literature. Possibly i t s f i r s t occurrence i s 
in Pacini's AsftadhyaVl (ill.3.100), and the compound kriya-yoga 
i s used i n Patanjali's Mahabhasya (l.1.H). Presumably originally 
kriya, l i k e i t s synonym karman, simply denoted 'action' or 
'activity'. Maybe as the word karman came to be increasingly more 
invested with an eschatological meaning, viz. 'action-determinant', 
the term kriya gradually acquired the sense of ' r i t e ' or ' r i t u a l i s t i c 
a c t i v i t y ' • 
In the Mahabharata. one of the great landmarks i n the history 
of Yoga, the compound kriya-yoga i s mentioned only twice. Both 
references were f i r s t pointed out by.E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 366 & 371). 
He interprets the one instance (XIII.14.22: nnana-siddhi-kriya-yogaih)^ 
i n terms of "the kind of Yoga-science characterized by necessary 
external actions as compared with that characterized by discarding this 
i n favour of psychical perfection", in.other words as hatha-yoga, but 
the text f a i l s to bear him out on th i s . Of greater interest i n relation 
to the Yoga-Sutra i s the second reference, viz. III.2.22: tad-asu-
pratikarac-ca Batatam ca-avicintanat. adhi-vyadhi-prasamanam kriya-
yoga-dvayena tu. or: "These ^physical a f f l i c t i o n s are to be dealt 
w i t h J by swift countermeasures and always by jjproperj reflection, but 
the healing of ^ psychological] ailments (adhivyadhi) i s by means of 
39 This i s not according to the c r i t i c a l edition by V.S.SUKTHANKAR 
EfeoMbly to the Calcutta edition. 
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kriya-yoga." 
Even though E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 371) contends that the \ 
phrase kriya-yoga-dvayena need not necessarily imply Toga, this / 
stanza reminds one immediately of the aphorism 1.30 i n the 
Yoga-Sutra which l i s t s the so-called citta-viksepas. In fact the 
f i r s t item to be mentioned i s vyadhi. That this i s not coincidental 
i s evidenced by the entire tenor of the epic.passage i n question* 
which i s a l l about suffering and i t s removal* Thus verse III.2.23 
reads: manasena h i duhkhena sariram-upatapyate, ayah pindena taptena 
kumbha-samstham-iva-udakam. or: "From mental pain the body is 
agonised, as £whenj a hot iron bar i s put i n a pot of water." To 
alleviate this pain, gnosis or .jnana i s recommended. Furthermore, 
i t i s emphasised that sneba ('attachment') i s at the root of a l l 
pain (see III . 2 * 2 6 ) . Sneha. again, gives bir t h to trsna or the 
' t h i r s t ' for l i f e which is said to lead a person to ruin* In 
subsequent stanzas the value of samtosa or 'contentment' i s praised. 
One cannot avoid the conclusion that this epic kriya-yoga 
foreshadows the kriya-yoga of Patanjali. The obvious l i n k between 
them i s the doctrine of suffering or duhkha as f u l l y developed i n 
the Yoga-Sutra i n the shape of the klesa theory. Both versions of 
kriya-yoga share the same 'cl i n i c a l ' approach to the alleviation of 
sorrow by means of gnostic illumination* 
I now proceed with a brief description of the three components 
of kriya-yoga 'proper', vi z . tapas, svadhyaya and Is*vara-pranidhana. 
In the Yoga-Sutra the term tapas seems to be used i n a generic, 
multivalent way. No actual definition i s provided, presumably 
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because the word was not intended i n any technical sense. Hence 
i t i s best translated with 'austerity 1 or 'asc e s i s 1 or perhaps 
even ' s p i r i t u a l exercise'. The difference between tapas and 
abhyasa or 'practice' must be c a r e f u l l y registered. The l a t t e r 
i s employed as a formal parameter of the yogic path i n association 
with vairagya or 'dispassion' which i s i t s negative correlate as 
i t were* Tapas. on the other hand, suggests a d e f i n i t e , concrete 
content* S t r i c t l y speaking, i t pertains to the abhyasa category. 
I n the yoga-anga section (see 11.43) i t i s stated that "on 
account of tapas. as a r e s u l t of the dwindling of the impurity, 
indriya-siddhir-a'Buddhi-ksayat-tapasah). but, again, t h i s i s no 
de f i n i t i o n . I n view of the secondary position of tapas i n the yoga-
anga t r a c t , i t i s r p o s s i b l e to speculate that i t may have.a 
more narrow connotation here than i n the kriya-yoga part. 
A s i m i l a r proviso must be made i n regard to the interpretation 
of the objective of svadhyaya as given out i n II , 4 4 » v i z * "contact 
with the chosen deity" (ista-devata-samprayogah). I n the k r i y a -
yoga t r a d i t i o n svadhyaya has probably a l e s s sectarian meaning. 
However, that i t simply stands for ' r e c i t a t i o n ' , as maintained 
by S. TAKAG-I (1966, 445) and others* i s u n l i k e l y . Considering 
the philosophical, 'learned' character of Pa t a n j a l i ' s t r a d i t i o n , 
one would rather expect svadhyaya to s i g n i f y 'self-study•, i n the 
sense of adhyayana or 'reading of s c r i p t u r e s ' . I n the Tattvartha-
Sutra (lX .25) of Umasvati (or Umasvamin). svadhyaya i s described as 
having f i v e forms* namely vacana or 'teaching', pracchana or 'con-
fthere comes about the perfection of the bodily organs" (kaya-
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sult a t i o n ' , anuprekga or 'contemplation*, amnaya or 'revising' and 
dharma-upadesa or ' preaching the lav;'. 
The t h i r d constituent of the t r i a d of practices c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of kriya-yoga i s Is*vara-pranidhana. Quite possibly i t i s t h i s 
feature which has misled so many interpreters into believing that 
kriya-yoga i s mere r i t u a l a c t i v i t y and preparatory to the asfo-anga 
path. This misconception was reinforced by the equally f a l l a c i o u s 
notion that isVara was introduced into C l a s s i c a l Yoga from the 
outside. The paramount significance of Isvara-pranidhana i s borne 
out by the f a c t that i t figures as an important element i n both 
yogic traditions present i n the Yoga-Sutra. 
As i s apparent from I.23ff•» Ssvara-pranidhana i s an i n t r i n s i c 
part of the practice structure of kriya-yoga, though again, i t i s 
nowhere defined unless one turns 1.28 into a d e f i n i t i o n . This 
aphorisms runs as follows: ta.i-.1 a pas-tad-art ha-bhavanam, or: "Re-
c i t a t i o n of that ^ pranava, i . e . ojpj jleads toj the r e a l i s a t i o n of 
i t s content^Ls. the Lor<^". Vyasa furnishes us vjith two, maybe 
complementary, explanations of what the practice of Isvara-pranidhana 
e n t a i l s , and both are f a r removed from the notion of 'reci t a t i o n ' 
(japa} as referred to i n 1.28. 
pranidhanad-bhakti-vi^e3ad-avar.iita Isvaras-tam-
anugrhnaty-abhidhyana-matrena tad-abhidhyana-matrad-api 
yogina asanna-tarah samadhi-labhah samadhi-phalam ca 
b h a v a t i - i t i . (l . 2 3 ) 
"On account of pranidhana, ["that i s | through a p a r t i c u l a r 
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love-attachment (bhakti) jiiowards him], the Lord 
i n c l i n e s j^tovrards the yoginj, and favours him alone 
by reason of h i s ^meditative-devotional} disposition 
(abhidhyana). By t h i s d i s position only, the yogin 
draws near to the attainment of enstasy and the f r u i t 
of enstasy ^ i . e . emancipation}." 
isvara-pranidhanam sarva-kriyanam parama-gurav-
aparnam tat-phala-samnyaso va. ( l l . 1 ; also 11.32) 
"Pranidhana to the Lord i s the offering-up of a l l 
deeds to the supreme teacher, or the renunciation of 
their f r u i t s . " 
Whereas the former interpretation echoes the bhakti-yoga of the 
Bhagavad-Gita, the l a t t e r presents i n a nutshell the essence of 
karma-yoga. Nonetheless, Vyasa t e l l s us nothing about possible 
technical devices employed externally or i n t e r n a l l y to execute 
t h i s pranidhana. 
The history of the word pranidhana. which, I have l e f t un-
translated so f a r , i s rather obscure* I t i s composed of the prefixes 
pra + n i and the root Jdha. ('to put, place!) and has the l i t e r a l 
meaning of 'putting together, application'. I n the Bhagavad-Gita 
j 
(XI»44) the gerund pranidhaya i n the sense of 'prostrating^the body] 1 
i s used, but t h i s seems to be the.only instance throughout the e a r l i e r 
Upanisads (see G.A. JACOB , '.1891). I t appears that pranidhana 
belonged o r i g i n a l l y to the buddhist phraseology. 
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I^vara-pranidhana i s usually translated with *devotion to the 
Lord*, but 'devotion* i s a somewhat ambiguous word, and I think 
that pranidhana has none of the emotive overtones generally attached 
to t h i s term i n r e l i g i o u s contexts. Perhaps the buddhist usage of 
pranidhana provides the e s s e n t i a l clue for understanding t h i s 
important concept within the hindu realm of teaching. I n the 
mahayanic scriptures, such as the s'atasahasrika (XJ458) and 
the Abhisamayalankara ( l . 6 8 ) , pranidhana i s employed i n the sense of 
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• r e s o l v e 1 . I t i s a kind of positive affirmation of, or respect f o r , 
the Lord. Again no r i t u a l i s t i c practice need be involved here. 
Perhaps pranidhana e n t a i l s the idea of 'emulation', which could be 
explained by the other buddhist usage i n the sense of 'plans for 
the future', as i n the Abhisamavalankara (lV.18) and the Pancaviinsati-
sahasrika (299). 
I s v a r a . unquestioningly, i s the archetypal yogin. I n order to a t t a i n 
to Ms l o f t y estate, that i s to recover one's S e l f - i d e n t i t y as the 
transcendental purusa, i t i s natural to think of him as a guide or . 
Vorbild. The grace which the Lord beBtows on theyogin by vi r t u e of 
h i s efforts i n emulating the divine being, i s not a c t u a l l y mentioned i n 
the Yoga-Sutra but i t can safely be assumed i n view of the antecedent 
developments leading up to the peculiar theism of C l a s s i c a l Yoga. 
I t has, I t r u s t , become evident that the kriya-yoga of P a t a n j a l i 
i s not a mere preliminary r i t u a l to the astanga-yoga tradition, but 
an independent type of Yoga with i t s s p e c i f i c p r a c t i c a l and theoretical 
framework. Despite.the f a c t that the t r i a d of tapas, svadhyaya and 
40 See E. CONZE (1967) 
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xsvar a-pranidhana were understood i n a r i t u a l i s t i c sense i n the 
pre - c l a s s i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , i n the Yoga-Sutra t h i s i s no longer the 
case except perhaps i n a metaphorical way i f one concedes that 
a l l Yoga i s in t e r n a l i s e d r i t u a l . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to observe that the r i t u a l i s t i c character 
of kriya-yoga has been retains!or revived, i n the doctrinal sphere 
of the Paranaa where the old association of k r i v a with ' r i t u a l 
action' has not been forgotten by reason of the a c t i v e c u l t i c 
worship among the Vaisnavas and Saivas. This leads one to 
conclude that only i n the s t r i c t l y philosophical yoga-dara'ana 
did tapas. svadhyaya and IsVara-pranidhana acquire a n o n - r i t u a l i s t i c 
meaning. 
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F A R T T H R E E 
S E M A N T I C I N V E S T I G A T I O N S 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS. 
1. I s v a r a 
The ontology of C l a s s i c a l Yoga, or kriya-yoga, has three 
f o c i , v i z . Is*vara, -purusa and p r a k r t i . These are deemed irreducible 
ontic ultimates. The most d i s t i n c t i v e feature of the ontology of 
Pa t a n j a l i ' s school of thought and, I wish to contend, of any form 
of hindu Yoga, i s the concept of 'the Lord' or xsvara. 
The word l s v a r a i s a derivative of the verbal rootyJx£ ('to 
r u l e ' ) , current already at the time of the ancient vedic samhitas. 
Synonyms are l£, l£a and Isana; I s v a r a being the more prevalent 
form i n l a t e r periods. I t conveys the notion of a highest personal 
god, a t times endowed with certain anthropomorphic characteristics 
but never t o t a l l y divorced from the concept of the impersonal 
absolute, the brahman, of philosophical enquiry. The term is'vara 
i s intimately bound up with the history of theism i n India. 
Repeated attempts have been made i n the past to trace the evolution 
of t h i s c r u c i a l religio-fahilosophical concept. One of the f i r s t 
scholars to apply himself to the study of the history of theism 
was P.M. MULLER. He distinguishes three major stages a l l of which 
can be evidenced i n the vedic age; they are (1) Polytheism, 
(2) Henotheism (or Kathenotheism), (3*) Monotheism and (3 b) 
Pantheism. 
Thus on the most primitive l e v e l M. MILLER (1916^) envisages 
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a kind of theological pluralism i n which the thirty-three known 
gods of the rgvedic pantheon were regarded as embodiments or 
abstractions of natural phenomena. On the basis of t h i s diffuse 
conceptual stage the need arose for a u n i f i c a t i o n of the multiple 
devas populating the heavens. According to M. MILLER the notion 
of the visve-devaa (• all-gods') was a f i r s t step i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . 
Certain gods were i d e n t i f i e d with each other or coupled together as 
i n the oase of Mitra-Varuna and Agni-Soma etc. On the next stage, 
as M. MDLLER sees i t , a s i n g l e god was invoked under the temporary 
• a 
forgetfulness of a l l other gods. M. MDLLER devises for t h i s 
phenomenon the term Henotheism (al s o : Kathenotheism). From then on 
the development proceeded i n a bifurcate l i n e . On the one hand 
i t gave r i s e to monotheistic conceptions and on the other hand to 
Pantheism with i t s impersonal absolute. 
The entire problem was renewedly investigated by H. JACOBI (1923). 
I n principle accepting M. MULLER's (1916*) c l a s s i f i c a t o r y system, 
he modifies somewhat his formulation of the nature of Henotheism i n 
that he prefers to regard i t not so much as a d i r e c t pre-stage to 
Monotheism, but as a r e j e c t i o n of the gods as t o t a l l y independent 
e n t i t i e s and thus as a preparatory stage for the development of the 
concept of the impersonal quintessence (or brahman) of the manifest 
world. 
The concept of brahman (neutr.) was of f i r s t - r a t e importance 
i n the r e l i g i o u s and philosophical speculations of the post-vedic 
period and, as S. DASGUPTA (1963^, I , 20) remarks, i t "has been 
the highest glory f o r the Vedanta philosophy of l a t e r days". I n one 
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sense i t i s antipodal to the idea of Is*vara, yet i n another sense 
i t can be said to complement i t , or perhaps even p a r t i a l l y define 
i t . For i n the formulation of the notion of a personal god the 
idea of the omnipresent and omnitemporal ground of being i s never 
l o s t sight of o 
The idea of the personal deity i s anticipated i n the vedic 
conception of the 'unknown god1 (14. MULLER's phrase) eulogised 
i n X.121, as also i n the conception of Prajapati, Dhatr, Visvakarman, 
Tvastr and Purusa (see X.90). Whether or not one interprets these 
according to some preconceived evolutionist scheme as the culmination 
of a primitive polytheist medley, by the time the bulk of the 
Mahabharata had been composed the concept of la*vara was firmly 
established i n the re l i g i o u s sector of Indian culture* The theism 
of the epic i s l a r g e l y analogous to that of the metric Upanisads, 
such as the Svetas'vatara- and the Ka]:ha-Upani sad and not l e a s t the 
Bhagavad-Glta. This highlights an interesting point, namely i t brings 
out the close r e l a t i o n which exi s t s between the concept of is'vara, 
Samkhya ontological ideas and yogic practice. Their j o i n t occurrence 
i n the post-buddhist period i s c e r t a i n l y remarkable and o a l l s f o r 
an explanation. 
B. KDMARAPPA (1934, 3) , i n a s l i g h t l y d i fferent context, suggests 
that theological speculation was o r i g i n a l l y triggered off by the 
primary question "Whence t h i s universe?". He thus l i n k s up theism with 
cosmological and e t i o l o g i c a l considerations, which would seem to 
have the supportive evidence of the many creation theories i n the 
Upanisads, But perhaps t h i s i s merely one half of the f u l l answer. 
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A d i f f e r e n t solution to t h i s problem i s possible i f one places 
proper emphasis on the f a c t i t i s not only the speculative 
Samkhya which i s bound up with the I s v a r a concept but also the 
age-old experimental t r a d i t i o n of Yoga* Basing myself on 
R. OTTO's (1959) acknowledgement of an innate capacity i n man 
f o r numinous experiencing, I wish to propose that Is*vara i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y and primarily an experiential construct arrived at 
through yogic self-absorption rather than theological r a t i o c i n a t i o n . 
I n t h i s respect i t can be aligned with the other ontological cate-
gories of Samkhya and Yoga which, as I w i l l show, are most 
appropriately understood as being phenomenological d i s t i l l a t i o n s 
of meditative-enstatic experiences. However. I must emphasise 
that t h i s l i n e of argumentation does i n no way imply either an 
affirmation or a denial of the objective r e a l i t y of any of these 
categories of experience* 
I t has not always been appreciated that theism i s woven 
into the very f a b r i c of hindu Yoga. Thus i n R. GARBE's (1896) 
opinion, Yoga i s a t h e i s t i c re-interpretation of the n i r l s v a r a 
t r a d i t i o n of ancient Samkhya. He speculates (p. 50) that thiB 
acceptance of I s v a r a into Yoga was the l i k e l y r e s u l t of an 
effo r t to make Yoga more acceptable to the popular s t r a t a of 
society. H. OLDENBERG (1915, 281) asks: "Did t h i s b e l i e f o r i g i n a l l y 
pertain to Yoga as an e s s e n t i a l element? Have Samkhya and Yoga 
always been dif f e r e n t i a t e d i n the way the epic has i t and as they 
are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n their c l a s s i c a l forms: as an a t h e i s t i c and 
a t h e i s t i c system respectively? This seems doubtful. The practice 
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of Yoga obviously does not necessarily presuppose the notion 
of god(...) V i s i b l e proof that a system greatly suffused with 
yogic elements could nonetheless r e j e c t the.belief i n god i s 
supplied by the doctrine (..;) of the Buddha." 
This stance has been challenged e a r l y on i n the controversy 
by H. JACOBI (1923, 39) who writes: "This assertion of IsVara 
has been interpreted as a concession of Yoga to Brahmanism, which 
i s surely wrong; rather one should admire the audacity and 
the courage of a school of philosophy which* i n the face of the 
prevalent atheism i n philosophical and orthodox c i r c l e s , dared 
to put forward the existence of Isvara (#..) as one of i t s 
doctrinal axioms." H. JACOBI thus reaffirms L. VON SCHROEDER's 
(1887* 687) contention that "Yoga has a d i s t i n c t t h e i s t i c 
character". This has been d e f i n i t i v e l y confirmed by more recent 
research into the p r e - c l a s s i c a l configurations of the Samkhya 
school of thought. I n an outstanding contribution* K.B.R. RAO 
(1966) has conclusively demonstrated the i n t r i n s i c t h e i s t i c 
nature of the p r e - c l a s s i c a l Samkhya schools. His comprehensive . 
study f u l l y corroborates and consolidates F. EDGERTON's (1924* 
8) findings: "Where* then* do we fin d that 'original' a t h e i s t i c 
view expressed? I believe: nowhere. A study of the epic and 
other early materials (••*) has convinced me that there i s not 
a single passage i n which d i s b e l i e f i n Brahman or God i s 
attributed to Sankhya." 
H. JACOBI (1923) sees a connection between the employment 
of tapas and the b e l i e f i n I s v a r a . He points out that not 
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infrequently the declared purpose of the f e a r f u l a s c e t i c practices 
was to get the attention of a p a r t i c u l a r deity who. impressed 
and g r a t i f i e d with the tapasvin 1 s s e l f - i n f l i c t e d hardship and 
unflinching endurance, would bestow a boon on. him. He mentions 
i n passing that i n such a context the deity was generally known 
as varada or 'bestower of the boon 1. He then states (p. 29): 
"For the popular conception at l e a s t , the grace of the deity 
was a necessary precondition f o r the recompense of a s c e t i c 
exertion. I t seems but natural that Yoga should adopt the 
recognition of Isvara into i t s system." 
This view i s reiterated i n many modern studies, e s p e c i a l l y 
on the history of r e l i g i o n s . Thus N. SMART (1968, 30), a t y p i c a l 
proponent of t h i s misconception, writes: "... Yoga has borrowed 
a concept from popular r e l i g i o n and put i t to a special use." 
As he asser t s elsewhere (1971, 163), Yoga i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
an a t h e i s t i c system. No reasons are- supplied. H. JAGOBI (1923) 
at l e a s t offers some kind of explanation even though i t i s 
unacceptable. For, what his interpretation amounts to i s the r e -
duction of the conception of a personal god to one of two actors 
i n a process of bargaining: the a s c e t i c e x c e l l s himself and i s 
rewarded or 'paid o f f by the deity. I do not contest that t h i s 
may be exactly the essence of many of the a s c e t i c 'deals' 
recorded i n the epic. But I f i n d i t unsound reasoning to take t h i s 
as a h i s t o r i c a l prelude to the act of grace (nrasada) spoken of 
i n l a t e r Yoga. I prefer to understand such legends as 
f o l k l o r i s t i c interpretations of a phenomenon which could well 
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be a parameter of mystical experiencing: the ultimate 
crossing of the threshold of phenomenal existence as a 
transcendental act xfhich appears to be i n i t i a t e d as i t were 
from 'outside' or 'above*. 
The idea i m p l i c i t i n H. JACOBI's (1923) suggestion that 
P a t a n j a l i i n a way made a compromise to placate the orthodoxy 
i s preposterous. Imputing to the famous Yoga teacher such 
hypocrisy, i t i s hardly suprising that his precise philosophical 
position has never been appraised i n any d e t a i l . 
Less objectionable but s i m i l a r l y unconvincing i s M. MULLER13 
(1916 , 326) psychological explanation. Rejecting the h i s t o r i c a l 
argument according to which P a t a n j a l i merely sought to appease 
the orthodox brahmanas, M. MULLER instead suggests that i t was 
the natural human craving for a f i r s t cause which led P a t a n j a l i 
to the postulation of I s v a r a . I f this were correct one would 
expect Tsvara to have a t l e a s t one d e f i n i t e cosmological function; 
yet 'the lord' i s neither the creator, sustainer or destroyer of 
the universe. The ' f i r s t cause* of which M. MULLER speaks i s , 
i n P a t a n j a l i 1 s system, the world-ground or p r a k r t i , the et e r n a l l y 
creative matrix of the manifest world. 
As against the above h i s t o r i c a l and psychological explanations 
of the concept of lavara, I wish to propose that i t s origins l i e 
i n the realm of yogic experiencing i t s e l f . This i s also M. ELIADE's 
(1973 » 75) conclusion: " P a t a n j a l i nevertheless had to introduce 
Isvara into Yoga, for I s v a r a was, so to speak, an experiential 
datum..." This of course does not imply that P a t a n j a l i ' s formulation 
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of the concept i s a creation ex n i h i l . I t i s obvious from a 
perusal of the Mahabharata, espe c i a l l y c e r t a i n portions of 
the twelfth parvan. that the conceptualisation of IsVara i n 
C l a s s i c a l Yoga has i t s epic antecedents. 
Philosophically the most important treatment of the t h e i s t i c 
component i n epio Yoga i s to be found i n section X I I . 2 9 6 ^ of 
the c r i t i c a l edition of the Mahabharata. Here hiranyagarbha-yoga 
i s dealt with which K.B.R. RAO (1966, 278) wrongly i d e n t i f i e s 
as the philosophy of the epic Yoga system par .excellence. 
However, t h i s s l i p does not detract from the general merit of 
his acute a n a l y s i s of t h i s particular school of Yoga. On the 
basis of P.M. MODI'S (1932) e a r l i e r work, he succeeded i n 
undertaking a complete reinterpretation of the above passage 
which has been lamentably misconstrued by P. EDGBRTON (1965) 
and others. He managed to reconstruct a good deal of the 
philosophy sketched i n these extremely d i f f i c u l t and obscure 
verses. 
Accepting i n pr i n c i p l e the general epic theories about 
the twenty-three evolutes of the unitary world-ground, the 
hiranyagarbha school of Yoga introduces the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the S e l f which has recovered i t s innate enlightenment, v i z . the 
so-called buddhyamana, and the ever-enlightened buddha or prabuddha 
I n comparison with the l a t t e r , i . e . god, the enlightened S e l f i s 
41 K.B.R. RAO (1966) follows one of the e a r l i e r editions of the 
Mahabharata where t h i s passage i s XII.308. 
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said to be abuddhiman (see v s . 17). Thus there i s no str a i g h t 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the' twenty-fifth t a t t v a . v i z . buddhyamana. 
with the twenty-sixth which i s the supreme godhead. The l a t t e r 
p r i n c i p l e i s also referred to as IsVara, maha-atman and avyakta-
brahman. The buddhyamana i s also c a l l e d purusa and buddha (which 
confusingly enough i s a l s o applied to the twenty-sixth t a t t v a ) • 
The twenty-fourth principle* which i s the insentient world-ground* 
i s known by the name of p r a k r t i , abuddha. avyakta and apratibuddha. 
I t i s said of the buddbyamana (see vs. 2) that i t creates* 
upholds and withdraws the gunas of the world-ground and that i t 
'knows' or apperceives the world-ground (see vs. 3) whilst i t s e l f 
being nirguna (see vs.,4) and hence 'unknown' by the avyakta. 
On the other hand* the buddhyamana does not apperceive the lord 
(see v s . 6) who i s pure* incomprehensible* eternal and always 
apperceiving (see v s . 7 ) . This maha-atman or great being permeates 
both the v i s i b l e and the i n v i s i b l e (see vs. 8 ) . When the buddhyamana 
or S e l f i d e n t i f i e s i t s e l f with something that i s external to i t s 
being i t i s known as avyakta-locana (see v s . 10). Taking h i s cue 
from XII.296.18 (= XII.284.18 c r i t . e d . ) f K.B.R.RAO (1966, 282) 
interpr e t s t h i s term as "wearing the spectacles of p r a k r t i " or 
"seeing through the avyakta" by means of the organ of cognition 
(which i s buddhi) father than understanding t h i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
compound i n the p l a i n sense of "seeing the avyakta". 
The goal of t h i s Yoga i s na t u r a l l y also quite d i f f e r e n t from 
that enunciated i n the contemporaneous Samkhya and Pancaratra schools. 
which implies a merger of the phenomenal s e l f with the universal S e l f . 
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This difference i s evident from such phrases as buddhatva (XII.296.11), 
kevala-dharma ( v s . 12) or kevalena samagamya ( v s . 13)» These, imply 
that the Tauddhvamana atta i n s to the 'estate' of the twenty-sixth 
pr i n c i p l e without becoming i d e n t i c a l with i t • I n other words, 
laVara always remains transcendent (para). I t never becomes involved 
with any of the lower t a t t y a s . Thus emancipation can be said to. be 
a condition of the buddhyamana qua the buddhyamana i n the 'company* 
(samiti) of the lord (see XII.296.27ff.). 
The metaphysics of t h i s dominant school of Yoga i n epic times 
undoubtedly provided the basis for the peculiar ontology of C l a s s i c a l 
Yoga. This was f i r s t pointed out by P.M. MODI (1932, 81): "The idea 
of God i n the Yoga System was not arrived at by superimposing i t on an 
a t h e i s t i c Samkhya System with twentyf ive p r i n c i p l e s , but by 
distinguishing the JTva from God on p r a c t i c a l grounds." This i s 
f u l l y confirmed by K.B.R, RAO (1966, 290): "Probably the Epic Yoga 
lays the inchoate foundation f o r the c l a s s i c a l Yoga conception of a 
detached Is*vara." However, he remarks (p. 291) that the conception 
of Tsvara i n the ancient Mranyagarbha-yoga i s " u t t e r l y naive and 
simple" since i t depicts god as "a motionless and f r i g i d witness" who 
i s not even interested i n the yogin's struggle for emancipation. He 
deems the more a c t i v i s t conception of god as expressed i n the Yoga-
Bhasya (l.25) a positive advance on t h i s view. But K.B.R. RAO's 
c r i t i c i s m i s biased. Although no mention i s made i n the epic 
passage i n question of the lord's soteriological function, one must 
nevertheless ask oneself why a need should have been f e l t to 
philosophically recognise the superlative status of i s v a r a i f t h i s 
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concept would not somehow have had an experiential content. 
This would seem to be corroborated by the s t r i c t l y pragmatic 
approach of Yoga with i t s emphasis on experiment and personal 
verification. Nor is the absence of any reference i n the above 
passage to the idea of grace or prasada, which looms large i n 
other contexts, a positive proof of i t s irrelevance i n the 
yogic process as envisaged i n hiranvagarbha-yoga. 
After this brief excursion into the epic antecedents of 
Classical Yoga, I w i l l next scrutinise Patanjali's theological 
formulations. He defines 'the lord' (Isvara) i n this way: 
kle^a-karma~vipa^a-as>ayair-aparamrs tah purusa-vilesa Xsvarahj or: 
"The lord i s a special Self untouched by the causes-of-affliction, 
\y?\ action [and i t s ] f r u i t jand by] the deposit |of subliminal-
activators] 1 1 (1.24)• In the Yoga and Samkhya ontology the entire 
spectrum of existence is analysed into the two primary modalities 
of Self (purusa) and non-self (prakpti). The former embodies the 
principle of pure awareness corresponding with the Kantian 'trans-
i n t e l l i g i b l e subject', whereas the l a t t e r i s the womb of a l l 
creation'. BOWES (1971, 168) circumscribes these as the 'principle 
of consciousness' and the 'principle of materiality' respectively. 
Understandably IsVara could not but be included i n the former 
category, as has been pointed put long ago by Vatsyayana i n his 
commentary to Nyaya-Sutra 17.1.21• 
Thus god is defined as a Self sui generis, and his separateness 
from the 'ordinary' transcendental Self or purusa i s explained 
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i n negative terms: The lord is unaffected by any of the modifications 
which the ordinary purusa i s subjected to by reason of his involve-
ment with the world-ground and i t s products. To put i t differently, 
1 1 vara at no time forsook or w i l l forsake his perfect condition of 
transcendence as pure Being-Awareness* Because of his ' i n a c t i v i t y 1 , 
by which i s not meant mere abstention from action but the kind 
of condition which the Bhaaavad-gltS calls 'actipnlessness' or 
naiskarmyat no vipaka ever accrues to him, and for the same reason 
he i s also never subjected to the causes-of-affliction which are 
the natural concomitants of any implication i n phenomenal existence* 
M. MULLER (19*16*, 321) remarks on this concept that the lord 
"may be primus inter pares* but as one of the Purushas, he i s but one 
among his peers* He is a l i t t l e more than a god, but he is.certainly 
not what we mean by God". Yet PataKjali's definition of lavara has 
also a positive aspect. This i s clear from 1.25-1*28: tatra 
niratisayam sarva-.ifla-bl.iam; purvesam-api guruh kalena anavacchedat; 
tasya vacakah pranavah; ta.i-.iapas-tad-artha-bhavanam, which can be 
rendered as follows: "In this fisvara"] the seed of omniscience i s 
unsurpassed. He was also the teacher of the former f yoginsl» since 
there i s no temporal limitation Jjfor himj* His signature i s the 
pranava jjL.e. omj* The recitation of that j^ pranavaj jjleads to] the 
realisation of i t s meaning*" To these statements must be added 
the concept of Isvara-pranidhana which has already been discussed* 
Aphorism 1*25 i s of special interest as i t has always been 
understood as a 'proof for the existence of god* Thus the Yoaa-
Bhasya (l.25) has: yatra kastba-praptir^.lnanasya sa sarva-.inah sa ca 
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purusa^via'esa i t i , or "In whom the l i m i t of knowledge i s reached, 
he i s all-knowing, and he i s a special Self"* By 'seed' Vacaspati 
Milra understands 'cause* (karana), whereas Vijnana Bhiksu, i n his 
Yoga-Varttika. explains i t as 'mark' (liftga). Our 1Bupra-sensuous 
grasping1 (ati-indriva-grahana), as Vacaspati Misra observes, 
depends on the degree to which tama3 obscures sattva. The moderate 
a b i l i t y for knowledge displayed by the worldling contains the seed 
for higher knowledge and, even, omniscience* There comes an upper 
l i m i t which cannot be surpassed, and th i s i s the omniscience of 
the lord. As G.M. KQELMAN (1970, 61) correctly notes: "The 
absolute extension of the lord's knowledge i s unambiguously asserted. 
But there i s no word, no insinuation even that the lord's knowledge 
i s different i n essence, i s a more perfect way of knowing." 
Vyasa explains the unexcellable knowledge of Ssvara as the 
result of the utter purity of the sattva reflecting his transcend-
ental Awareness* His knowledge extends to a l l objects and a l l 
periods, and i t i s this trhich distinguishes him from such seers as 
Kapila or the Buddha. 
I t is d i f f i c u l t to decide whether or not these observations 
by the classical exegetists were i n fact intended as a kind of 
'proof1 for the existence of god* Patanjali himself, again, i s far 
too concise to win such an interpretation from sutra 1*25. Probably 
i t simply refers to the fact that i n contrast with the awareness 
of the ordinary purusa, the Isrora's awareness i s perfectly 
continuous, that is to say, uninterrupted by pr a k r t i , since Isvara 
at no time and not even for an instant f a l l s victim to nescience or 
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avidya. Thus maybe 1 .25 does not entail so much a grading of 
omniscience which would make l i t t l e sense than a statement about 
the fact that what constitutes a potential for the ordinary 
being i s a permanent actuality for isvara. I cannot agree with 
S. RADHAKRISHNAN'3 ( 1 9 5 1 6 , I I , 369) assertion that "Patanjali 
proves the omniscience of God by means of the law of continuity, 
which must have an upper l i m i t 1 1 • I prefer to see i n 1 . 2 5 a 
parallel to the mahayana buddhist notion of the tathagata-garbha 
as the seed of consummate enlightenment, temporarily covered 
with defilements of a cognitive and conative nature, viz. 
vikalpa and abhinivesa. whilst i n re a l i t y i t i s transcendental 
and nirvikalpBi. As long as this seed has not sprouted, cognition 
i s distorted and things are not seen as they are (yatha-bhuta). 
That the lord i s not conceptualised as a being who is 
of complete irrelevance to mankind clearly emerges from 1.26 
where Isvara is called "the teacher of the former |Vogina|"« This 
i s i n keeping with the traditional pre-classical interpretation 
of the concept of god as expressed, for instance, in-the following 
stanza from the Bhagavad-GSta (lV.1): imam vivasvate yogam proktavan-
aham-avyayam. vivasvan-manave praha manur-iksvakave'bravlt. or: 
"To Vivasvat I expounded this imperishable Toga; Vivasvat related 
i t to Manu; Manu told i t to Iksvaku". Unless one presumes this 
doctrine to be no more than a forced concession to s r u t i , which would 
be incongruous with PataSftali's generally self-reliant approach, 
there i s one d i f f i c u l t question which calls for an answer. This 
i s : How can a perfectly transcendental being assume a teaching 
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role? Vyasa, i n his Yoga-Bhasya (l.25), attempts to solve this 
problem by introducing anthropomorphic features: tasya-atma-
anugraha-abhave'pi bhuta-anugrahah prayo.ianam. .inana-dharma-
upadesena Icalpa-pralaya-maha-pralayesu samaarinah purusa-
anuddharisyami-iti, tatha ca-uktam^adi-vidvan^nimana-cittam-/ 1$ 1 ^ ' 
adhisthaya karanyad^bhagavan parama-rsirj-asuraye .ii.iSIasamanayay / 7 i f i }v> 
tantram provaca-iti, or: "Although he has no ^feeling o f ] self-
gratification, £the lord's] motive is the gratification of beings: 
'By instruction i n knowledge and virtue, at the dissolution [of 
the world] [at the end of] a world-age £qr] at the great dissolution 
|of the entire universe] , I w i l l u p l i f t the Selves ^immersed] i n 
conditioned-existence'• And likewise i t has been said: 'The f i r s t 
knower, assuming a created mind out of compassion, the exalted, 
supreme seer declared this teaching to Asuri who desired to know.'" 
This passage epitomises the popular and orthodox belief that \ 
lsvara i s the author of the Vedas by whose teachings the staunch | 
believer transcends a l l i l l . Within the framework of Patanjali's 
philosophy such an interpretation makes l i t t l e sense. A more 
sophisticated solution i s called for which does not i n any way 
interfere with the definition of xaVara as transcendence per se. 
The classical exegetists are of no help here. Their interpretations 
of the nature of Isvara are exclusive attempts to somehow relate 
his existence to the mechanisms of the world-ground and to the 
destinies of the sentient beings ensnared by prakrti. 
I f one excludes the possibility of lavara actively entering 
into a teaching situation by somehow phenomenalising himself, there 
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remains only one logical alternative, and this i s that his role 
as a teacher is entirely passive: His very existence i s a 
sufficient challenge to the yogin who either has come through 
sraddha to believe i n him or whose spir i t u a l discipline has brought 
him to the margins of conditioned existence where experiential 
proof of his existence is found* In other words, Isvara i s the 
42 
archetypal yogin who 'instructs* by his sheer being. . Pressing 
this metaphor s t i l l farther, one could say that 'communication' 
between him and the aspiring yogin i s possible by reason of the. 
ontic co-essentiality of god and the inmost nucleus of man, viz. 
the Self (purusa). H. ELIADB (1973^ » 74) circumscribes this with 
the phrase 'metaphysical sympathy'• 
On the transcendental level the relation between IsVara and purusa 
is one of 'enclosure' by coalescence; the Self i s eclipsed by the 
being of Isvara. Empirically, however, the relation i s a one-way 
aff a i r i n which the believing yogin emulates lBvara's condition 
which i s co-essential with the condition of his inmost Self. This 
is the idea implicit i n the concept of Tsvara-pranidhana which is 
a channeling of one's emotive and cognitive l i f e to god by endeavouring 
to'simulate' his unconditioned nature. For the purpose of this 
i m i t a t i o n s ! the yogin symbolises god i n the form of the pranava 
which i s the sacred phoneme om. As Vyasa, i n his Yoga-Bhasya (l.27), 
aptly points out this symbolisation is not due to convention 
42 Cf. G. OBERHAIMER (1964, 197-207) 
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(sanketa), but the relation between lavara and om i s a natural 
and permanent one* In other words, am i s an experience rather than 
an arbitrary verbal construction. I t i s thus a true symbol charged 
with numinous power. Experiencjable i n deep meditation i t i s A fc 
a sign of the omnipresence of isvara as manifest on the level 
of sound. Access to this experience i s gained, paradoxically, 
through the recitation of om. Thus om i s both expedient and goal. 
The human voice i s employed to reproduce a 'sound* which i s 
continually 'recited' by the universe i t s e l f — an idea which 
i n the Pythagorean school came to be known as the 'harmony of 
the spheres'. On the Indian side i t led to the development 
of nada-yoga. 
By now i t should have become evident that notwithstanding 
the precarious philosophical interpretation of Isvara i n Classical 
Yoga, god i s of no mean importance i n i t s practical sphere. 
I cannot therefore endorse G.M. KOELMAN's (1970, 57) contention 
that i t "is striking how the mention of the Isvara i n the Yoga 
Sfitras i s quite casual" and that, as he continues (p. 58) we "could 
very well cut out the sutras relating to the Lord, without i n any way 
impairing the systematic coherence of the Patan.iala Yoga, without 
even leaving a trace of the excision". This is of course a 
recapitulation of R. GARBE's (1917 , 149) view which, incidentally, 
i s also accepted by S. RADHAKRISHNAN (19516, I I , 371, fn.3). 
G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 63f.) elucidates his position further: " I f 
we said that the I^vara does not answer any logical need in the 
Pataftjala Yoga, we do not maintain that either PataKjali himself or 
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the Yogis i n general cannot be true devotees of the Ilvara. The 
only thing we mean to say i s that the whole Yoga philosophy and 
the psychological technique of liberation i t stands for are 
atheistic i n nature. I f some oneyogi, even i f a l l yogis, did 
admit IsVara as somehow God, this would be due not to Yoga 
doctrine, but to the yogis' individual religious dispositions. 
We might say that Pata'n.iala Yoga technique prescinds from whether 
someone admits a God or denies him." Yet, strangely enough, i n 
the very next sentence the author states: "We believe that 
Patan.1ala Yoga i s essentially theistic. -But as G.R.F. Oberhammer 
has proved ( s i o l ) , the Patan.iala doctrine of the Supreme Lord had 
to express i t s e l f i n terms of a philosophical school, the Sankhya 
School, which has no room for God." Despite his unusual objectivity 
on other points, the author — a Jesuit — obviously found i t 
d i f f i c u l t to suspend his own conception of what god ought or ought 
not to be. How else can one explain the formidable ambiguity 
of his statements? 
The fact i s that the doctrine of Idvara i s an integral 
component of the philosophy of Classical Yoga and that, moreover, 
TIvara figures prominently i n the practice structure of Yoga, and 
any attempt to exorcise this concept would amount to a crippling 
of both.the theoretical superstructure and the practical substructure 
of Yoga.. I t is correct, as M. BLIADE (1973"5, 73) observes, that 
St^vara i s a god only for the yogins, the spiri t u a l l y awakened who 
are prepared to take him as their Vorbild. But since i t is implied 
i n the philosophy of Classical Yoga, as i n a l l other darsanas, 
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that the summum bonum of human l i f e i s to transcend contingent 
existence, god can,and i n terms of this ethical model should, 
be meaningful also to the l a i t y . Shocking as this attenuated theism must 
be to the committed deist, i t i s a curious fact that rather 
cognate views can be found i n the writings of some of the 
intellectual mystics such as Meister Eckehart or Plotinus. 
This may be instructive i n that i t entails the warning not 
to look at this question from a purely theoretical or logical 
point of view rather than from the angle of spir i t u a l practice 
and experiential verification. 
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2. Purusa 
Like the notion of Isvara the concept of the Self or purusa 
is not a purely theoretical construct. I t i s best understood as 
circumscribing a particular yogic experience of the numinous. This 
'experience' i s not of the nature of what i s ordinarily meant by 
this term. Owing to the radical dualism between the Self and the 
non-self (or prakrti), as conceived i n Classical Yoga, there can 
s t r i c t l y speaking be no experience of the Self at a l l . This 
holds true of Isvara as well-being defined as he is as a purusa 
sui generis. However, Patanjali does make certain provisions 
which allow one to speak of a 'vision of the Self' (purusa-khyati) 
or 'Self gnosis' (puruaa-.jnana). I w i l l go into this later. 
In view of the experiential derivation of the concept of 
purusa a l l explanations which seek to establish the logical 
necessity of the Self within the conceptual l a t t i c e of Classical 
Yoga, or which t r y to make a case for the theoretical inadequacy 
of this doctrine, must be relegated to a subsidiary position. 
This pre-eminently practical orientation of Yoga has not always 
been duly appreciated by western scholars. Thus when R. GARBE 
(1917 , 356) insists that the purusa i s primarily a philosophical 
postulate inferred from empirical data, he blatantly ignores the 
fact that whatever role ratiocination may play i n Classical 
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Samkhya, i t s foundations are, l i k e those of Classical Yoga, 
to he found among the diverse traditions of consciousness 
technology current at the time of the Mahabharata. The classical 
proofs adduced for the existence of the Self must therefore be 
looked upon as afterthoughts to consolidate what constituted 
originally an experiential (but not empirically observable) 
datum* Nonetheless, the 'rationalisation' and 'moralisation* 
— these are R. OTTO's (1959) terms — of the encounter with the 
numinous i n Yoga are potent i n themselves, because they are the 
building blocks of the soteriological formulations i n the 
doctrinal structure of both Classical Yoga and the Samkhya 
of Isvara Krsna. {Treating the interrelation between Self and 
non-self, A. BHARATI (1970^, 204) offers another suggestion 
which l i e s midway between the experiential and the rationalistic 
answer* He regards the purusa as a "postulate of i n t u i t i o n rather 
than of discursive reasoning". Elsewhere (p. 16) he explains 
his use of the term 'intuition* which he sets off from gnosis or 
.jnana» and consequently one must appraise this interpretation as 
inadequate as the rationalist conjecture. 
The history of the word purusa and i t s association with the 
experience of the numinous in Yoga i s a long and interesting one. 
I t i s remarkable that the Yoga and Samkhya traditions should have 
adopted this designation rather than the synonym atman which 
enjoys such a great popularity i n the Vedanta schools of thought. 
The etymological derivation of the word has given rise to a 
considerable amount of speculation. Native Indian tradition proffers 
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several, more or less f a n c i f u l , etymologies. The oldest reference 
is to be found i n the Atharvaveda (x.2.28) which has a pun on the 
word pur or 'citadel' to the effect of stating that pur-usa i s 
a derivative of i t * This etymology is also mentioned i n the 
Maiiabharata (XII.294.37) where purusa i s analysed into "he who .lies 
(sete) i n the 'citadel' (pura)" of the unmanifest world-ground. 
In the Hirukta (??) a derivation from pur + sad (= purisada) and / 
also from^pr ('to f i l l ' ) i s suggested. A further etymology is 
given i n the Brhadaranvaka-Upanisad (l.4«l) where the word i s 
broken down into purva +Jua (* to burn'). According to R. GARBE 
(1917 , 356) the correct etymology of the word purusa and i t s 
synonyms pums and pumams i s the one suggested by E. LEUMANN 
( ?? , 10-12), namely the compound pu-vrsa both components of / 
which signify 'man' • 
In i t s earliest recorded.conception, purusa stands both for 
^™"~—.—• 43 
the mortal 'person' and, more significantly, for the cosmic 
creator who, l i k e the giantYmir i n teutonic mythology, i s the 
causa materialis and the causa efficiens of the manifest universe: 
He is the demiurge and the primordial substance from which the 
world is fashioned* This double role i s possible because the act 
of creation i s understood as the self-dismemberment of the 
macrocosmic Person. Symbolically this is interpreted as the f i r s t 
sacrifice (yajna). of archetypal importance to the pan-Indian 
s a c r i f i c i a l c u l t . In most instances, this gigantic purusa is 
43 See e.g. Rgveda X.97.4-5 
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thought of as transcending the world which he emitted from his 
44 
own body. I t is this cosmogonic model which was destined to 
exert a decisive influence on subsequent thought i n India, as can 
readily be appreciated from a study of the Bhagavad-Gita and other 
-iw - 45 
works of the Fancaratra school. 
In the Chandogya-Upanisad (VIII.10.1) a record of a popular 
psychological theory has been preserved according to which the 
purusa, conceived as a 'mannikin', departs from the body of the 
sleeping person. This notion of an indwelling 'ghost* i s part 
of many folk philosophies and figures, among other ancient 
non-Indian l i t e r a r y documents, i n Homer's Odyssey (e.g. X.493). 
E.H. JOHNSTON (1937, 41ff.) speculates that the later 'soul 
theory 1 as he calls the doctrine of purusa was arrived at through the 
gradual fusjiion of the primitive notion of an immaterial principle / ^ 
or principles animating the human body and of the equally archaic 
notion of a separate.psyche which acts as the carrier of a person's 
post-mortem identity. He thinks (p. 43) that the Rgveda "contains 
traces of both conceptions and of the beginning of their amalgam-
ation". This historical approach, which seeks to establish a 
causal relation between conceptualisations of a different type and 
degree of complexity, i s entirely inapt and inconclusive. 
44 See e.g. Rgveda X.90.3-4 and 1.164.45, as also Atbarvaveda II.1.2. 
45 See also the highly symbolic rites performed on the occasion of 
the installation of a temple which.is regarded as a manifestation 
of the vastu-purusa or supreme architect of the world. This is 
ably discussed in*H. ZIMMER (1926). 
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Following up the development of the concept of purusa 
E.H. JOHNSTON (1937) observes that i n the early metric Upanisads 
and i n the Bhagavad-Gita (except for the chapters HII-XVIIl) 
purusa denotes the individual psyche. He thinks (p. 53) that this 
term replaced the theory of the atroan-kaetrajna i n the older texts. 
He also maintains that those epic passages which equate the purusa 
with atman belong to a more recent period. J.W. HAUER (1958, 64) 
points out that the frequency of the word purusa is higher i n 
the Atharvaveda than i n the Rgveda which far more often employs 
the term atman. He even goes so far as to suggest that the word 
purusa i s specific to the vratya tradition as recorded i n the 
Atharvaveda (see especially book XV) and that i t came to be 
introduced into the doctrinal sphere of orthodox Brahmanism 
as a result of the large-scale conversion of the vratyas. The 
heterodox origin of purusa i s strongly indicated by the fact that 
the ancient litany on Rudra, the god of the vratyas, viz. the 
so-called Satarudriya found i n the Kathaka-Samhita (XVII.11-17; 
cf • XXI.6) represents, according to J.Wo HAUER, the oldest 
version of the famous gayatrl-mantra. I t links up Rudra with 
purusa: tad-purusaya vidmahe maha-devaya dhimahi tan-no rudrah 
pracodayat, or: "This [ l i t a n y ] we have invented for the Purusa; 
l e t us meditate the great god; may Rudra promote!this .' 
[meditation]". 4 6 
46 Cf. Rgveda III.62.10: tat-savitur-varenyam bhargo devasya 
dhimahi dhiyo yo nah pracodaySt (= savitrl-mantra). 
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H. OLDENBERG ( 1 9 1 5 , 2 2 4 ) makes a pertinent observation: 
" I t i s significant that linguistic usage tends to connect atman 
with the genitive case i n order to express whose Atman i s 
referred to, whereas purusha occurs more often i n conjunction with 
a locative i n order to indicate wherein this Purusha dwells. In 
view of thi s I would suspect that the preference of the designation 
Purusha for the spi r i t u a l principle i n Samkhya is related to the 
s t r i c t separation and confrontation, peculiar to this system, 
between the s p i r i t and nature." I am not sure to what extent 
this proposition i s valid, but certainly purusa tends to be 
associated i f not with spatial metaphors, so with the idea of 
rulership and proprietorship. This i s quite evident i n the 
phraseology of the Yoga-Sutra which on this point reflects the 
general trend of the upanisadic period. 
Patanjali employs the term purusa altogether eight times 
(viz. 1.16, 2 4 ; III.35 twice; 111.49, 55; IV.18, 34). He also 
avails himself of a number of synonyms such as drasty ( l . 3 ; 11.17, 
2 0 ; I V . 2 3 ) , svamin ( I I . 2 3 ) , grahitr (1.41), drg-lakti ( l l . 6 ) , 
d r i i ( 1 1 . 2 5 ) , drsi-matra ( l l . 2 0 ) , prabhu (lV.18), c i t i ( l V . 2 2 ) , 
c i t i - s a k t i ( l V . 3 4 ) and para ( l V . 2 4 ) . With the exception of the 
word para ('the other') these are a l l 'loaded' terms insofar as 
they are modelled on the empirical relations of perceiving, 
cognising and owning and for the sake of communication ascribe a 
content to something which i s by definition without a l l differentiae 
(nir-guna) and hence s t r i c t l y speaking incommunicable. The f u l l 
latitude of the meaning of purusa is brought out when one maps the 
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above synonyms in the following manner: 
metaphor of otherness 
I A ; 
metaphor 
of seeing < 
drastr 
drg-sakti 
df i i 
drs'i-matra 
PURUSA 
svamm 
prabhu 
grahStr 
1 metaphor of owning 
c i t i 
citir-sakti 
metaphor, of cognising 
I f one were to place the concept of IsVara into this semantic 
grid, i t would have to be accommodated to the far right by virtue 
of the strong connotation of 'lordship 1 attached to this term. 
Host of these synonyms of the word purusa belong to the old stock 
of yogic terminology and occur already i n the metric Upanisads 
and the Mahabharata, but drli-matra and drg-^akti are more recent 
coinages which may possibly have originated in the doctrinal sphere 
of Mahayana Buddhism. 
Nowhere i n the Yoga-Sutra is there a full-fledged definition 
of the concept of purusa, and the most probable reason for this 
is that by the time of the composition of Patalljali's vade-mecum 
i t s precise meaning was perfectly evident. The opposite case 
must have been true of the concept of ITS'vara which Patanjali 
carefully demarcates from i t s popular usage i n the sense of 'creator*. 
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Prom the few references i n the Yoga-Sutra i t i s clear beyond doubt 
that the concept of purusa is remarkably akin to that delineated 
i n the epic and other pre-classical Sanskrit li t e r a t u r e . I t expresses 
the notion of man's 'transcendental id e n t i t y 1 , here rendered with 
•Self or 'transintellijjjible subject', as distinct from the world-ground 
(prakrti) both i n i t s noumenal form as pradhana and in i t s manifest 
form as the objective universe (drsya). The Self i s an aspatial and 
atemporal reality which stands i n no conceivable relation to the 
composite world of phenomena nor to their transcendental source. 
I t i s sheer awareness as opposed to consciousness-of and in this 
respect i s the exact antithesis to the world-ground which is by 
definition insentient. This Self is considered the authentic being 
of man. 
Since the mental apparatus, with i t s consciousness-of, is ° 
regarded as an evolute of the world-ground, the Self i s necessarily 
also quite distinct from the mind ( c i t t a ) . Viewed psychologically 
the Self i s the 'seer' (drastr) of the on-going psychomental 
processes or y r t t i (viz. I.3)• As long as the empirical consciousness 
is operative and man's transcendental identity is obscured, this 
watchman i s said to be 'of the same form' (sarupya) as the psychomental 
whirljjfo. Thi3 is to say, the loss of authenticity is due to the 
shifting identifications with the discontinuous states of experience: 
" I am this sensation; I am that thought" etc. This perpetual 
process of constructing false identities is known as asmita or 
•I-am-ness'. I t is this power, generated by 'nescience' or avidya, 
which is responsible for the erection of man's inner world, i.e. 
his motivations, cognitive schemata and emotive response patterns 
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and so fort h . The Self is set apart from a l l these mechanisms 
which are founded on the energetic character of the primary 
constituents of the world-ground, the so-called gunas. Properly 
speaking, the purusa i s neither an actor nor a passive enjoyer 
of the experiences which occur i n the mind, even though some 
Samkhya works speak of i t metaphorically as the 'enjoyer' (bhoktr) 
of a l l experiences. The Self does not intend, feel or think. The 
involvement with the discontinuous contents of consciousness, as 
implied by the phrase sarupya. is merely an apparent one. i t 
is 'affected' (-paramrsta) by the kle^a-karma-vipaka-asaya seauence 
only insofar as these factors are instrumental i n cluttering the 
empirical consciousness and thus i n relinquishing i t s capacity 
for emptying i t s e l f which i s the only way i n which the presentation 
of the transcendental Self to the mind can take place. The 'correlation' 
(samyoga) between the 'seer' and the 'seen' (viz. 11.17) i s a peculiar 
one and ranks among the most problematic issues of the dualistic 
metaphysics of Yoga and Samkhya. For i t i s d i f f i c u l t to comprehend 
how the Self, which i s defined as drsi-matra and s'uddha ( 1 pure 1), 
can apperceive the presented-ideas (pratyaya) as stated i n 11.20. 
The mental on-goings ( v r t t i ) are always apperceived because the 
purusa does not suffer any alteration but is a perfect continuum 
(viz. IV.18). 
M. BOWES (1971, 169) sums up the situation i n this way: "Indian 
philosophers, when faced with the objection that there i s no such 
thing as consciousness as such, meaning that there is no empirical 
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experience of such a thing, stress that even i f a l l consciousness 
is consciousness of something there must be a function called 
'consciousness' to be conscious of this something* Many would 
object no doubt that this i s hypostatising consciousness which 
arises only i n a particular context of contact with objects and 
which is not to be thought of as an entity by i t s e l f , but the 
Indians claim that consciousness performs a distinct function, that 
of manifestation (equivalent to Sartre's revelation and Husserl's 
constitution function) of the.object i t i s conscious of as well as 
of i t s e l f — -a function which cannot be performed by anything 
which is non-conscious;^/ and so i t must be thought of as there, 
as a r e a l i t y of a distinct sort." 
For Patanjali this puzzle i s no puzzle at a l l , but an 
eminently practical issue* As long as samyoga;prevails there is 
suffering (duhkha)* Since the root of the correlation, rather 
phantom correlation, between Self and non-self i s nescience 
(avidya)* i t i s this which must be terminated for samyoga to be 
abolished. The prescribed expedient for this i s viveka-khyati. 
the 'vision of discernment* as a high-level enstasy which eliminates 
a l l one's false identities not by way of mere intellectual 
acrobatics but i n a process of cl a r i f i c a t i o n and purification of 
consciousness. First the mind is withdrawn from the external 
stimuli, then a l l presented-ideas are obliterated and ultimately 
the subliminal traces or vasanas themselves are rooted out which 
amounts to the t o t a l dispersion of the consciousness-of or c i t t a * 
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Ordinary experience is possible only on account of the 
massive identity confusion arising from the overpowering influence 
of the subliminal traces which habitually throw the consciousness 
outside i t s e l f thus forcing i t to gather in continually new 
impressions thereby replenishing the stock of vasanas in the 
depths of the mind. In other words, the fundamental confusion 
about man's true identity is b u i l t into the psychomental organism 
whose growth and decay the individualised consciousness i s 
witnessing. In fact, without this cognitive mix-up no experience 
would be possible. Experiencing, called bhoga i n I I I . 3 5 , is an 
intrapsychic process which does not actively involve the Self; 
the purusa simply apperceives the presented-ideas i n the experiencing 
mind. Patanjali promotes an extreme dualism when he insists that the 
Self and the most translucent aspect of the consciousness complex, 
the sattva, are eternally •unmixed* (asamklrna) (viz. III.3 5 )» and 
that precisely because of this perfect distinction the recovery of 
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Self-authenticity i s at a l l possible. 
Parenthetically i t may be observed that by reason of the 
transphenomenal nature of the Self any qualitative ascription is 
in the last analysis tantamount to a f a l s i f i c a t i o n . This i s as 
true of the description of purusa i n terms of awareness (see c i t i , 
citi-s'akti) as i t is of the more obvious tropological predications. 
47 Cf. IV.22 where c i t i i s said to be apratisamkrama which J.H.WOODS 
(19663) translates with which unites not Twith objectsj 
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Unlike the anonymous author of the Samkhya-Sutra. Patanjali 
does not seem to favour negative descriptions of the nature of the 
Self but prefers, as we have seen above, metaphors of seeing, 
cognising and owning which are i n keeping with his psychological 
rather than metaphysical approach. 
One last important point remains to be discussed. This i s 
the controversial question of the singularity or pl u r a l i t y of the 
Self as conceived i n Classical Yoga. M. ELIADE (1973^, 32-33) gives 
vent to the popular view on this matter when he says about Sainkhya 
and Yoga that they "affirm that there are as many purusas as there 
are human beings. And each of these purusas is a monad, is completely 
isolated; for the Self can have no contact either with the world 
around i t (derived from prakrti) or with other s p i r i t s . The cosmos, 
then, is peopled with these eternal, free, unmoving purusas — monads 
between which no communication is possible." 
Apart from the objection which one may wish to raise against 
M. ELIADE1s nonsensical use of concepts such as 'monad' and 
'communication' as also against his blatantly wrong metaphor of the 
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Selves' populating the cosmos , another more serious criticism 
must be brought against his unquestioning acceptance of the testimony 
of r i v a l schools which ascribe to Yoga the doctrine of the plurality 
of the transcendental Selves. He obviously relies i n his judgement 
on the work of his teacher S. DASGUPIA (1930, 167) and others. 
48 For a similarly loose and misleading use of language cf. 
G.J. LARSON (1969, 183) who says about the Self that " i t is 
simply present i n the world". 
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But i s this doctrine really a part of Patanjali's system of thought? 
There can be no question that this strange doctrine i s part and 
parcel of the philosophy expounded in the commentarial literature on 
the Yoga-Sutra and also i n Tsvara Krsna's Samkhya-Karika. The 
latt e r text has a stanza (18) which reads as follows: .iana-marana-
karananam pratiniyamad-ayugapat-pravrt tes'-ca. purusa-bahutvam siddham 
traj-gunya-viparyayac-ca-eva, "The m u l t i p l i c i t y of the Self is 
established by reason of the idiosyncracy^ of [a person's"^ b i r t h , 
death [and/J deed*^ and because of non-simultaneous a c t i v i t y and 
also on account of the alteration i n the guna-triad". That the word 
bahutva i n this stanza does not merely signify 'duplicity* but 
•multiplicity* i s borne out by the phrase prati-purusa-vimoksa-artham 
or "for the sake of the release of ever/ (prati) Self" i n verse 46 
of the same work. The word pra t i . a favourite expression with 
IsVara Krsna (viz. verses 5, 3 1t 37) has consistently the sense of 
•every, each' i n his Samkhya-Karika. 
The word bahutva is derived from bahu meaning 'abundant, much*, 
and i t signifies 'multiplicity, multitude'. In the Mahabharata the 
cognate nanatva i s generally employed to express the idea of 
•manifoldness1. There i s , however, at least one instance i n which 
Bahudha i s used (viz. XII.296.2, according to the edition employed 
by K.B.R. RAO XII.308.1). According to K.B.R. RAO's (1966, 278) 
analysis of this"; verse the idea of the pl u r a l i t y of Selves i s 
definitely implied in this passage, but P. EDGERTON (1924) thinks 
49 G.J. LARSON (1969) translates pratiniyatna i n a more conservative 
fashion with 'diversity 1. 
50 The commentators take the term karana as referring to buddhi etc. 
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that such a view i s entirely untenable. As C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS 
(1936 , 146) notes: "A heresy so startling would have needed 
to be rubbed i n , as i t is not." P. EDGERTON (1924) severely 
criticises E.W. HOPKINS (1901 ") f or grossly misinterpreting the 
epic passage XII.303.11 (= XII.315.11 acc. to K.B.R. RAO): 
avyakta-ekatvam-ity-ahur-nanatvam purusas-tatha 
sarva-bhuta-daya-vantah kevalam .jSanam-asthitah. 
E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 123): 
"Those who have the religion of compassion ... say 
that there i s unity i n the Unmanifest but a plurality 
of s p i r i t s . " 
P. EDGERTON (1924 , 26)! 
" I t i s a unity i n the Unmanifest; so they explain 
the plurality (of the manifest, empiric universe),— 
men who, having compassion for a l l beings, resort to 
pure knowledge." 
K.B.R. RAO (1966, 237): 
"Men who are compassionate with a l l beings, and who 
have resorted to kevala .jnana. i.e. the knowledge of 
the Absolute, say that the Avyakta i s eka and also nana. 
P. EDGERTON makes the undoubtedly valid point that the phrase 
"plurality of s p i r i t s " would require either purusa-nanatvam or 
nanatvam purusanam. I t is his conviction that the epic view 
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coincides with that of the metric Upanisads, which i s one "of a 
plurality i n the empiric, f i n i t e world, hut an underlying unity, 
realized by the enlightened, in which there is no longer any 
plur a l i t y , nor any consciousness, the attribute of plurality" (p. 25). 
S. DASGUPTA (1930, 167) argues on the basis of 11.22 that 
Patanjali recognises a pl u r a l i t y of Selves. In this he follows the 
cues provided i n the Yoga-Bhasva and especially i n the Tattva-
Vaisaradi. But what does this aphorism really convey? The Sanskrit 
text runs as follows: krta-artham prati-nastam-api anastarn tad-anya-
sadharanatvat. or: "Though jthe objective world] has ceased for 
[the one whose] purpose is accomplished, i t has not ceased [altogether] 
since i t is common to [ a l l ] the other [empirical selves]." I t cannot 
be conclusively shown on the strength of this aphorism alone that 
Patanjali subscribed to the doctrine of p l u r a l i t y . Nor are there 
any other statements i n his work which would vindicate such a 
view. I therefore wish to propose that i t seems far more congruent 
to read this sutra in the s p i r i t of the epic tradition where krta-artha 
denotes the person who has become the Self, i.e. who has recovered 
Self-authenticity, beyond a l l p l u rality. 
Availing himself of the stock arguments of the Samkhya thinkers, 
S. DASGUPTA (1930, 167f.) sees an epistemologial problem here. He asks 
how i n view of the postulated reality of prakrti one single purusa of 
equal r e a l i t y could possibly be responsible for a l l the cognitive 
processes occurring i n the multiple real organisms. He draws attention 
to the viewpoint of Advaita-Vedanta according to which-the Self is 
at least not identified with the real experiencing subject, but which 
asserts that the notions of experiencing etc. are a l l false, produced 
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by the i l l u s i v e action of maya (which is i t s e l f inscrutable or 
anirvacaniya). He contends that i f indeed only one purusa were 
'associated1 with the many psychosomatic entities, the release 
of a single being would imply the simultaneous, release of a l l 
others. However, these arguments are lame, since the process of 
emancipation i s a prakrtic event which effects only a particular 
entity, whereas the Self is ex hypothesi neither ever i n bondage 
nor i n need of liberation. 
Assuming that Patanjali does not maintain that there 
are innumerable Self monads which inhabit some acosmic dimension, 
i t must next be asked how this interpretation affects the conception 
of IsVara i n his system. For, is"vara i s defined as a 'special S e l f 
which i s untouched by the klesas, by the propelling force of karman 
and so on. I t may be thought that 1.24 tabernacles the idea that 
the ordinary purusa is somehow 'touched' by the klesas etc. 
which would be an indirect confirmation of the doctrine of pl u r a l i t y . 
But there can be no question of the purusa - be i t 5svara or not -
ever being affected by the klesas or any other prakrtic phenomenon., 
The phrase klesei-karma-vipaka-a^ayair-aparamgstab, must therefore be 
applicable as much to the ordinary purusa as to Isvara. Unless one 
wants to stretch this aphorism beyond i t s capacity, i t does not appear 
to entail either any real inconsistency or a hidden reference to the 
notion that there are multiple Selves, and that lsvara is primus inter 
pares as M. MULLER (19164-, 325)or9ues. 
Thus PataSTjali seems to promulgate a variant of the pre-classical 
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epic Yoga tradition which affirms the singularity of the transcendental 
Self. Furthermore, he also appears to accept the theistic conception of 
hi3 predecessors who understood Tsvara as eclipsing the purugsa. Yfhere 
he differs from them is i n his insistence on the absolute separateness 
of purusa and prakrti — thus developing the dualistic trends i n the 
Mahabharata and the metric Upanigads into a full-fledged dualism 
with the transintelligible subject on the one side and the 
objective universe on the other side. .Philosophically unattractive, 
51 
this Cartesian dichotomy i s of considerable practical relevance. 
51 See ff.A. FEUERSTEIN (1971, 38f.) 
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3. Prakrti 
The t h i r d of the transcendental principles which together 
constitute the tripod of the conceptual edifice of Classical Yoga 
is prakrti. The word is composed of the preposition pra 'forth', 
the verbal root J k r 'to do' and the feminine suffix t i , and i t 
conveys the idea of 'bringing f o r t h ' . In the Brahma-Vaivarta-
Purana (II.1..5) these three morphemes are explained symbolically 
as representing sattva, rajas and tamas respectively. 
Although the word i t s e l f does not occur prior to the metric 
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Upanisads , the concept of prakrti appears to be known i n principle 
already i n the Rgveda and Atharvaveda. K.B.R. RAO (1966, 99)» for 
instance, conjectures that whilst the notion of atman led to the 
formulation of the concept of purusa, the earlier concept of brahman 
as the substratum of the manifest world gave rise to the idea of 
aksara, avyakta and, then, prakrti. He cites P.O SCHRADER (1956 ) 
i n confirmation of this hypothesis. However, D. CHATTOPADHYAYA 
(1959) proffers an entirely divergent view. He links up the evolution 
of this key concept with the f e r t i l i t y cult of what he regards as 
the original non-vedic Samkhya-Tantrism . "Evidently the term praknti 
52 See Bhagavad-SIta III.27, 29, 33; IV.6; VII.5, 4, 20; IX.7, 8, 10, 
12, 13; XI.51; XIII.19, 20, 23, 29; XVIII.59. gvetasvatara-Upanisad 
IV.10. MaitrSyan1ya-Upani3ad VI.10, 30; I I . 6 . Mahanarayana-Upanisad 
X.8. 
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was not the invention of the early Sankhya philosophers because i t 
was the basic concept of Tantrism, the history of which i s traced 
back to a very remote antiquity. And i t is impossible to deny that 
the pra k r i t i originally stood for the female principle without 
53 
questioning the Indian cultural tradition fundamentally." 
Despite the persuasiveness of D. CHATTOPADHYAYA•s tight-knit 
argumentation, I f a i l to be convinced by his sweeping reconstruction 
of the history of Indian thought and hence entertain certain 
reservations about his unilinear derivation of the philosophical 
concept of prakrti from popular religious contexts. I have, however, 
similar misgivings about K.B.R. RAO's attempt to recognise in 
Rgveda 1.164 and X.129 the earliest references to the proto-conception 
of purusa and prakrti. I am not sure that he is j u s t i f i e d in his 
conjecture that these two hymns must have "in no small measure 
contributed to the breaking of the original absolutism of Brahman 
as the Personal or Impersonal into the dual Principles, the Personal 
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and the Impersonal" . I t seems to me that the actual situation at the 
time must have been far more complex than is suggested by either view. 
Besides, there are interesting references in the Atharvaveda 
which w i l l have to be taken into account i f one wants to arrive at 
a more comprehensive interpretation. Regrettably this whole hymnody 
has been rather neglected and underrated, but possibly the fu l l e s t 
survey of the Atharvaveda from the viewpoint of proto-Yoga and -Samkhya 
53 D. CHATTOPADHYAYA (1959, 404) 
54 KB.R. RAO (1966, 114) 
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materials is that by J.W. HAUER (1922; 1927; 1958). For instance, 
he (1958, 59) sees i n Atharvaveda X.8 a definite l i n k with the much 
l a t e r SvetasVatara-Upanis,ad which i s one of the outstanding early 
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Yoga texts, and he perceives i n X.8.29-31 a clear indication of 
the germ of the later notion of prakrti. Of particular interest is here 
the use of the verbal root /«/ac/anc which J.W. HAUER regards as the 
origin of the later concept of vyakta and avyakta. What seems to be 
the essence of these early expressions is the idea of a primal, 
transcendental source or 'womb' (yorii) from which issues forth the 
multiform universe. This is precisely the meaning of the concept of 
prakrti as the creative matrix, the ap^O » which holds i n posse 
* a l l things, i t s e l f being unbounded (aTTf I p o y ) . 
E.H. JOHNSTON (1937), i n his admirable and s t i l l useful study, 
shows that the older term for prakrti is avyakta, the 'unmanifest*, 
s t i l l current at the time of the Katha-Upanisad. In the Bhagavad-
Gita which is slightly older than the Svetas*vatara-Upanisad,0 both 
terms are employed interchang^ibly. Avyakta is mentioned, f o r instance, 
i n VIII.18 and contrasted with vyakta (plural use), and in VIII.20 
the word i s employed to denote something which is higher than the 
ordinary avyakta. whilst i n VIII.21 this higher avyakta is identified 
with aksara. At that time prakrti had not yet acquired a s t r i c t l y 
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technical sense (as •nature 1; , whereas aksara signifying the purusa 
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is decidedly a technical expression i n the Bhagavad-Glta. j 
55 This strange relation between sVetasVatara-Upanisad and Atharvaveda 
is highlighted by the fact that IV.3 i n the former scripture is a 
verbatim quotation from the la t t e r , viz. X.8.27. 
56 See K.N. UPADHYAYA (1971) on the age of the Bhagavad-GTta. 
57 See e.g. Bhagavad-GIta III.33, IV.6 et a l . 
58 See P.M. MODI (1932, 5) 
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In the Svetasvatara-Upanisad (lV .10) the term prakrti is 
found i n the phrase mayam tu prakrtim vidyan mayinam tu maha-i^varamt or: 
"prakrti is to be known as maya (and] the great lord as the mayin". 
Here prakrti = maya (not i n the sense of ' i l l u s i o n 1 ) stands for 
avyakta which elsewhere i n this text is denoted by the word 
pradhana. E.H. JOHNSTON (1937, 27) points out that since this 
particular stanza is i n the anustubh metre i t must have been inserted 
into this series of tristubh verses at a later stage. The regular 
use of prakrti for this period is i n the plural, which refers to 
the set of eight primary evolutes, viz. buddhi, ahamkara, manas and the 
fxve.fai.it elements. This enumeration i s according to the Bhagavad-GTtg 
(VII.4—5), but other variants are known. Pear example, i n the Buddha- ^ 
carita (XII.18) these eight constituents are said to be avyakta, 
buddhi, ahamkara and the five elements. This text also mentions 
the complementary set of sixteen vikaras or secondary evolutes, 
viz. the five senses, the five sense-objects, the five organs of 
action and the manas (see XII.19)* This double usage of the term 
prakrti is also retained i n the Samkhya-Karika which speaks of prakrti 
( i n the later sense of avyakta) and of the various prakrtis and v i k r t i s , 
that is the primary and secondary evolutes of the world-ground. 
Remarkably, this i s also the way i n which Patanjali applies 
the term prakrti. I t is mentioned a mere three times i n the Yoga-Sutra, 
namely i n 1.19 as prakrti-laya and in IV.2-3. In IV.3, significantly 
enough, the word is used i n the plural genitive (as prakrtinam). The 
two sutras i n question run as follows: jaty-antara-parinamah prakrty-
apurat; nimittam-aprayo.iakam prakrtinam varana-bhedas-tu tatah 
ksetrikavat. In consonance with J.W. BAUER1 s (1958) revised interpretation 
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of the i n i t i a l aphorisms of the fourth pada,I propose this translation: 
"The transformation into another category-of-existence ( j a t i ) 
[derives] from the pouring-over of the world-ground. — The 
incidental-cause (nimitta) [ V i z . the store of samskaras"! does 
not i n i t i a t e the prakrtis, but [merely] singles out possibilities 
(varana) j i n accordance with the karmic conditions] , like a farmer 
j^ who irrigates a f i e l d by selecting appropriate pathways for the 
water]." 
The plural prakrtis has been subjected to various renderings and 
paraphrases, such as 'evolving-causes' (J.H.Y/OODS), ' Yferdevorgange' 
(J.W.HAUER), 'natural tendencies' ( i . K . TAIMNl), 'die (schopferisch 
sich betatigenden) Naturen' (P. DEUSSEN), 'material causes' (G. .TEA), 
'creative-causes' (R. PRASADA) and 'constituents' (M.N. DVIVEDl). 
Because of the classical commentators' complete misunderstanding of 
the true intent of these sutras which have nothing to do with 
magical feats, the obvious meaning of this plural use has never been 
spotted: Here we have not just a reference to some vaguely conceived 
process of creation, but very probably the plural prakrtis refers to 
the well-known set of the primary evolutes emerging from the primal 
matrix. Of course, one cannot be sure that Patanjali had i n mind 
the set of eight principles as enunciated, f o r example, i n the 
Bhagavad-GItg or in other passages of the Mahabharata. As a matter 
of fact his ontology - as w i l l be seen - follows i t s own idiosyncratic 
pattern which is distinct from those promulgated i n the epic, the 
Caraka-Samhita. the Buddhacarita or other coeval sources. . — — — — — — 
Patanjali*s vocabulary includes several synonyms of the term 
prakrti. Thus he employs drsya (viz. 11.17, 18, 21.; IV.23), grahya 
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(1.41), alinga (l.45; 11.19), and sva ( I I . 2 3 ) . E.H.JOHNSTON 
(1937, 26) states that pradhana is the regular term used i n the 
Yoga-Sutra, but this word i n fact occurs only once i n I I I . 4 8 . 
The term avyakta, on the other hand, does not appear at a l l . However, 
Patanjali employs vyakta (lV . 1 3 ) , contrasting i t with suksma ('the 
subtle'). These are said to be the two aspects of the dharmas 
which compose the universe; their essence are the gunas. In this 
case vyakta and suksma refer to the time dimension of things, vyakta 
being the generic term for those properties which are evident, i.e. 
present, and suksma for those which are potential either because they 
existed i n the past or w i l l exist i n the future. 
The most common denotation for prakrti i s unquestioningly 
the term drsya, xfhich covers both the unmanifest and the manifest 
component of prakrti. This concept has an epistemological ring about 
i t which is yet another indication of the psychological experiential 
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orientation of Yoga. Thus drsya (from/Vdrs 'to see') signifies anything I$> 
that is capable of becoming the object of the transcendental witness-
Self, that i s to say, anything that pertains to prakrti i n any of i t s 
modes, including the causal core (pradhana) i t s e l f . I n this respect 
three major aspects of prakrti can be differentiated: ( i ) the transcend-
ental dimension, ( i i ) the objective (physical) part and ( i i i ) the 
subjective (psychic) aspect. G.M. K0EU4AN (1970, 158) calls the last-
mentioned, more appropriately perhaps, 'subjectivo-objective* byway 
of contrast with the 'objectivo-objective' energisations of prakrti. 
The commentators appear to have taken drsya i n a far more restricted 
sense. Thus the Maniprabha (II.17) has drsVam buddhi-sattvam, "the seen 
is the translucent-aspect of the mind". Vyasa, again, says i n his 
Yoga-Bhasya (II.17): drsya buddhi-sattva-upartldhah sarve dharmah, "The 
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o b j e c t s - o f - s i g h t (drsyah) are a l l q u a l i t i e s |"of p r a k r t i j which have 
a f f e c t e d the s a t t v a o f the m i n d " . Vacaspat i Mis'ra exp la ins t h i s 
f u r t h e r i n h i s T a t t v a - V a i s a r a d i ( l l . 1 7 ) : t ad -e tad-buddhi - sa t tvam 
^abda-ady-akaravad-drs'yam-ayas-kanta--mani-kalpain purusasya svam b h a v a t i 
drs ' i - rupasya svaminah, "Thus t h i s same s a t t v a o f the mind, c o n t a i n i n g 
£ t h e o b j e c t s o f ] sound e t c . , ^becomes] the ' seen ' j j a c t i n g ] l i k e a 
loads tone , i t becomes the p rope r ty (sva) o f the S e l f , the p r o p r i e t o r 
o f the f o r m of Awareness". That P a t a n j a l i employs drsya i n the wides t 
p o s s i b l e sense ifc ev iden t f rom 11.18 where he de l inea t e s i t s main 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . He speaks of a ' d i s p o s i t i o n ' ( ^ x l a ) t o (a ) 
l u m i n o s i t y (prakasa) , ( b ) a c t i v i t y ( k r i y a ) and ( c ) i n e r t i a ( s t h i t i ) . 
Th i s t r i p a r t i t i o n i s the outcome of the presence o f the th ree types 
o f gunas, which i s c l e a r f r o m 11.19 which g ives out the v a r i o u s 
l e v e l s o f m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f these p r imary b u i l d i n g - b l o c k s o f the 
w o r l d - g r o u n d . I w i l l come back t o t h i s issue s h o r t l y . 
I w i s h to conclude these p r e - e m i n e n t l y l i n g u i s t i c observat ions 
w i t h the f o l l o w i n g semantic m a t r i x cons t ruc ted on the basis of the 
above synonyms of the term p r a k r t i . 
PRAKRTI : 
p r a k r t i ( p l u r a l ) 
^comprehensive concepts ; ( ^ r e s t r i c t e d concepts^ 
V - Y 
sva p r a k r t i ( s i n g u l a r ) 
drsya pradhana 
grahya a l i n g a 
vyakta - suksma 
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I t must next be asked what e x a c t l y p r a k r t i stands f o r . F i r s t 
of a l l , i t i s impor tan t t o r e a l i s e t h a t i t comprises two 
c a r d i n a l dimensions. On the one hand the re i s the noumenal m a t r i x 
o f c r e a t i o n , a l so c a l l e d a l i n g a (= ayyakta = pradhana), and on the 
other hand the re i s the realm o f the m u l t i t u d i n o u s phenomena of 
cont ingent ex i s t ence . The l a t t e r category i s not exhausted by the 
v i s i b l e un ive r se o f o r d i n a r y space and t i m e . I n i t s phenomenalised 
na tu re , p r a k r t i a lso embraces the vas t hidden dimension impervious t o 
the senses but experiencjable i n yog ic i n t r o s p e c t i o n and l o g i c a l l y 
deducible f r o m the spa t i o - t empora l sense-derived da ta . Th i s i n n e r 
o r ' s u b t l e ' (suksma) aspect o f p r a k r t i I propose to c a l l deep 
s t r u c t u r e i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to the su r face s t r u c t u r e , i . e . 
the v i s i b l e , a u d i b l e , t a c t u a l w o r l d . 
The deep s t r u c t u r e o f p r a k r t i i s s t r a t i f i e d h i e r a r c h i c a l l y , 
a l b e i t i n an a s p a t i a l sense. This s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , wh ich v a r i e s 
i n i t s concep t ion f r o m one t r a d i t i o n t o another , has a l so been 
r e f e r r e d to as ' o n t o l o g i c a l map ' , as i t serves the y o g i n as a gu ide -
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beam i n h i s programme o f conscious i n v o l u t i o n . Viewed dynamica l ly 
r a the r than s t r u c t u r a l l y , one can also speak o f an e v o l u t i o n o f 
o n t i c ca tegor ies o r t a t t va - an t a r a -pa r i nama . The term t a t t v a 
denotes such ca tegor i e s as buddh i , ahamkara, e t c . 
T h i s concept ion i m p l i e s a view o f the un ive r se as an e s s e n t i a l l y 
autonomous system of n e c e s s a r i l y i n t e r r e l a t e d even ts . Th i s p a r t i c u l a r 
aspect o f j g r a k r t i was p r e c i p i t a t e d i n the ved i c concept o f r t a o r 
• o r d e r 1 , and l a t e r on came to be expressed f o r ins tance i n the idea 
o f ad r s t a ' t h e i n v i s i b l e law 1 i n the ph i losophy of Nyaya and 
59 See G.A. PEUERSTEIN ( 1 9 7 4 ' , 8 7 f . ) 
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Vais 'es ika. P r a k r t i can thus be looked upon as a system or ' f i e l d ' 
composed o f in terdependent sub-systems arranged h i e r a r c h i c a l l y 
accord ing to the p r i n c i p l e t h a t each higher sub-system i s 
p r o g r e s s i v e l y more i n c l u s i v e . This i s best i l l u s t r a t e d on the 
example of the w e l l - k n o i m schema u t i l i s e d i n C l a s s i c a l Samkhya^ 
which pe rmi t s the f o l l o w i n g diagrammatic condensat ion: 
( 1 ) PRAKRTI 
JZEIDD I ^ T ^ l 115-19) 120-24 
(2) MAHAT 
3 4-14 15-19 20-24 
(3) AHAMKARA 
H 114-141(15-191 120-24 
/ — r 
(4-14) TEN SENSES + MANAS 
zzi (zzi tz i czi tzn 
(15-19) FIVE TAMATRAS 
• CZ3 LZZl I Z Z } J ^ 
(20-24) FIVE BITOT AS • • • • • 
The c o - o r d i n a t i o n and interdependence between the seve ra l 
stib-systems are d e f i n e d i n terms of causal r e l a t ions o f a s p e c i f i c t y p e . 
60 See Samkhya-Karika 22 and 24. 
142 
I t i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y known as the ' d o c t r i n e o f ( p r e - ) e x i s t e n t e f f e c t * 
o r sat-karya-vada o r , more s p e c i f i c a l l y , as the ' d o c t r i n e o f ( r e a l ) 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n 1 or parinama-vada. R.A. SINARI (1970, 38) c a l l s t h i s 
the " e a r l i e s t and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y the most va luab le a t tempt made i n 
I n d i a n phi losophy t o se t up a theory o f causa l o rde r " . This v iew i s 
p a r t l y foreshadowed i n the Bhagavad-GTta ( I I . 1 6 ) which con ta ins these 
l i n e s : na-asato v i d y a t e bhavo, na-abhavo v i d y a t e s a t a h , o r : " 0 f the 
non -ex i s t en t there i s no becoming, o f the e x i s t e n t there i s no 
d is -becoming" . The f u l l - f l e d g e d d o c t r i n e , be ing a re-s ta tement o f 
the above n o t i o n , i s t o be found i n the Samkhya-Karika (9): asad-
akaranad-upadana-grahanat-sarva-sambhava-abhavat, saktasya sakya-
karanat-karana-bhavac-ca sat-karyam.or ' . " ^There ±s~\ p r e—exi s t en t 
e f f e c t because o f the non-productiTrehes,s o f non-being, because o f 
the need f o r a ma te r i a l - cause , because o f the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e r i -
v a t i o n f r o m e v e r y t h i n g , because o f [ a t h i n g ' s ^ ab i l i t y - t o^ -p roduce 
£ o n l y what i t i s ] capable j o f producing^ and because of the na ture o f 
the cause". 
T h i s , somewhat obscure passage stands i n need of e l u c i d a t i o n : 
The p re -ex i s tence o f the e f f e c t i n the cause i s based on f i v e l o g i c a l 
reasons. The f i r s t i s t ha t . some th ing which i s no t cannot be brought 
i n t o ex is tence nor can i t b r i n g any th ing e l s e i n t o e x i s t e n c e . This i s 
the famous axiom e x g n i h i l o n i h i l f i t . The second reason adduced by 
I sva r a Krsna i s t h a t any e f f e c t r e q u i r e s a cause which i n h i s o p i n i o n 
must be o f the same m a t e r i a l . Nex t , i t i s argued t h a t the e f f e c t must 
have a s p e c i f i c cause and cannot be d e r i v e d s imply f rom the sum t o t a l 
o f o ther e f f e c t s ; t h e r e must be a spec ia l r e l a t i o n between e f f e c t and 
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cause, and t h i s i s i n t e r p r e t e d i n the sense t h a t t h e cause p o t e n t i a l l y 
con ta ins the e f f e c t . F o u r t h l y , not e v e r y t h i n g i s capable o f producing 
a s p e c i f i c e f f e c t which i s y e t another a f f i r m a t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l 
inherence o f the e f f e c t i n the cause. F i n a l l y , the p re -ex i s tence o f 
the e f f e c t i n the cause i s demanded by the f a c t t h a t the cause i s o f 
the same nature as the e f f e c t . These statements can h a r d l y be sa id 
t o amount to p roo f s unless i t i s admi t t ed t h a t a c i r c u l a r l o g i c i s 
pu t f o r w a r d . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s c r i t i c i s m , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
t h a t Samkhya and Yoga c a r e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h between the m a t e r i a l 
(upadana) and the i n s t r u m e n t a l ( n i m i t t a ) cause o f a t h i n g , subsuming 
bo th under the heading o f karana which i s se t aga ins t karya o r ' e f f e c t * . 
Occas iona l ly the e f f e c t i s d e f i n e d e i t h e r as aupadanika or n a i m i t t i k a . 
A l l phenomena, whether they belong t o the su r face s t r u c t u r e o r t o 
the deep s t r u c t u r e o f p r a k r t i , are considered as ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ' 
(parinama)' ' o f one and the same substra tum, v i z . the wor ld -ground . 
Here a p p l i e s , i f ever , the phrase p lus ca change, p lus c ' e s t l a meme 
chose. The t e c h n i c a l d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r theorem i s 
p r ak r t i - pa r i nama-vada . I t i s one o f f o u r ma jo r t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n s 
on the i ssue o f c a u s a l i t y as developed i n I n d i a n ph i lo sophy . There i s 
f i r s t o f a l l the v i ew of the Nyaya and Vais 'esika schools o f thought -
known as arambha-vada - accord ing to which e t e r n a l atoms crea te by 
c o n t i n u a l r e -combina t ion the m u l t i f o r m u n i v e r s e . Also the A j l v i k a s , 
Jainas and m a t e r i a l i s t s o f anc ien t I n d i a must be reckoned as subsc r ib ing 
t o t h i s v i e w . The best known r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the second type o f 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s HInayana Buddhism w i t h i t s dharma t h e o r y . Th i s 
sanghata-vada asse r t s t h a t separate e x i s t e n t i a l f a c t o r s create the 
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i n d i v i d u a l and h i s e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l environment by a process 
o f co -ope ra t ive c o l l o c a t i o n ( sanghata) . The t h i r d p o s i t i o n i s 
the v i v a r t a - v a d a which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the non-dual ism o f s'ankara, 
accord ing t o which the one r e a l brahman remains ever unchanged; 
a l l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s are a t t r i b u t e d to the cont ingent un ive r se which 
i s regarded as v i v a r t a o r an appearance q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n nature 
f r o m i t s cause. The Mahajpana t h i n k e r s m a i n t a i n a s i m i l a r v i e w . 
F i n a l l y , the parinama-vada asser t s t h a t the Many i s c rea ted out 
o f the One by way of a se r i e s o f r e a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , and i t i s t h i s 
p o s i t i o n which i s t y p i c a l o f Yoga, Samkhya and the o l d e r Vedanta schoo l s . 
The parinama-vada c la imed a considerable f o l l o w i n g , and i t s 
prominent place i n I n d i a n p h i l o s o p h i c a l specu l a t i on can r e a d i l y 
be apprec ia ted when one considers the f r e q u e n t r e f u t a t i o n s o f i t 
61 — by other t r a d i t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y Buddhism. I n l a t e r t imes Samkhya 
and Toga t h i n k e r s a v a i l e d themselves a l so o f such concepts as 
had been developed i n opponent schools i n order t o b u t t r e s s t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n i n the i n c r e a s i n g l y more compe t i t i ve s p i r i t of a n a l y t i c a l 
p h i l o s o p h i s i n g . For example, P a t a f t j a l i adopts the concepts o f 
q u a l i t y (dharma) and substance (dharmin) which played a d e c i s i v e 
62 
r o l e i n the heyday of I n d i a n ph i lo sophy . 
I n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d to the concept of p r a k r t i i s the d o c t r i n e 
o f the gunas which I w i l l proceed to discuss n e x t . The world-ground 
as concep tua l i sed i n the Samkhya and Yoga t r a d i t i o n has been 
61 See W. LIEBERTHAL (1934) 
62 See E. FRAUVALLNER (1953,1,390) 
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descr ibed by some scho la r s as a k i n d o f ' u l t i m a t e energy 1 t r a n s -
mut ing i t s e l f i n t o v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s by means of a re-arrangement 
of i t s basic c o n s t i t u e n t s , the s o - c a l l e d gunas, which i n v i t e 
comparison w i t h the 'quantum packets ' of modern nuc l eu r phys i c s . 
The n o t i o n o f the gunas i s one o f the c e n t r a l doc t r i ne s o f Yoga-
Samkhya on to logy and can s a f e l y be regarded as the s i n g l e most 
o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h i s p r o l i f e r a t i n g t r a d i t i o n . 
The word guna means l i t e r a l l y ' s j j r a n d , rope ' and i s a lso used 
t o denote ' q u a l i t y 1 . I n the present con tex t i t i s best rendered 
as ' p r i m a r y - c o n s t i t u e n t ' of the wor ld -g round . Other f r e q u e n t 
t r a n s l a t i o n s are ' a spec t ' ( j . H . WOODS), ' q u a l i t y ' (S . DASGUPTA), 
' a t t r i b u t e ' (G. JHA). N . SMART (196+) p r e f e r s to t r a n s l a t e i t w i t h 
' s t rand-subs tances ' and J.W. HAUER (1958) w i t h ' W e l t s t o f f - E n e r g i e n ' , 
w h i l s t o thers r e t a i n the S a n s k r i t term (see I . K . TAIMNI, G.H. KOEIMAN). 
The d o c t r i n e o f the gunas has a p r o t r a c t e d and r a the r r econd i t e 
h i s t o r y . The idea was conceived l o n g before the c o d i f i c a t i o n o f e i t h e r 
Yoga o r Samkhya, but i t s exact o r i g i n s are shrouded i n mys t e ry . 
Var ious a t tempts have been made t o t r a c e the development o f t h i s 
impor tan t p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept, w i t h v a r y i n g degrees o f success. 
The a v a i l a b l e h i s t o r i c a l data pe rmi t the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the guna 
theory was g r a d u a l l y developed out of much o l d e r specu la t ions recorded 
i n the ved ic samhitas, the brahmana t e x t s and a l so the Upanisads. 
63 See f o r ins tance F . CAPRA (1972, 1 5 f f . ) 
64 See the extensive b i b l i o g r a p h y by M. ELIADE (1973^) . Not mentioned 
but o f paramount importance i s the study by J . A . B . VAN BUITENEN 
(19567) i n the Journal o f the American O r i e n t a l S o c i e t y , v o l s . 76 
( p p . 155ff .) and 1 5 3 f f . - f and 77 gfigT88ff.). Also n o t l i s t e d are 
T . STCHERBATSKY (1934, 737-60) and A . WAYMAN (1962, 14 -22 ) . 
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There i s no compel l ing reason t o assume t h a t i t evolved w i t h i n 
non-aryan t r a d i t i o n s , though i t may not have been the c r e a t i o n 
s o l e l y o f the brahmanic or thodoxy e i t h e r . According to E .H. 
JOHNSTON (1937) , t h e gunas were o r i g i n a l l y s imply p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
q u a l i t i e s , and he r e f e r s to the use of the synonym bhava or 
• f o r c e o f becoming, sent iment* . But as J . A . B . VAN BUITENEN 
(1956) shows beyond a l l doubt , there are two types o f e v o l u t i o n a r y 
schemata advocated by Samkhya, namely a v e r t i c a l and a h o r i z o n t a l 
theory o f e v o l u t i o n which l a t e r on came to be i n t e g r a t e d 
i n some schoo l s . He denies t h a t the term guna (= bhava) 
/1 
o r i g i n a l l y meant 'mora l o r ps | ;h i ca l q u a l i t y of the b u d d h i 1 . 
The o r i g i n a l v e r t i c a l v e r s i o n d i d not i n v o l v e the gunas at a l l . 
J . A . B . VAN BUITENEN understands bhava as a " f o r m o f be ing , cosmic 
phase evolved under the i n f l u e n c e of a guna" . Thus gu.na i n i t s 
most a rchaic concept ion stood f o r a t r i a d o f f a c t o r s one o f which 
was ra . jas . T h e i r combined a c t i o n on buddhi r e s u l t e d i n the e v o l u t i o n 
o f the three bhavas o r s t a t e s o f be ing w h i c h , accord ing to J . A . B . VAN 
BUITENEN's r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the epic evidence, may cons i s t i n manas, 
the i n d r i y a s and t h e bhutas . The wel l -known t r i a d o f s a t tva - ra . j a s -
tamas i s d e f i n i t e l y a subsequent c r e a t i o n , though the p r i n c i p l e 
i m p l i e d i n these concepts must have been present a l r eady i n the 
e a r l i e r t r i a d i c concep t i on . 
What then are the gunas i n t h e i r c l a s s i c a l sense? S u r p r i s i n g l y 
enough t h i s ques t ion has never been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y answered by any o f 
65 J . A . B . VAN BUITENEN (1956* :, 156 ) . 
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the e a r l i e r t h i n k e r s , and i t was i n f a c t V i j f i a n a Bhiksu who, as 
l a t e as the 16 th c e n t u r y , a f f o r d e d t h i s t o p i c a f i r s t c r i t i c a l 
examinat ion and d i s c u s s i o n . The gunas can be descr ibed as 
boing the u l t i m a t e b u i l d i n g blocks o f the m a t e r i a l and mental 
phenomena i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y . They are n o t merely q u a l i t i e s or 
p r o p e r t i e s , bu t a c t u a l e n t i t i e s or ' r e a l s ' (s. DASGUPTA) and as 
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such n o n - d i s t i n c t f r o m the world-ground i t s e l f . They are the 
i n d i v i s i b l e atoms of e v e r y t h i n g there i s w i t h the excep t ion o f 
the S e l f (purusa) which i s by d e f i n i t i o n n i r - g u n a . The gunas 
unde r ly every appearance, and are the wor ld-ground i n i t s noumenal 
cha rac t e r . T h i s i s expressed by Ts'vara Rrsna i n t h i s way: t r i - g u n a m -
a v i v e k i v i sayah samanyam-acetanam prasava-dharmi, vyaktam t a t h a 
pradhanam t a d - v i p a r i t a s - t a t h a ca puman.or: "The man i fes t [ w o r l d j 
and the pr imary-subs t ra tum j a r e b o t h of the na ture o f j the t r i p l e 
gunas, w i t h o u t discernment , o b j e c t i v e , gener i c , w i t h o u t Awareness 
6*7 
and p r o d u c t i v e . Yet the S e l f i s the reverse of t h i s " . 
Thus they are the very m a t e r i a l o f p r a k r t i . I n f a c t i n C l a s s i c a l 
Samkhya p r a k r t i i s d e f i n e d as t r i -guna-samya-avastha or " the s t a t e o f 
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homoeostasis o f the three gunas" . I n h i s s tudy on the Bhagavad-GTta 
S. DASGUPTA ( 1 9 6 5 4 , I I , 465) suggests t h a t i n t h i s s c r i p t u r e the gunas 
are n o t thought t o c o n s t i t u t e the w o r l d - g r o u n d , but t h i s i s obv ious ly 
wrong, f o r he c l e a r l y over looks 711.14 where Krsna ' s maya (= p r a k r t i ) 
66 See Vi jnana Bh iksu ' s remarks t o Samkhya-Sutra 1 .61 : s a t t v a - a d i n i 
d ravyan i na va i s e s ika gunah, t ha t i s . " s a t t va e t c . are substances 
no t q u a l i t i e s [as t aught i n the school of3 V a i s e s i k a 1 1 . 
67 Samkhya-Karika (11) 
iVScaspat i Mis ra on 
68hiamkhya-Karika (3) ; c f . Samkhya-Sutra ( 1 . 6 1 ) : sattva-ra.jas-tamasam 
sSmya-avasthS p r a k r t i h . 
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i s c a l l e d guna-mayi or 'composed of the gunas ' . Nor do we need 
to perce ive any r e a l c o n f l i c t between t h i s statement and such 
expressions as gunah prakr t i -sambhavah ( X I V . 5 ) o r ' the gunas born of 
the wor ld -g round* . Any argument to the c o n t r a r y would be meaningless 
i n view o f the sa t -ka rya d o c t r i n e which demands t ha t the gunas 
i n the i r , noumenal s t a t e are mere p o t e n t i a l i t i e s which become a c t u a l i s e d 
w i t h the process o f e v o l u t i o n . As K .B .R . RAO (1966, 52) s t a t e s : "Gunas 
are themselves p r a k r t i . Gunas are not ' i n g r e d i e n t s ' , or ' p a r t s ' " . 
C.T. KENGHE (1958, 4) has a remark to the same e f f e c t : "The th ree 
f o r c e s Sa t t va , Rajas and Tamas cannot be sa id t o be the p a r t s o f 
P r a k r t i , f o r i n themselves they are e q u a l l y i m p a r t i t e and i m p a r t i t e 
t h i n g s can never be pa r t s of a n y t h i n g e l s e " . The author a l so c a l l s 
p r a k r t i a • suprapsych ica l substance 1 r e j e c t i n g the w i d e l y prevalent 
t r a n s l a t i o n of the term w i t h ' m a t t e r ' ; but t h i s i s e q u a l l y obscure . 
P a t a n j a l i i s p e r f e c t l y cogent on t h i s i s s u e . I n 11.19 a l i n g a 
which corresponds w i t h the Samkhya praler t i -pradhana, i s sa id t o be 
one o f the l e v e l s (parvan) o f the gunas. There are f o u r l e v e l s i n a l l 
which w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n d e t a i l below. I t i s d e a r f r o m t h i s 
t h a t f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes the gunas can be equated w i t h p r a k r t i 
( i n the comprehensive sense) . 
The impor tan t ques t ion o f the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y o f the gunas has been 
l e f t un t ack l ed by bo th Vyasa and Vacaspati M i ^ r a , j u s t as they ignored 
the problem o f t h e i r m u l t i p l i c i t y . The t e x t s ment ion t r i p l e gunas 
but do n o t e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e whether there are on ly th ree types o f gunas 
or a m u l t i t u d e o f gunas which may be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o t h r e e ca tegor ies 
i n respec t o f t h e i r s e v e r a l f u n c t i o n s . However, the p o s t u l a t i o n o f 
a l a r g e number o f gunas seems a l o g i c a l neces s i t y i f i t i s mainta ined 
t h a t the p l e t h o r a of phenomena are the d i r e c t outcome of i n f i n i t e 
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guna permutat ions which i s a t l e a s t I svara K r § n a ' s p ropos i i ion . 
I n h i s o p i n i o n the e n t i r e phenomenal w o r l d and i t s deep s t r u c t u r e 
are c rea ted by a process o f c o n t i n u a l r e -combina t ion of the p r imary -
c o n s t i t u t e n t s of p r a k r b i . Indeed, i f the re were on ly th ree d i s t i n c t 
e n t i t i e s the i n o r d i n a t e m u l t i p l i c i t y of e x i s t i n g t h i n g s c o u l d not 
be exp l a ined . On the o ther hand, i t i s conv inc ing tha t a near 
i n f i n i t e number o f gunas o f three d i f f e r e n t types should by 
way of c o l l o c a t i o n and pe rpe tua l r e -combina t ion produce the m u l t i -
f a c e t e d dynamic network o f e x i s t e n c e . 
Maybe today t h i s ques t ion can be r e so lved on a n o n - s u b s t a n t i a l i s t 
basis i n the l i g h t o f contemporary f i e l d t heo ry -wh ich has s u c c e s s f u l l y 
supplanted the c l a s s i c a l concept ion o f ma t t e r as a chunk o f substance 
f l o a t i n g i n empty space. Perhaps i t i s not too f a r - f e t c h e d to compare 
the gunas w i t h the atoms of modern nuclear physics which are 
descr ibed as l o c a l i s a t i o n s of f i e l d s . As F . L . KUNZ (1963, 5) puts i t : 
"An atom . . . may be c o r r e c t l y thought o f as a s tanding wave system i n 
an open wave f o r c e f i e l d p o t e n t i a l . " I t i s s u r e l y not by accident t h a t 
i t i s always the energe t ic nature o f the gunas which i s pushed i n t o 
fo reg round by the l a t e r expounders o f the Samkhya and Yoga t r a d i t i o n s . 
A l though Vi jnana Bhiksu cha rac te r i ses them as dravyas or 'substances* 
he does so on ly i n o rde r t o r e f u t e the Vaises ika p o s i t i o n accord ing to 
which the gunas are q u a l i t i e s , and had he known the express ion 'energy 
p a r c e l ' he would probably no t have h e s i t a t e d to use i t i n s t e a d . 
As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 77) no tes : "The gunas' nature i s throughout 
expressed i n terms o f f u n c t i o n a l q u a l i t i e s , k i n e t i c d i s p o s i t i o n s and 
causal u rges . " Th i s i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by the Yoga-Bhasya ( I I . 1 8 ) 
I^rom t h i s passage emerges t h a t 
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( 1 ) a l though the gunas are q u i t e d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s 
having d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , , 
( 2 ) they nonetheless i n f l u e n c e each other and by 
t h e i r interdependent f u n c t i o n i n g crea te the 
phenomenal u n i v e r s e , and thus 
(3) e v e r y t h i n g must be looked upon as a ' s y n e r g i s a t i o n ' 
(G.M. KOELMAN, 1970, 78) of the three jgunas. 
The energe t i c na tu re o f the gunas i s fu r the rmore i n d i c a t e d by the 
f a c t t h a t P a t a n j a l i associates them w i t h the concept o f parinama or 
• t r ans fo rma t ion* and t h a t o f p r a t i p r a s a v a or ' i n v o l u t i o n ' , the f l o w i n g 
back o f the man i fe s t gunas i n t o the p o t e n t i a l i t y o f the wor ld -g round . 
Yoga on to logy thus conceives Nature to be a q u i v e r i n g f o r c e f i e l d 
undergoing cont inuous t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . The dynamism i s sus ta ined by the 
incessant i n t e r a c t i o n o f the th ree types of gunas whose a c t i v i t y can 
be i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e i r phenotypes as experienced e x t e r n a l l y or i n t e r n a l l y . 
The c l a s s i c guna t r i a d i s headed by s a t t v a . The word means l i t e r a l l y 
' be ing-ness ' and i s d e r i v e d f rom sat ' b e i n g ' and the a b s t r a c t s u f f i x - t v a . 
A grea t v a r i e t y o f render ings have been proposed, such as ' i n t e l l i g e n c e -
s t u f f ( S . DASGUPTA), ' e s s e n t i a l i t y ' (R. PRASADA), 'goodness' (G. JHA) 
a l l o f which h a r d l y touch the core meaning o f t h i s t e rm. J . H . WOODS 
(1966 5 ) w i s e l y leaves the word u n t r a n s l a t e d , but G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 10) 
contends t h a t i t i s best rendered by i t s L a t i n e q u i v a l e n t e n t i a (as 
i n p r e s e n t i a , a b s e n t i a ) , w h i l s t the a d j e c t i v a l fo rm s a t t v i k a would 
co r re spond ing ly assume the appearance o f ' e n t i c ' . I must admit t h a t 
I f a i l t o see the advantage o f such a procedure . I f one has to have 
recourse t o a f o r e i g n language anyhow i n order t o convey the meaning o f 
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s a t t v a , might one not s imply r e t a i n the S a n s k r i t term and maybe 
a n g l i c i s e i t s a d j e c t i v e to s a t t v i c ? 
The s i n g l e most impor t an t s tudy of the concept of s a t t v a 
i s t h a t by J . A . B . VAN BUITENEN ( 1 9 5 7 f )*'. ." i n which he c r i t i c i s e s 
past s cho l a r sh ip f o r r ead ing the c l a s s i c express ion o f t h i s concept 
i n t o the o l d e r m a t e r i a l . He remarks , ! ( ,p , 8 8 ) : "One r e s u l t of t h i s 
c l a s s i c i s m was the acceptance o f s a t t v a and the o ther gunas as f a c t o r s 
o n l y c o n d i t i o n i n g the i n d i v i d u a l ' ' - - s o u l ' s buddhi , t h e i r cosmologica l 
f u n c t i o n being looked upon e i t h e r as secondary or as superseded!'. 
Thus J . A . B . VAN BUITENEN completes the p a r t i a l r e c t i f i c a t i o n o f 
t h i s a p r i o r i s t i c view by E*. SENART (1915 and 1925) . 
I n the p r e - c l a s s i c a l Samkhya and Yoga t r a d i t i o n s the term s a t t v a 
was used i n many d i f f e r e n t senses; i t denoted the body-complex but a l so 
the psyche and the conc re t e ly e x i s t i n g e n t i t y or s e n t i e n t b e i n g . 
J . A . B . VAN BUITENEN ( 1 9 5 7 ? / . " p . 105) says: " I t would seem t h a t s a t t v a , 
undoubtedly a n o t i o n t h a t was e labora ted i n c i r c l e s where the i d e a o f 
a p e r s o n a l i t y — w i t h i n c r e a s i n g l y microcosmic f e a t u r e s — p e r s i s t e d , 
r e f l e c t s i n i t s f u n c t i o n s the aspect of sa t as the r e i f i e d and c r e a t e d . 
As such i t could e a s i l y become l i n k e d up w i t h t r i p a r t i t e c r e a t i o n . . . " 
On page 106 he remarks: " I t i s no t c l ea r how s a t t v a came t o be associated 
j u s t w i t h r a j a s and tamas. Probably i t succeeded to a p r i n c i p l e l i k e 
tapas or j y o t i s , which acqu i red th6 c o n n o t a t i o n o f ' l i g h t o f knowledge' 
and had i t s opposi te i n 'darkness ' and ' o b s c u r a t i o n ' " . 
The second member o f the guna t r i a d i s r a j a s which accord ing to 
J . A . B . VAN BUITENEN (1957? 106) p robably "brought the t r i a d i c p a t t e r n 
a l o n g " . L ike s a t t v a i t has s u f f e r e d v a r i o u s more or less adequate 
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render ings i n t o E n g l i s h , such as ' e n e r g y - s t u f f ( S . DASGUPTA, F . V . 
CATALINA), ' energy ' (R. PRASEDA ) ," 1 f o u l n e s s ' (G. JHA ) . &. SENART ;(1915), 
the f i r s t to g ive a thorough examinat ion t o t h i s t e rm, shows t h a t 
o r i g i n a l l y r a j a s s i g n i f i e d the ' a tmosphere ' . Th is was r e c e n t l y chal lenged 
by T . BURROW (194S, 645) who r e l a t e s i t t o ' d i r t ' •» ' m o r a l d e f i l e m e n t ' 
'cosmic p r i n c i p l e ' . However, t h i s h y p o t h e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 
the e v o l u t i o n o f the concept of ra.jas i s f i r m l y r e j e c t e d by J . A . B . 
VAN BUITENEN (1957? '."."p. 92) who i s most i n s i s t e n t t h a t r a j a s 
had to begin w i t h a p u r e l y cosmologica l s i g n i f i c a n c e and t h a t o n l y 
subsequent ly i t acqu i red a p s y c h o l o g i c a l meaning. To cover both the 
cosmic and- the psychic aspect of t h i s t e rm, G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 12) 
uses the Greek word ]~p7fo\> paraphrasing ra.jas w i t h ' e r g e t i c c o n s t i t u e n t ' . 
I t i s the a c t i v e p r i n c i p l e which s t i m u l a t e s , i n i t i a t e s a c t i o n and 
s u p p l i e s the dynamic impulses w i t h o u t which the f i e l d o f p r a k r t i 
would c o l l a p s e . 
F i n a l l y , there i s tamas which has been t r a n s l a t e d w i t h 'mass-
s t u f f (S . DASGUPTA, F .V . CATALINA), ' i n e r t i a ' (R. PRASAD) and 
•darkness ' (G. JHA). Whi l s t r a j a s i s d e r i v e d f r o m A r a j / r a n j ' t o glow, 
be b r i l l i a n t * , tamas i s a d e r i v a t i v e of Jtam ' t o be exhausted, become 
r i g i d ' . G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 12) connects i t w i t h the a l l i e d L a t i n 
term temus o f which the a b l a t i v e temere ' b l i n d l y , r a s h l y ' has s u r v i v e d . 
He c a l l s t h i s t h i r d member o f the guna t r i a d a c c o r d i n g l y the ' t emer i c 
c o n s t i t u e n t ' . 
S. DASGUPTA ( 1 9 6 3 5 , I , 242-3) makes an a t tempt to e x p l a i n these 
gunas as ' f e e l i n g - s u b s t a n c e s ' . According to h im, f e e l i n g s "mark the 
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e a r l i e s t t r a c k o f consciousness, whether we l o o k a t i t f r o m the 
p o i n t of v iew o f e v o l u t i o n or of the genesis of consciousness i n 
o r d i n a r y l i f e (. . . )The f e e l i n g s are t h e r e f o r e the t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s , 
the u l t i m a t e substances o f which consciousness and gross mat te r are 
made up ( « . . ) T h e t h ree p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f thought and ma t t e r 
(»..)are but the m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of th ree types o f f e e l i n g substances". 
This seems t o be accepted prima f a c i e by F .V. CATALINA (1968, 35), 
but i n t e r e s t i n g as S. DASGUPTA1s pe r spec t ive i s i t never the less 
i m p l i e s an unwarranted p s y c h o l o g i s a t i o n of the nature of the gunas. 
Such a one-sidedness must be avoided i f one wants t o do f u l l j u s t i c e 
t o t h i s complex concept . The gunas are both cosmogonic and psychogonic 
f o r c e s . Th i s ambivalent nature o f the p r i m a r y - c o n s t i t u e n t s i s indeed 
c o n f u s i n g accustomed as we are t o d i s t i n g u i s h most c a r e f u l l y between 
m a t e r i a l phenomena on the one hand and psychomental events on the o ther 
hand. But , a g a i n , we must take heed not t o p r o j e c t our own 
c o g n i t i v e pa t t e rns onto the I n d i a n schemata. 
One can sympathise w i t h ' R . GARBE (1917 , 272) when he s t y l e s 
the d o c t r i n e o f the gunas a "strange t h e o r y " , but he i s dec ided ly 
mis taken i n h i s f u r t h e r statement t h a t i t i s "a pure hypothesis (• • • ) 
which shares the f a t e w i t h many o ther p h i l o s o p h i c a l hypotheses 
not t o be ab le to h o l d good i n the l i g h t of i f y modern n a t u r a l science" 
( p . 284) . On the c o n t r a r y , as I have i n t i m a t e d above, t h i s s t r i k i n g 
t each ing i s f a r f rom being a w e i r d product o f e a r l y man's v i v i d 
i m a g i n a t i o n but t h a t i t can be exp la ined most adequately w i t h the he lp 
69 
o f such avant-garde sciences as f i e l d t h e o r y . Moreover, the guna 
69 See also J.W. BAUER (1958, 334) 
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model appears to be a p e r f e c t l y cogent framework o f e x p l a n a t i o n 
of r e a l i t y as encountered by the t r a i n e d y o g i n . L ike the concept 
of p r a k r t i t h a t of the gunas, t oo , cannot be regarded as based on 
mere f i c t i o n . Rather more compel l ing i s the unpopular view t h a t 
these are e x p e r i e n t i a l l y d e r i v e d concepts . To gansay t h i s a p r i o r i 
i s t o deny the r a i s o n d ' e t r e o f Yoga and of the o lder Samkhya 
which are geared t o experience r a t h e r than c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n . 
L i t t l e wonder t h a t S. RADHAKRISHNAN ( 1 9 5 1 6 , I I , 274) who seems to 
be o b l i v i o u s to t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s cons t r a ined t o make the f o l l o w i n g 
admission: " I t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand the p rec i se s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f the Samkhya account o f e v o l u t i o n , and we have no t seen any s a t i s f a c t o r y 
exp lana t ion as t o why the d i f f e r e n t s teps o f e v o l u t i o n are what they a r e . 
— The d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s o f the Samkhya system cannot be l o g i c a l l y 
deduced f r o m p r a k r t i , and they seem to be se t down as i t s p roduc t s , thanks 
t o h i s t o r i c a l a c c i d e n t s . There i s no deduct ive development o f the 
products f r o m the one p r a k r t i . V i jnanabh iksu i s aware of t h i s d e f e c t , 
and so asks us to accept the Samkhya account of e v o l u t i o n on the 
a u t h o r i t y of the s c r i p t u r e s . But t h i s i s t o surrender the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n . " 
I n r e j e c t i n g VijSiana Bh iksu ' s answer, S. RADHAKRISMAN s imul taneous ly 
f o r f e i t s the o n l y reasonable exp l ana t i on of these concepts which are 
o f an e x p e r i e n t i a l na tu re , f o r what i s the f o u n d a t i o n of the a u t h o r i t y 
of t h e s c r i p t u r e s i f n o t ' r e v e l a t i o n ' i n the sense of the experience 
of r e a l i t y i n non-ord inary s t a t e s of consciousness (such as m e d i t a t i o n or 
samadhi)? A d m i t t e d l y , such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s seemingly c o n t r a d i c t e d 
by the f a c t t h a t a l l these concepts have a h i s t o r y , t h a t i s , underwent 
a process o f development and d i d no t j u s t s p r i n g i n t o ex is tence ready-made. 
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However, gradual conceptual refinement i s an in t eg ra l part of the 
l i f e of any theory and t h i s f a c t by no means undermines the raw data 
themselves which, i n t h i s pa r t i cu la r case, are the subjective observations 
during meditative and enstatic states of consciousness. The question i s 
rather to what degree the l a t e r doc t r ina l sophist icat ions, especial ly 
those of Classical Samkhya, can be said to r e f l e c t the o r i g i n a l 
» 
experiences. 
But to come back to the word fjuna, we f i n d that i t i s used 
altogether s ix times i n the Yoga-Sutra ( v i z . 1.16; 11.15, 19; IV.13» 
32, 34) • To these instances must be added sutra 11.18 which mentions 
the phenotypes ( J i l a ) of the three gunas, namely prakas^a or ' l u m i n o s i t y ' ; 
(per ta in ing to sa t tva) , k r i y a or ' a c t i v i t y * (belonging to r a j a s ) and 
s t h i t i or ' i n e r t i a ' (connected with tamas). K.B.R. RAO (1966, 54-)> 
who i s bold enough to speak of "the s c i e n t i f i c character of the theory 
of gunas" (p . 51)» epitomises t h e i r respective nature as f o l l o w s : 
Sattva i s that "which makes f o r existence or beingness"; ra jas i s - tha t 
"which makes f o r change i n i t s e l f " and tamas is that "which" denies 
a n n i h i l a t i o n through change". I n other words, sattva represents the 
p r inc ip l e of existence, ra jas that of d i scon t inu i ty and tamas that o f 
c o n t i n u i t y . 
These are said ( I I . 1 8 ) to be 'bodied f o r t h 1 i n the elements and 
the senses. The exact Sanskrit phrase i s bhuta-indriya-atmakam which 
J .H. WOODS (1966 ) renders as "wi th the elements and organs as i t s 
essence". R. IRASlDA (1912) has " i t consists of the elements and the 
powers of sensation", whi ls t J.Wl BAUER (1958) agrees wi th the above 
in t e rp re t a t ion ("kbrpert sich dar i n Elementen und Organen"). 
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Of course these bhutas and indr iyas as the external aspects of the gunas 
merely cons t i tu te what I have previously ca l l ed the'surface s t ruc ture ' 
of p r a k r t i . To express the same idea, Pa ta f i j a l i employs the technical 
term vi^esa or ' the part icular ised* (see 11.19). The 'deep s t ructure ' 
of the gargantuan "body of p r a k r t i , on the' other hand, i s s t r a t i f i e d 
i n to three primary leve ls of increasing complexity and organisation; 
these are the so-called guna-parvans or ' l eve l s of the ffiunas', namely 
avisesa 'the unpar t i cu la r i sed 1 , linga-matra ' the d i f f e r en t i a t ed* and 
al inga 'the u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e ' which i s the most generic- stratum. 
According to M.N. DVIVEDI (1934 ) these parvaris are i den t i ca l 
wi th the ' f o u r stages' a l legedly described i n 1.45; but t h i s par t icular : 
aphorism does not mention any stages at a l l , and he himself quite 
co r rec t ly translates suksma-visayatvam ca-alinga-paryavasanam vrith "The 
province of the subtle ends wi th the indissoluble" . I . K . TAIMNI 
(1965 , 180), again, attempts to correlate the levels of the gunas 
wi th the stages of samadhi mentioned i n 1.17 and also w i t h the vedantic 
not ion of the kosas or 'sheath/. He proposes the f o l l o w i n g equations: 
vitarka-samadhi — 
. - o 
vicara-
nanda-
asmita- 0 
vis'esa — manomaya-ko 6a 
avis'esa — vi.jftanamaya-0 
l i nga — anandamaya-0 
alinga — atman 
The apparent neatness of th i s tabulat ion i s matched only by 
i t s t o t a l f i c t i t i o u s n e s s . F i r s t of a l l , i t i s misleading to equate 
the enstatic experience of al inga wi th the r e a l i s a t i o n of atman i n 
Vedanta. The l a t t e r i s synonymous w i t h the yogic purusa as the p r inc ip le 
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of Awareness, whereas alinga i s without question conceived of as 
an insent ient category. I f a comparison can "be made at a l l , one would 
rather expect that i t i s the anandamaya-kos'a which corresponds wi th 
alinga as both are regarded as the root of spir i tual nescience. 
The vijnanamaya-kos'a f again,would seem to be more properly related to 0 
buddhi as the higher mental f a c u l t y , and the manomaya-kos"a could then 
be put on a par wi th the manas and the sensory complex. The realm 
of the pa r t i cu la r i sed (visesa) en ta i l s also the f i v e sthula-bhutas 
which, i f one wanted to be consistent, would c a l l f o r the inclusion 
of the f i f t h and lowest (or outermost) 'sheath* as well, namely the 
annamaya-kos/a. Thus one would have to squeeze a pentadic c l a s s i f i ca tory 
system ( i . e . the panca-kos'a doctrine) in to a quaternary schema 
( i . e . the parvan doctrine) which i s unsat isfactory and i n t h i s 
pa r t i cu la r case misleading as w e l l . 
I . E . T A I M I ' s second contention according to which there i s 
a cor re la t ion between the four types of samadhi and the guna-parvans 
i s on f i r s t s ight more promising, but on closer examination i t reveals 
i t s e l f to be equally f a l l a c i o u s . For, the vitarka-samadhi concerns only 
the sthula aspect of p r a k r t i , that i s , the manifold composites of the 
f i v e categories of bhutas. ' e l e m e n t s e x i s t i n g i n the space-time universe. 
On the other hand, the vieara-samadhi comprises a l l subtle e n t i t i e s up 
to al inga (see 1.45)> that i s , the ent i re deep structure of p r a k r t i . 
The ananda-samadhi. again, i s directed towards the instruments of knowledge 
( i . e . the senses) i f we can r e l y on the testimony of the commentators, 
whi ls t the asmita-samadhi i s orientated towards the p r inc ip le of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
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Nor must one confuse the four ' l e v e l s ' on which the gunas 
manifest themselves w i t h the ontogenetic series. I t appears that 
P a t a n j a l i ' s f o u r - l e v e l model i s a s t ruc tu ra l view of the 
universe const i tuted by the primary-constituents or gunas and 
i s not meant to explain the actual evolutionary process i n which 
the i nd iv idua l .tattvas emerge from the world-ground. I n f a c t Pa tan ja l i 
does not r e f e r to the t a t tva evolut ion at a l l and merely mentions 
some of the emergent categories of existence, such as the bhutas, the 
indr iyas , the mind or manas.; v The term buddhi appears to be used i n 
the sense of 'cognition* only . Ahamkara i s probably replaced by asmita, 
and the tanmatras are nowhere mentioned and may have been unknown to 
the author of the Yoga-Sutra. The c ruc i a l problem now i s one of 
assigning the tat tvas to Pa t an j a l i ' s f o u r - l e v e l model. Vyasa ( I I . 1 9 ) 
advances t h i s correla ted schema: 
tatra-akasa-vayv-agny-udaka-bhumayo bhutani sabda-sparsa-
rupa-rasa-gandha-tanmatranam-avis^esanam vis'esah. tatha 
sVotra-tvak-caksu-jihva-ghranani buddhi- indr iyani . vak-
pani-pada-payu-upasthani karma-indriyani, ekadalam manah 
sarva-artham, ity-etany-asmita-laksanasya-avilesasya vis'esah, 
gunanam-esa sodLasako visesa-parinamah, sad-avis'esah, tad-yatha 
sabda-tanmatram sparsla-tanmatram rupa-tanmatram rasa-tanmatram 
gandha-tanmatran-ca, i ty-eka-dvi-tr i-catus-panca-laksanah 
sabda-adayah panca-avis'esah, sastas'-ca-avis'eso' smitamatra i t i , 
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ete sattamatrasya-atmano mahatah sad-avis'esa-parinamah, 
yat tat-param-avis'esebhyo lingamatram mahat-tattvam. 
I propose the f o l l o w i n g t rans la t ion : 
"Of t h i s [ f o u r - l e v e l s t ructure] the elements ' e the r ' , 
• a i r ' , ' f i r e * and 'ear th ' are the par t icu la r i sed [ m o d i f i -
cations] of the unpart icularised potent ia ls (tanmatra), 
f v i z ] sound, touch, form-percept (rupa) , taste and smell. 
S i m i l a r l y , ear, sk in , eye, tongue and nose are the cognit ive 
organs, [ w h i l s t ] voice, hands, f e e t , anus and genitals are the 
conative organs. The eleventh [par t icu la r i sed modification^] 
i s the mul t i -ob jec t ive (sarva^artha) mind. These are the 
pa r t i cu la r i sed (vi^esa) [modif icat ions] of the unpart icular ised, 
[jwhich i s ] characterised as asmita. This i s the s ix teenfold 
pa r t i cu la r i sed [modi f ica t ion]of the gunas. The unpart icularised 
[modif ica t ions] are s ix ; they are the sound-potential, the 
touch-potent ia l , the s igh t -po ten t ia l (rupa-tanmatra), the 
tas te -poten t ia l and the smel l -po ten t ia l . Thus sound e tc . 
[having respect ively] one, two, three, four or f i v e 
charac ter i s t ics , are [known as] the f i v e unpart icularised 
[ m o d i f i c a t i o n s ] . And the s i x t h unpart icular ised [mod i f i ca t ion ] 
i s the 1substratum-of-I-am-ness 1 (asmita-matra)• These are 
the s i x unpart icular ised modif icat ions (avisesa-parinama) of 
160 
the great e n t i t y , the 1substratum-of-beingness' ( sa t ta-
matra) . That which i s p r i o r to the unpart icularised 
Jmodifications] i s the ' subs t ra tum-of- (a l l that which bears)-
charac te r i s t i cs 1 ( l if tga-matra) t the great p r i n c i p l e . " 
Whether or not t h i s account i s t rustworthy cannot d e f i n i t e l y 
be ascertained. However, i t seems quite s i g n i f i c a n t that Vyasa 
here makes ample use of Pa tan ja l i ' s own specif ic terminology, while 
elsewhere of ten completely ignoring i t and superimposing his 
personal nomenclature on that of the Yoga-Sutra. The above excerpt 
from the Yoga-Bhasya can be reduced to the f o l l o w i n g diagram which 
shows up Vyasa's cor re la t ion of the four parvans wi th the better known 
series of t a t tvas ; 
alinga 
linga-matra 
avisesa •— = asmita-matra + the f i v e tanmatras (absent 
i n Pa t an ja l i ' s work) 
visesa = manas + the ten indriyas + the f i v e bhutas 
I w i l l next analyse each of the f o u r parvans separately. To begin 
wi th the concept of a l inga , the word i t s e l f i s composed of the negative 
p r e f i x a- and l inga (from ^ l i n g / l a g ' t o attach, adhere, c l i n g t o 1 ) 
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and has the meaning of ' t ha t which i s without mark or s i g n 1 , here 
rendered as ' the u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e ' . Alinga i s f i r s t used i n the 
metric Upanisads where i t designates the S e l f . However, i n the 
Yoga-Sutra i t i s c l ea r ly a synonym of p r a k r t i i n i t s noumenal s tate 
as the matrix of the evolved cosmos. As such al inga i s iden t i ca l 
wi th the Samkhya concept of avyakta or 'the unmanifest ' . G.M. KOELMAN 
(1970, 88) describes i t as the 'non-resoluble genetic e n t i t y ' , 
seemingly having i n mind the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the term 
l inga as 'the mergent 1, that i s , that which resolves in to the world-ground 
70 
upon the accomplishment of emancipation. However, t h i s interpretation 
of al inga i s of a secondary nature only . I t s primary connotation i s 
1 the s ign less ' . 
From the ul t imate substrative cause - al inga - derives the f i r s t 
of the series of ont ic evolutes (natura naturata) , namely linga-matra 
or 'the d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ' . The second hal f of t h i s i n t e re s t ing compound, 
matra, i s customarily employed i n the sense of 'on ly , mere', but 
i n the present philosophical context i t must be credited wi th a more 
substantial meaning. I n i t s oldest usage matra s i g n i f i e d as much as 
71 -
'substance' or 'ma te r i a l ' , and the l a t e r form matra as met wi th i n 
such compounds as l inga-matra, asmita-matra or tan-matra unquestionably ^ 
has retained a shade of the o r i g i n a l meaning. Hence i n the above-quoted 
passage from the Yoga-Bhasya ( I I . 1 9 ) I have r isked to t rans la te i t 
t en t a t i ve ly w i t h 1 substratum-of- 0 *. 
70 See e .g . Vacaspati Mi^ra 's Samkhya-Tattva-Kaumudl on Samkhva-Karika 40 
and Aniruddha's V r t t i on Seupkhya-Sutra VI.69. This native view i s 
r e fu ted by R. GARBE~0917i2f7~3285. 
71 See e.g. Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad IV.3.10 and Chandogya-Upanisad 11.24.16 
and 111.19*1. 
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But what does the concept of linga-matra stand for? 
Even though there i s no d e f i n i t i o n of th i s term i n the Yoga-Sutra 
and i n f a c t the word occurs but once ( i n 11.19), i t s meaning can be 
f a i r l y r e l i a b l y i n f e r r ed from the context and wi th the addi t iona l 
evidence of comparable ontological models. Vyasa quite r i g h t l y 
i d e n t i f i e s i t as ' the great p r i n c i p l e ' (mahat-tattva) or 'mere 
beingness' (sat ta-matra) . As the d i r ec t source of a l l f u r the r 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of the und i f f e r en t i a t e noumenal world-ground, 
linga-matra i t s e l f has but a single character is t ic which i s 
•exis tence ' . No more can be said of i t except that i t ex is ts ; i t 
i s non-d i f fe ren t ia ted existence. I n G.M. KOELMAN's (1970, 92) words: 
"This state of 'being-only ' i s not a state of f unc t i ona l a c t i v i t y , 
whereby i t could be charac ter ized^ . . ) I t i s the l eve l of pure non-
f u n c t i o n a l existence. The only operation i t may be said to possess 
i s i t s s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n to the fo l lowing evolutes. But th i s i s 
a cosmical energization, not a func t iona l a c t i v i t y . " I n other 
t r ad i t ions t h i s threshold from the noumenal to the phenomenal i s 
known as 'the golden germ1 (hiranya-garbha) or as 'the l o r d of creatures' 
( p r a j a p a t i ) . and i t can be compared w i t h the \?0Tf$ . i n the philosophy 
of Neoplatonism. 
According to S. DASGUPTA (1920, 51) the term linga-matra i s a 
synonym of asmita-matra (as used i n I V . 4 ) , but th is i s an unfounded 
assumption which i s not corroborated by the evidence i n the Yoga-Sutra 
i t s e l f or i n any of the schol ia . J.V/. BAUER (1958, 286), who usually 
displays a more r . c r i t i c a l acumen than his predecessors, unexpectedly 
commits the same blunder only to contradict and thus unknowingly correct 
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himself on p . 288. Nor must linga-matra be equated w i t h buddhi which, 
i n Pa tan ja l i ' s philosophical jargon, stands f o r ' cogn i t ion ' only 
and not f o r any ont ic p r i n c i p l e . 
The t h i r d l e v e l (parvan) of the gunas i s known as avis'esa 
or 'the unpar t icular ised 1 ( f r o m V ^ i s ' t o l e a v e 1 ) . The word is used 
only twice i n the Yoga-Sutra, once i n the general 3ense of 'not 
dis t inguished' ( i l l . 3 5 ) and then i n the technical sense ( l l»19)> 
Again, Pa t an ja l i o f f e r s no d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s important concept. 
According to Vyasa i t i s an umbrella term covering asmita-matra 
and the set of f i v e tanmatras. This i s a plausible enough explanation, 
but there i s no degree of ce r ta in ty about whether or not Pa t an j a l i 
included the concept of tanmatra i n his ontogenetic theory. I n view 
of the f a c t that v i r t u a l l y a l l ancient and modern commentators i n s i s t 
on the inc lus ion of the tanmatras, I w i l l b r i e f l y delineate 
t he i r essential nature. 
The word tanmatra ( l i t . ' t h a t o n l y ' ) i s l i k e most of these 
concepts d i f f i c u l t to t r ans la te . Various suggestions have been made, 
such as ' f i n e element' ( j . H . WOODS), 'rudimentary element ' (G. JHA), 
•sensation' ( i . K . TAIMNl), ' subt le element' (G.J. LARSON), 'Grunds to f f 
(R. GARBE) and 'Subt i lenergie ' ( j . W . HAUEEt). Possibly S. DASGUFTA's 
rendering of the tenn w i t h ' p o t e n t i a l ' best captures i t s meaning: 
"The tanmatras possess something more than quantum of mass and energy; 
they possess physical characters, some of them pene t r ab i l i t y , others 
powers of impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again 
72 
capab i l i t y of viscous and cohesive a t t r a c t i o n . " This i n t e rp re t a t i on 
i s based on B.N. SEAL (1915) who defines the tanmatras as energy 
72 S. LASGUPTA (1963 5 , I , 251) 
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potent ia ls being the essences of the sensory f a c u l t i e s . However, 
t h i s does not resolve any of the obscurity which surrounds t h i s 
conception, and w i t h G.J. LARSON (1969, 205) one i s forced to admit 
that " \ e ] x a c t l y what i s meant by 'subtle element' i s d i f f i c u l t i f 
not impossible to determine". 
G.J. LARSON also draws a t t en t ion to the Samkhya-Karika (38) 
which describes the tanmatras as avis'esa, thus opposing them to the 
bhutas which are said to be vi^esa. This appears to be the 
appl ica t ion of both these terms i n the Yoga-Sutra as w e l l . Vyasa 
p ro f f e r s t h i s explanation: There are s ix 'unpar t icu lar i sed 1 modifications 
of the primary substratum, the s i x t h being asmita-matra (which i s 
excluded i n IsVara Krsna's ve rs ion) . He arranges them i n the f o l l o w i n g 
manner: 
(1) sabda-tanmatra — po t en t i a l of sound 
(2) sparsa- 0 — po ten t i a l of touch 
(3) rupa- 0 — p o t e n t i a l of s ight ( l i t . ' f o r m ' ) 
(4) rasa- 0 — poten t ia l of taste 
(5) gandha-0 — poten t ia l of smell 
(6) asmita-matra — substratum of I-am-ness 
No d e f i n i t i o n s are supplied by the author of the Yoga-Bhasya, but 
he makes mention of the f a c t that they are to be dist inguished by 
t h e i r respective number of charac ter i s t ics , which may be one, two, three, 
four or f i v e . Vacaspati Mis*ra provides the proper a t t r i b u t i o n s : 
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(1) sabda-tanmatra — one character is t ic only 
(2) sparsa- 0 — two character is t ics 
(3) ruga- 0 . — three character is t ics 
(4) rasa- 0 — four character is t ics 
(5) gandha-0 — f i v e charac ter i s t ics . 
The number of character is t ics inherent i n each tanmatra i s explained 
by the number of ways i n which the corresponding bhuta can be 
experienced. Each subsequent bhuta incorporates the propert ies of 
a l l the previous bhutas. Thus while the ether (akasa) per ta in ing to 
sabda-tanmatra can only be heard, the a i r (vayu) per ta in ing to 3parsa-
tanmatra can be heard and f e l t ; f i r e (agni) can be heard, f e l t and seen 
and hence i t s corresponding tanmatra which i s rupa - ° i s stated to have 
three charac te r i s t i cs ; water (udaka) can be heard, f e l t , seen and 
tasted and consequently i t s matr ix which i s rasa-tanmatra i s said to 
display four charac ter i s t ics ; f i n a l l y , earth (bhumi) can be heard, 
f e l t , seen, tasted and smelled wherefore gandha-tanmatra must have 
73 
f i v e charac ter i s t ics . 
These tanmatras are, as G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 114) puts i t , 
' ob jec t ive universals* which do not stand f o r any par t icu lar sound, 
taste or v isual percept but are sound as such, taste as such. 
He, moreover, makes the valuable observation that they are not purely 
l o g i c a l categories, but unlike the ob.jectum formale o f Scholasticism 
are experiencable ontic rea ls ; however, as they are p r io r to sensation 
they can only be experienced by way of immediate apperception as 
73 According to another theory each tanmatra has but one cha rac te r i s t i c . 
See Yukt id lp ika on Samlchya-Karika (25) eka-ut taram-i t i varsaganyah. 
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cu l t iva ted by the vogin . We merely recognise t h e i r e f f e c t s i n 
the properties of t h e i r mater ia l counterparts, the bhutas. 
Whether or not Pa tan ja l i was aware of the tanmatras, the concept 
of asmita-matra must d e f i n i t e l y be assigned to the avis^esa category. 
Whereas linga-matra i s a t a t tva of which nothing can be predicated save 
tha t i t ex i s t s , asmita-matra " d i f f e r e n t i a t e s and p lura l izes the 
indetermined and universal p r inc ip le of being (sattamatra) in to so many 
74 
d i f f e r e n t centres of reference, so many sources of i n i t i a t i v e " . 
And: "These centres of reference cons t i tu t e , so to say, d i s t i n c t 
nucleations w i t h i n the one P r a k r t i , i n such a way that there arise 
d i f f e r e n t suppositations or subject ivat ions , or numerically d i s t i n c t 
un i t s of cen t ra l i za t ion , adapted to the needs of each par t i cu la r ized 
S e l f . This suppositation i s s u f f i c i e n t l y stable to be ca l l ed a 
75 - -
substant ial e n t i t y , a t a t t va or a dravya." Asmita-matra i s , i n other 
words, that agency which s p l i t s the primary substratum in to subjects 
v i s a, v i s objects i n the form of a b i fu rca te l i n e of evo lu t ion . 
This concept corresponds w i t h the Samkhya notion of ahamkara. 
The author of the YuktidTpika (on Samkhya-Karika 4) i s therefore mistaken 
when he maintains that Pa t an ja l i does not know ahamkara as a separate 
76 
e n t i t y but includes i t i n ma hat . S imi l a r ly erroneous i s S. RADHAKRISHNAN1s 
statement that Yoga "does not recognise ahamkara and manas as separate 
74 G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 107) 
75 i b i d . 
76 The Sanskrit t ex t reads: evam t a r h i na-eva-ahamkaro vidyata i t i 
p a t a n j a l i h , mahato'smi-pratyaya-rupatva-abhyupagamat, "Thus, then, there 
i s no I-maker [says] P a t a n j a l i , on account of the admission of the 
appearance of the not ion of I-am i n the great IfentityQ". 
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from buddhi" . 
This confusion could have been avoided by acknowledging the f a c t 
that Pa t an j a l i ' s vocabulary i s not j u s t a rep l ica of Samkhya terminology. 
Asmita-matra, w i t h him, i s the 'un iversa l ' p r inc ip l e of i nd iv idua l i s a t i on 
(corresponding w i t h mahat of the Y u k t i d i p i k a ) . but asmita connotes the 
pa r t i cu la r i sed 'I-am-ness' . Thus a d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between the 
ontological ( s t r uc tu r a l ) and the psychological ( func t iona l ) use of the 
word asmita. Asmita-matra occurs only i n IV.4 where i t i s unequivocally 
given out as the source of the mul t ip le ind iv idua l i sed minds or 
nirmana-cit tas. On the other hand, asmita as a func t ion of the 
phenomenal mind i s mentioned i n I I . 3 , 6 and I I I . 4 7 , and as a pa r t i cu la r 
experience i n samadhi i n 1.17. 
Of special in te res t i s the use of asmita-matra, the pre- individual ised 
ontic p r i n c i p l e of s u b j e c t i v i t y . The in t roduc t ion of t h i s special 
gutty 
designation does away wi th much of the ambivalenee connected w i t h 
the equivalent term ahamkara which i s used both i n the sense of ' i n d i v i -
dualised ego-consciousness' and as 'p re - ind iv idua l i sed generic p r inc ip l e 
of egohood1. Host commentators ignore the second meaning of ahamkara, 
and hence J .A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957 dedicates considerable space 
to t h i s concept i n order to correct the past lop-sided in terpre ta t ions 
by br ing ing out the ' I -maker 's ' "cosmic func t ion of creator of the 
78 -
empirical universe" . His penetrating analysis i s of relevance also 
to the study of the concept of asmita-matra i n Classical Yoga. 
J .A.B. VAN BUITENEN (:p, 21) points out the mythological elements 
77 S. RADHAKRISHNAN ( 1 9 5 1 6 , I I , 434) 
78 J .A.B; VAN BUITENEN (1957J* . .., 15) 
i 
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present i n the not ion of ahamkara and makes i t clear that "the 
o r i g i n of the creat ive ahamkara must be sought i n the ancient 
upanisadic speculations on a se l f - fo rmula t ing , s e l f - c r e a t i n g 
pr imordia l personali ty" (p . 21) . He c r i t i c i s e s the current 
exclusive i n t e rp re t a t i on of the term as that organ which forms the 
conception of the ego, pu t t i ng forward that " i f t h i s had been the 
intended meaning when the term was coined, one wonders why the 
responsible. thinker, capable of such conceptual thought, did not 
express himself more accurately i n ahamta-kara. Besides, °kara has as 
a rule the much more concrete sense of ' fashioning, buklding, making 
and doing wi th one's hands'" ( p . 16). He continues (p .17) : "Side by 
side w i t h ahamkara we f i n d i n l a t e r texts mamakara. Explications of 
aharnVrara take always the form of a quoted sentence wi th i t i : ' I am . . 
I d o . . ' e t c . ; of mamakara: 'This i s mine' e tc . This points to another 
meaning of °kara , not as i n kumbhakara e tc . , but as i n omkara, vasatkara, ——•—~™ — — — — * . • 
svahakara, e tc . : ' the cry , u t t e r i n g or e jacu la t ion : Aham'.'" 
I t i s t h i s creat ive aspect of ahamkara, as ant ic ipated i n the 
words aham bahu syam,"May I be many", of the Chandogya-Upanisad (v i . 2 .3 ) , 
which i s c r y s t a l l i s e d i n the concept of asmita-matra. Although Pa tan ja l i 
merely asserts that the nirmana-cittas or ig ina te from asmita-matra, i t 
i s safe to assume that asmita-matra also acts as the source of the 
tanmatras (granted that Pa t an j a l i incorporated them i n his ontology) 
and the bhutas and indr iyas . This successive evolut ion can be depicted 
graphical ly i n the fo l lowing way: 
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linga-matra 
asmita-matra 
avisesa -< / 
tanmatraB (?) indr iyas 
bhutas 
Vacaspati Mis'ra, f o r no apparent reasons, places asmita-matra and 
the tanmatras on the same ontogenetic leve l inasmuch as he regards 
o 
both as evolutes of buddhi (= linga-matra) . However, both on 
l o g i c a l and on h i s t o r i c a l grounds the v e r t i c a l arrangement suggested 
above makes more sense. As G.M. K0E1MAK (1970, 115) observes: 
"Since the funct ions of cognit ion are evolved from the Ego-function, 
i t seems plausible that the object ive universals are evolved from the 
same Ego-function; t h i s seems even more probable when we consider 
tha t the pure Ego-function on the ex i s t en t i a l l e v e l (asmitamatra) 
i s also the p r a k r i t i c subject of the a c t i v i t y of cognizing." 
This brings us to the l a s t guna-parvan, the l e v e l of the p a r t i c u l a r -
ised phenomena or visesa, that i s , the 'surface s t ructure ' of p r a k r t i . 
Contrary to Isvara Krsna, the author of"the Yoga-Sutra does not 
80 
equate avi |esa w i t h the tanmatras and visesa wi th the bhutas but 
includes i n the category of vi^esa also the indr iyas . This i s hinted at 
by the phrase bhuta-indriya-atmaka ( I I . 1 8 ) and possibly also by the 
79 See Ta11va-Y ai^aradl ( l l . 1 9 ) : tanmatrani bKuddhi-karanakany-avi^esatvai asmitgvad - i t i . 
80 See Saqkhya-Karika (38) 
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compound kaya-indriya ( l l . 43 )« Besides, i t i s i n perfect alignment 
w i t h the epic t r a d i t i o n s . 
The word indr iya occurs seven times i n the Yoga-Sutra: 11.18 
(bhuta- indr iya) , 11.41 ( i n d r i y a - j a y a ) , 11.43 (kaya- indr iya) , 11.54 
(indriyanam pratyahara), 11.55 (vasyata indriyanam), I I I . 1 3 (bhuta-
i n d r i y a ) , and I I I . 4 7 ( i n d r i y a - j a y a ) . Indr iya i s an o ld term, we l l known 
already to the composers o f the early Upanisads. As a d i s t i n c t 
• 
ontogenetic set the indriyas are f i r s t mentioned i n the Katha-Upanisad 
( i l l . 3 -4 ) i n the famous al legory of the char iot (= body) which i s 
spun to horses (= senses) by means of reins (= mind) held by the 
char io t -d r iver (= buddhi) . 
The Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad contains an archaic passage — I I I . 2 . 1 - 9 
i n which we f i n d one of the ea r l i e s t analyses of the sensory t o o l s . 
An in te res t ing d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between the eight 'graspers' (graha) 
and t he i r corresponding 'super-graspers' ( a t i -g raha ) . 
(1) the v i t a l force (prana) i s 'supergrasped' by the in-breath 
(apana) 
(2) speech (vac) i s 'supergrasped' by name (nama) 
(3) the tongue ( j i h v a ) i s 'supergrasped1 by taste (rasa) 
(4) the eye (caksus) i s *supergrasped' by form (rupa) 
(5) the ear (sVotra) i s 'supergrasped 1 by sound (sabda) 
(6) the mind (manas) i s 'supergrasped' by desire (kama) 
(7) the hands (hasta) are 'supergrasped 1 by act ion (karman) 
(8) the sk in ( tvac) i s 'supergrasped' by touch (spars'a) 
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I n l a t e r times t h i s somewhat random enumeration came to be 
replaced by the classical double set of f i v e conative and f i v e 
cognitive senses, known as the karma-indriyas and the Jnana- or buddhi-
indriyas respectively. To these must be added the mind or manas 
as the relay s t a t i o n f o r a l l other sensory capacities. I t s inclusion 
among the indriyas brings to the fore one all-important point, namely 
that correctly speaking these indriyas must not be confused w i t h 
the sense organs themselves, but they represent t h e i r i n t r i n s i c 
2 
capacities. This was recognised long ago by R. GARBE (1917 , 320) 
who remarks: "These ten senses must not be mixed up with the 
v i s i b l e organs (goloka) i n which they have t h e i r seat (adhisthana); 
they are i n f a c t supra-sensory (atlndriya) and can only be deduced 
from t h e i r functions." However, his words have been heeded by very 
81 
few translators. 
Manas i s used th r i c e i n the Yoga-Sutra ( i l l . 4 8 ; 1.55; 11.53) and 
very probably has the usual denotation as that mental capacity which 
organises the sensory input, or as K.B.R. RAO (1966, 68) puts i t "the 
synthesising factor of the experience got by the indriyas" which "converts 
the indeterminate percepts i n t o a determinate idea". I t i s a mute point 
whether manas should be assigned to the avis'esa category or whether 
Patanjali conceived of i t as j u s t another indriya pertaining to the 
vis'esa category. I tend to favour the former solution i n view of the 
special nature of the manas. 
Turning next to the set of f i v e elements which together with 
the senses compose the visesa-parvan, we f i n d that Patanjali employs 
the term bhuta f i v e times, v i z . once i n the sense of •creature* ( i l l . 1 7 ) 
81 G.J. LARSON (1969), f o r one, i s oblivious to t h i s whole argument. 
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once as a p a r t i c i p l e ( i l l . 2 0 : avigayIbhutatvat) and t h r i c e i n the 
sense of •element1 ( I I . 1 8 ; I I I . 1 3 i 44). Although the elements 
— ether, a i r , f i r e , water and earth — are not s p e c i f i c a l l y l i s t e d , 
P atanjali was undoubtedly acquainted with the bhutas as ontogenetic 
factors. Parenthetically, i t may be remarked that the Yoga-Sutra 
contains no reference to the •atoms' as the ultimate subdivisions 
of the elements, and the statements of the commentators must be taken 
cum grano s a l i s . The word animan 'fineness*, denoting the yogic 
paranormal a b i l i t y to reduce the si?e of the body (see III.45)» 
does not implicate i n the least that Patanjali subscribed to the 
atomic theory as developed i n the Vais'esika school. The word 
appears already i n the Chandogya-Upanisad (VI.6; 8) at a time when 
the notion of atoms was ce r t a i n l y quite unknown. 
I t should now be possible to attempt an overall reconstruction 
of Patanjali's i m p l i c i t ontogenetic model as i t can be ascertained 
on the basis of the Yoga-Sutra and comparable sources. The findings 
presented on the preceding pages can be epitomised i n the following 
diagram: 
alinga 
. i-
linga-matrai 
i . 
asmita-matra avisesa 
5 tanmatras manas 
5 bhutas 10 indriyas L visesa 
y ' < y ' 
physico-genesis psycho-genesis 
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Granted that t h i s conjectural model i s correct, Patanjali apparently-
favoured a version of ontogenesis which has been grossly distorted 
"by the classical commentators. Furthermore, the present reconstruction 
discredits a l l those misinformed e f f o r t s t o reduce the ontology 
of Classical Yoga to that of Classical Samkhya. On the other 
hand, i t i s equally incorrect to assert, as did J.W. KAUER (1958, 
282), that Patanjali made no use of ontogenetic categories at a l l 
hut rather subsumed everything under the generic heading of c i t t a , 
as derived from asmita-matra. I w i l l substantiate t h i s c r i t i c i s m 
i n some of the l a t e r chapters. 
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4» Kaivalya 
I n view of the preceding reappraisal of the ontology of 
Classical Yoga which led to multiple corrections of long-standing 
misconceptions about i t , i t seems desirable to re-examine also the 
concept of emancipation (kaivalya), "the greatest o r i g i n a l 
82 
contribution of Indian philosophy" . For, i f is*vara and purusa 
must, as I have t r i e d to demonstrate, be understood d i f f e r e n t l y 
from what has commonly been assumed ever since Vyasa superimposed 
the views of his pa r t i c u l a r school on the philosophy of Patanjali, 
t h i s can be expected to have i t s l o g i c a l reverberations necessarily 
also i n the conception of l i b e r a t i o n . 
The technical designation f o r t h i s concept i s kaivalya which 
can be said to be a yogic term par excellence. I t s earliest known 
occurrence i s i n the Yoga-Sutra, where i t i s employed i n 11.25, I I I . 5 0 , 
I I I . 5 5 and IV.26. Kaivaiva i s the gunated form of kevala meaning 'alone 1. 
The l a t t e r word i s frequently used i n the epic, and i n the philosophical 
sense occurs f o r instance i n XII.294.43; 296.13, 29; 304.16, 26; 
306.5, 74, 77, 79. The Svetasvatara-Upanisad ( l . 1 1 ; IV.18) also knows 
t h i s usage. I n the Maitrayaniya-Upanisad (VI.21) the synonym kevalatva 
•aloneness* i s introduced, though i t i s doubtful whether th i s particular 
section belongs to the oldest material of the t e x t . F i n a l l y , as 
H. ZIMMER (1953 , 305f•) points out the words kevala and kaivalya 
82 A.K. LAD (1967, preface) 
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played a s i g n i f i c a n t role also i n the philosophy of older Jainism. 
The word kevala i s used for instance i n the Tattvarthadhigama-Sutra 
(l.9» 30; X . l ) , and i n VIII.8 of the same text the compound keyala-
darsana occurs. Moreover, the great pathfinders of Jainism, the t i r t h a n l ^ r a s 
were also known by the name of kevalins. But these are not the only 
points of contact between Yoga and Jainism; there are also s t r i k i n g 
p a r a l l e l s i n the e t h i c a l sphere which i t would be worthwhile to pursue 
i n a separate study. 
What kind of yogic experience does kaivalya denote? J. GONDA 
(1960, I , 312) offers t h i s explanation:."The various members of Yoga 
which are as i t were arranged i n stages have but one purpose, the 
i s o l a t i o n of the s p i r i t (Kaivalya), that i s , the union with God. 
Kaivalya i s the experience of the perfect s i m p l i c i t y and uniformity 
of the nucleus of the personality. This experience (...) i s one of 
transcendental bliss i n f i n i t e l y superior to the ordinary state of 
consciousness, and i n i t the true being of the yogin expands immensely. 
The condition of enlightenment i s indescribable: one has transcended 
nature and no longer stands i n need of anything and experiences the 
unity of a l l existence." This description of the goal of Yoga i s not 
only fragmentary but p o s i t i v e l y defective and misleading. Aside the 
fact that the 'members* of the yogic path cannot be regarded as rungs 
on a ladder, i n what sense can one possibly speak of a union with god? 
Does kaivalya r e a l l y contain an element of bliss? What does i t mean: "the 
true being of the yogin expands immensely"? 
To what degree these s t r i c t u r e s are v a l i d i s borne out by the 
actual meaning of kaivalya as i t emerges from an unprejudiced study of 
i t s context i n the Yoga-Sutra. Here we f i n d that i n 11.25 kaivalya i s 
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used to q u a l i f y the word dr£i or 'seeing' which i s identical with the 
•sheer seeing' (dr^i-matra) of 11.20. I f any predication:.- can be made 
at a l l of the Self i t i s t h i s that the purusa i s of the nature of pure 
unmitigated Awareness, or as Patanjali (lV.34) has i t , c i t i - s a k t i . 
Visual experience supplies the most il l u m i n a t i n g metaphors to describe 
t h i s transcendental Awareness, though i n e a r l i e r days the other sensory 
and mental experiences also served the same purpose. I n a famous passage 
i n the Brhadaranyaka-Upanisad (III.!?.22), for instance, Yajnavalkya 
instructs his disciple thus: "[The Self] i s the unseen Seer, the 
unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the unknown Khower — other than 
He there i s no seer, other than He there i s no hearer, other than He 
there i s no thinker, other than He there i s no knower. He is the Self, 
the Inner Controller, the Immortal." 
The Expression 'aloneness of seeing' (drseh kaivalyam, 11.25) i s 
not repeated elsewhere i n the Yoga-Sutra, but i t can be taken to be 
implied i n a l l other instances where the term kaivalya i s mentioned. 
Kaivalya i s primarily the 'aloneness of seeing (of the S e l f ) ' and only 
secondarily and by implication the 'aloneness of purusa 1. This 
strange usage can be explained by those aphorisms which speak of the 
seeming involvement of the Self w i t h theprocesses of p r a k r t i or, more 
precisely, w i t h the states of the psycho-somatic organism. Kaivalya 
i s the exact antithesis of samyoga or 'correlation', which refers 
to the Self's function as the 'seer' of the contents of consciousness. 
83 adrsto dras^a asrutah srota amato manta avi.jnato vi.jnata na-anvo'to'sti 
drasta na-anyo'to'sti srota na-anyo'to'sti manta na-anyo'to'sti vi.jnata 
esa t a atma~antaryamy-amrtah. 
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This i s the condition described i n 1.4 as vrtti-sarupya or •conformity 
with the fluctuations (of the mind)'. I n contrast to t h i s , kaivalya 
denotes the 'own-form' (sva-rupa) of the 'seer' ( d r a s t r ) . I t supervenes 
when samyoga, the correlation between the Self and the contents of 
consciousness, i s disrupted. 
Samyoga i s defined i n 11.23 as the "cause of the appriiension of 
the own-form of the power of the 'owner' Jand that of J the 'owned'" 
(sva-svami-saktyoh sva-rupa-upalabdhi-hetuh). I n 11.24 avidya 
or 'nescience' i s stated as the cause of samyoga. The correlation 
between purusa and c i t t a i s of a purely noetic nature. No r e a l 
substantial intermixing takes place, since an unbridgable hiatus 
i s postulated between the Self and p r a k r t i . However, because of the 
uniformity of the Self as the p r i n c i p l e of Awareness, i t i s possible 
f o r the purusa to apperceive continuously the ongoing transformations 
of p r a k r t i as mirrored i n a p a r t i c u l a r consciousness (see II.20) of 
a specific organism. 
As i s emphasised i n I I I . 3 5 purusa and sattva (= c i t t a ) are always 
'unmixed' (asamkirna), and yet somehow the ordinary unenlightened 
mind f a i l s t o perceive t h i s fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n and confuses 
both principles. Purusa i s always and irrevocably pure Awareness, 
whether the mind i s operative or i d l e . Consciousness-of ( c i t t a ) 
i s i n perpetual motion and can diminish to the point where one speaks 
of the inception of unconsciousness, but c i t i - s a k t i i s i n no way altered 
or reduced when a person i s hypnotised, asleep or plain unconscious. 
The Self i s quite unaffected by the behaviour of the mind. 
This axiom, undoubtedly derived from yogic noumenous experiencing 
and therefore also only ex p e r i e n t i a l l y v e r i f i a b l e , has caused some 
western c r i t i c s considerable embarrassment, accustomed as they are to 
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regard consciousness as an a t t r i b u t e of the mental l i f e . I n a 
recent study on the nature of consciousness as seen from 
various philosophical angles, P. BOWES (1971, 170T71) makes the 
following pertinent observation: "One of the reasons why people are 
inclined to f e e l that consciousness i s a function of the brain i s that 
they i d e n t i f y the conscious with the mental, and the mental, as 
recent researches i n neurophysiology and computer functioning show, 
can be i d e n t i f i e d with the physical with some gain i n c l a r i t y and 
understanding. I f the mental i s the physical the conscious must be 
physical too, f o r consciousness i s an a t t r i b u t e that sometimes 
qu a l i f i e s the mental. But the conclusion that the conscious i s 
the physical does not follow i f the conscious i s something d i s t i n c t 
from the mental. This i s where Samkhya philosophy comes i n , which may 
have a contribution to make, not i n the deta i l s of i t s explanation, 
much of which i s p r e t t y archaic, but i n i t s contention that the 
conscious i s not the mental when the mental i s characterised by 
in t e l l i g e n c e , and that the mental has to be explained i n terms of 
the material." 
The notion of the Self as pure underived Awareness i s only one 
side of the doctrine of emancipation; the other i s the'postulate that 
man's true i d e n t i t y l i e s outside the personality complex i n the Self. 
I t i s t h i s second point v/hich provides the eth i c a l imperative of 
Yoga which challenges man to dissociate himself from the impermanent 
states of the body-mind configuration i n order to regain true 
S e l f - i d e n t i t y . Man's essence i s thus the pure Awareness i t s e l f . 
Hence the empirical s e l f must be a mirage. C r i t i c i s i n g t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
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of r e a l i t y as advocated i n Yoga and Samkhya, P. BOWES (1971, 184) 
contends that Samkhya may be misled by the term 'pure' frequently 
prefixed to 'transcendental awareness' i n order to demarcate i t 
from the empirical consciousness-of or c i t t a which always i s a 
84 
knowing of t h i s or that. She says: "But the term 'pure* has also 
a moral connotation which suggests that whatever i s pure i s f a r more 
desirable than what i s not pure. So consciousness as such, pure 
consciousness, becomes something with which men ought to i d e n t i f y 
themselves rather than with empirical consciousness which i s r e l a t i v e 
to i t s content and hence not pure." 
The concept of freedom as conceived i n Yoga i s manifestly quite 
d i s t i n c t from the western interpretations of i t . I n a sense man i s , 
essentially, always free because the Self i s never entering the 
mechanisms of p r a k r t i . Ergo emancipation i s not something which could, 
s t r i c t l y speaking, be attained or effected. But i n another, empirical, 
sense there i s a movement towards the Self via p u r i f i c a t i o n and 
noetic catharsis. Emancipation i s t o t a l transcendence which amounts 
to the same as saying that when the essence of man i s 'somehow' recovered, 
man ceases to be man as vie know him. 
The self-same transcendental Awareness 'shines f o r t h ' unalloyed 
and unabated. I t s ' l i g h t ' i s 'mirrored' i n those organisms of p r a k r t i 
which have evolved a s u f f i c i e n t degree of complexity, such as the 
human organism. I t i s at t h i s point i n time that there arises the vexed 
problem of i d e n t i t y : the s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e stage of the mind. Thus 
consciousness-of i s i n a way a function of pure Awareness and p r a k r t i 
84 Cf. G. KAVIRAJ (1966, 128): "The term • kaivalya 1 •(.'..) conveys the sense 
of being 'kevala' or alone. I t implies the idea of pu r i t y and freedom 
from defilement". 
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combined. By manipulating the organismic s i t u a t i o n i n the form of 
vo l u n t a r i s t i c alterations of consciousness., the mind can be 
approximated to the pure Awareness. This process i s couched i n 
terms of p u r i f i c a t i o n (s*uddhi): the yogin must endeavour to 
remove the ' v e i l s ' (ayarana) which prevent the transcendental 
Awareness from manifesting i t s e l f i n the organism; he must burn 
up the 'defilements* (dosa) which s t a i n the mirror of his mind. 
This i s i n p r i n c i p l e a purely cognitive cleansing process ° 
as i s brought home by such key terms as viveka-khyati or anvata-
lchyati. This inner re-arrangement or mental p u r i f i c a t i o n consists 
i n the main i n a gradual but persistent e f f o r t of d i s p e l l i n g the 
various empirical mal- i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . I n other words, the yogin 
assumes a p r i o r i that the Self i s the locus of his true i d e n t i t y and 
then proceeds to disentangle his multiple misconceptions about his 
own" nature by r e t r a c t i n g from everything that exposes i t s e l f to him as 
non-self. And 'non-self i s absolutely everything that proves to be 
unstable, fin/te and sorrowful. Thus severing a l l contacts with / 
prakrtic i d e n t i t i e s , the empirical consciousness ultimately collapses 
for lack of an objective prop. What remains i s the pure Awareness 
i t s e l f . 
Kaivalya ensues upon the disappearance of even the l a s t trace 
of defilement (dosa)at which point the sattva i s , f i g u r a t i v e l y speaking, 
as pure as the Self (see I I I . 5 5 ) • This at least i s the d e f i n i t i o n of 
kaivalya according to the asta-anga-yoga t e x t . Here sattva does not j 
s i g n i f y one of the three gunas, but i t stands f o r a condition of 
the mind which i s connected with the "upward progress of return to 
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to the o r i g i n a l state" • I t corresponds with linga-matra i n the 
structu r a l schema of ontogenesis. 
I t i s clear from what has been said hitherto that kaivalya, 
or rather the 'aloneness of seeing 1, transcends every known 
state of mind. S t r i c t l y speaking, i t represents an unknowable. 
Hence to describe i t as an 'experience 1, as did i n t e r a l i a 
J. GONDA (1960, i ) , or worse s t i l l as an 'experience of joy', 
must be recognised as a serious d i s t o r t i o n of the true position 
of Classical Yoga. Likewise, s p a t i a l metaphors are out of place, 
since the Self i s an aspatial/atemporal r e a l i t y . Ho 'expansion' 
of anything or i n t o anything can occur. 
Equally unsound i s the popular idea, ostensibly subscribed to 
by J. G01TDA, that kaivalya implies a union with the divine. 
Whatever the r e a l i t y may be that kaivalya stands f o r — and I dp 
not wish to discard the idea of a transcendental unity of numinous 
experiencing — the system of explanation proposed by Patanjali 
c e r t a i n l y does not leave a niche for such an assumption. Union 
presupposes a si t u a t i o n of separation, and Isvara and purusa are 
absolutely and i r r e v e r s i b l y co-essential, wherefore the question of 
a r e - l i n k i n g does not even arise. I n t h i s respect Classical Yoga 
d i f f e r s markedly from the teaching of the Bhagavad-GTta where 
emancipation i s conceived of as a kind of l i v i n g i n the eternal 
presence of God i n a medium of mutual transcendental love-participation 
( b h a k t i ) . This i s the concept of brahma-nirvana as subsisting i n the being 
of God. 
Lastly, having demolished the repeated allegation that Patanjali 
85 J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957?,MOS) "• ". 
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affirmed the p l u r a l i t y of Selves, kaivalya can also not be said to 
represent a sbate i n which each Self-monad i s reinstated i n utmost 
i s o l a t i o n from the world and from a l l other Self-monads, as i s 
asserted by M. ELIADE (1973 » 32). Kaivalya i s not anything separate 
from the Self. Nor i s i t properly speaking a condition or quality of 
the Self. Nor i s i t a goal f o r the Self. I t i s simply an empirical 
construct invented to mark o f f the Self as postulated i n the mash 
of psycho-somatic existence from the Self as 'ver i f i e d * a f t e r the 
2 
pseudo-event of l i b e r a t i o n . I am not sure that H. ZIMER (1953 ) 
i s r i g h t i n emphasising that kaivalya denotes both * i s o l a t i o n * and 
'perfection*. Primarily kaivalya appears to be used i n a more narrow 
sense, as describing the Self's uncontaminated p u r i t y . This seems to 
be confirmed by the use of apavarga or 'li b e r a t i o n * i n 11.18 which 
i s regarded as the antithesis of bhoga or 'world-enjoyment'. Apavarga 
describes the e t h i c a l goal of the yogin. the movement towards the Self, 
and i t i s to t h i s notion to which applies H. ZIMMER's tr a n s c r i p t i o n 
of the yogic target as 'integration*. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS 
In response to i t s s o teriological purposes Yoga has developed 
a peculiar psychology whose primary objective i s the f a c i l i t a t i o n 
of the yogin 1s pursuit to reconstitute his consciousness so as to 
allow the transcendental Self-Awareness to become manifest i n the 
mental complex. I t i s thus an eminently prac t i c a l endeavour which 
cannot be separated from the over-all philosophical concerns 
of Yoga and i t s e t h i c a l goals. As a matter of fa c t there does not 
even exist a synonym f o r what i s here called 'psychology'. This 
important circumstance i s f u l l y appreciated by M. ELIADE (t973^# 
38) who places the word i n quotation marks. I t must be remembered 
that any compartmentalisation of the homogeneous structure of 
Yoga theory into such divisions as 'psychology 1, 'philosophy' or 
•ethics' i s no more than an a r t i f i c i a l device i n order to promote 
the analysis and understanding of a rather d i f f e r e n t l y organised 
body of knowledge. Because of the prominent prac t i c a l orientation 
of the 'psychological' aspect of Yoga, i t has occasionally been 
compared to western psychoanalytical theories and procedures, but 
86 
t h i s comparison i s only conditionally v a l i d . 
The fact i s that the psychological dimension of Yoga i s s t i l l 
a f a i r l y unexplored t e r r i t o r y awaiting a far-sighted explorer. There 
86 See e.g. A.W. WATTS (1961) 
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exist a few tentative studies of various aspects of Yoga psychology, 
mostly by Indian authors, but these do not amount to a great deal 
87 
and conceptually often leave much to be desired. One of the 
pri n c i p a l reasons which invalidate, or at least render questionable, 
many of these well-meaning contributions, i s a certain lack of 
semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . More often than not these interpretations 
take l i t t l e notice of the pa r t i c u l a r context i n which concepts occur. 
Yet only a scrupulous analysis of the contextual meaning of a concept 
creates an adequate base f o r a comparative study and assessment. 
On the following pages, then, an attempt i s made to determine the 
semantic content of a select number of concepts as they occur 
i n the Yoga-Sutra. 
1. C i t t a 
The single most important psychological concept employed i n 
Classical Yoga i s c i t t a . A va r i e t y of translations have been suggested 
f o r t h i s word, such as 'mind' (R. PRASADA, S. DASGUPTA), 'mind-stuff 
(J.H. WOODS, H. ZIMMER), 'inte r n a l organ' (G. JHA, C.K. RAJA), 'innere 
Welt' (j.W. HATJER), 'mind-complex' (G.M. KOELMAN) and 'consciousness' 
(M. ELIADE). 
87 See e.g. R. ROSEL (1928), S. LIMDQUIST (1935), P.V. PATHAK (1931), 
S.K. SAKSENA (1944), E. ABEGG (1955) and SWAMI AKHILANANDA (1946). 
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The word c i t t a i s a derivative of the verbal root * / c i t meaning 
•to recognise, observe, perceive' and 'to be bright, to shine'. I t 
i s applied wherever psycho-mental phenomena connected w i t h conscious 
a c t i v i t y are to be expressed. C i t t a i s used already i n the Rgveda and 
the Atharvaveda besides the more frequently employed terms asu ' l i f e ' 
or ' v i t a l force' and manas 'mind'. I t i s also a scarce term i n the 
Upanisads. However, i t was i n constant use by the time of the 
composition of the Mahabharata, and from then on belonged to the 
standard psychological vocabulary. Unlike manas which i s used by 
most other orthodox hindu schools of thought to denote the concept 
'mind', the term c i t t a appears to be more" s p e c i f i c a l l y at home i n Yoga 
In Samkhya the synonym 'inner organ' (antahkarana) i s found which i s 
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taken to be constituted of buddhi, ahamkara and manas. The Yoga 
commentators, on the other hand, employ the terms buddhi, antahkarana 
and c i t t a rather indiscriminately. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Patanjali does not provide a 
d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s concept, i t i s transparent from i t s twenty-two 
applications i n the Yoga-Sutra i t s e l f and from the commentaries that 
c i t t a generally denotes the entire mental complex. I t i s an umbrella 
term comprising a l l the various func.tionings of the mind. As G.M. 
KOELMAN (1970, 100) trenchantly puts i t , c i t t a " i s surely not a 
separate prakatic evolute" inasmuch as i t i s not d i s t i n c t from i t s 
component factors, i . e . buddhi etc., whose emergence from the ground 
of p r a k r t i i s the theme of the ontogenetic schema outlined above. 
This evinces yet again the h o l i s t i c approach of Classical Yoga which 
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lays great stress on the organicity of the processes of consciousness 
and i s only secondarily interested i n an anal y t i c a l categorisation 
of the inner states. Often c i t t a conveys simply 'consciousness'. I t 
i s impossible to f i n d a single label f o r i t i n English. 'Mind-complex' 
and 'consciousness' should both^borne i n mind. / t 
I n any event, I believe S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951 6, I I , 345) 
to be e n t i r e l y wrong when he conjectures that c i t t a i s a synonym 
of the Samkhya mahat. Nor do I understand his statement that i t " i s . —~— 
the f i r s t product of p r a k r t i , though i t i s taken i n a comprehensive 
sense, so as to include i n t e l l e c t , self-consciousness and mind". 
Nowhere i n the Yoga-Sutra i s c i t t a regarded as the f i r s t evolute of 
the world-ground, and i f i t were thus considered how could i t possibly 
be said to e n t a i l the other categories l i s t e d by S. RADB3KRISHNAN? 
P. TUXECT (1911, 99) and E. FRAUV7ALLNER (1953, I , 411) are likewise 
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mistaken i n regarding manas as equivalent to c i t t a . I n one sense 
c i t t a i s a comprehensive operational concept which embraces the 
function of the sensorium commune or manas, and on the other hand 
i t i s 'consciousness' as a non-structural concept. 
Precisely what c i t t a e n t a i l s can be pieced together from 
the relevant statements i n the f o u r t h pada which deals more with 
the philosophical issues of Patanjali's teaching. The following points 
emerge from an analysis of these references: 
(1) C i t t a i s i n a way the product of both the transcendental 
Self-Awareness (purusa) and the insentient vrorld-mechanism 
88 Cf. also T.R. IOJLKARNI (1972, 69): "Patanjali c l e a r l y seems to have 
used the Sanskrit terms c i t t a and manas interchangeably." 
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( p r a k r t i ) , f o r i t i s said to be 'coloured' (uparakta) 
by the perceived objects as well as by the Self (see 
IV.23). However, i t i s not an actual derivative of 
either. I t can thus be characterised as a function of 
the r e l a t i o n between purusa and p r a k r t i . For t h i s 
reason the t r a n s l a t i o n with 'mind-stuff must be 
rejected. 
(2) I n IV .4 c i t t a i s said to arise from asmita-matra. 
I t i s important to know that no causal dependence 
i s implied here. C i t t a i s not a separate t a t t v a which 
could be traced back to asmita-matra along a dir e c t 
evolutionary l i n e . C i t t a denotes the whole set of 
psycho-mental factors as the true evolutes of asmita-
matra . Only inasmuch as c i t t a i s constituted by 
these individual tattvas of the psychic branch of 
ontogenesis can i t be said to. have derived from asmita-
matra which i s the point where the b i f u r c a t i o n into 
physical-objective and psychic-subjective tattvas takes 
place. I n t h i s sense alone can c i t t a be regarded as a 
p a r t i c u l a r i s a t i o n or nucleation of asmita-matra. 
(3) Although c i t t a i s held to be born of the 'single mind' 
(eka-citta) vfhich i s none other than asmita-matra, there 
are nevertheless many d i s t i n c t c i t t a s which are a l l 
r e al (see IV.16) and not merely a t t r i b u t e s of external 
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objects (see IV. 15). Nor are they simply 
products of the imagination of the single mind.. 
(4) C i t t a i s suffused with, and i n a certain way structured 
by, countless subliminal-impressions or 'activators' 
(samskara) which form in t o ' t r a i t s ' (vasana) (see 
IV.24), and i t i s they which feed the fluctuations 
( v r t t i ) thus causing the c e n t r i f u g a l i t y of the mind 
which ac t i v e l y prevents Self-actualisation. 
(5) However, despite the innumerable subliminal t r a i t s 
which are without beginning (see IV.10), the samskaras 
being stored i n the depth-memory (smrti) (see IV.9), 
the mind nonetheless serves the purpose of emancipation 
(see IV.24). This teleology of c i t t a i s explained 
by the 'proximity' of the Self. 
(6) When the Self shines f o r t h i n perfect p u r i t y , the 
gunas involute, and with the dissolution of the organism, 
the mental complex likewise i s annihilated (see IV.34). 
This dissipation of the mental complex upon emancipation 
i s inferred from the fact that the gunas are said to 
stream back into the transcendental core of prak-rti. 
As i s clear from the above, Patanjali operates with a remarkably 
sophisticated concept of mind which bears close semblance to certain 
modern psychological theories. According to him, mind represents a 
system of dynamic relations which have as t h e i r mainstay the complex 
neurophysiological (= objective-prakrtic) organism. There are various 
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sub-systems — the evolutionary tattvas proper — such as manas 
which translates the sensory data i n t o concepts, or asmita which i s 
the f o c a l point of most of the occurring i n t e r n a l processes. There 
i s also a deep structure, formed by the depth-memory as the storage 
centre of past mental a c t i v i t y which i s not confined to this 
p a r t i c u l a r existence but extends backwards ad i n f i n i t u m . Consciousness 
i s energised by t h i s network of vasanas which set up a certain tension 
thereby causing the mind to i n c l i n e towards sensory experience. 
Externalisation, i n turn, leads to the formation of subliminal-
activators (samskara) which reproduce themselves by means of the 
v r t t i s . The f i r s t and foremost task of the yogic process i s to 
intercept t h i s cycle (samskara - v r t t i - samskara ...) by way of 
the gradual introversion of consciousness or pratyak-cetana. 
I n passing i t may be pointed out that the question of the spatial 
extension of the mind which seems to pre-occupy especially the l a t e r 
exegetists, i s r e a l l y a pseudo-problem. The mind can be said to have 
a depth dimension but no location or extension. This i s borne out 
by the ontogenetic model i t s e l f . The space-time universe i s but the 
outermost rim of the vast body of p r a k r t i which i s essentially aspatial 
and atemporal but holds the p o s s i b i l i t y of spatial/temporal existence. 
2. V r t t i 
According to Patanjali, the centrifugal consciousness functions i n 
f i v e major ways. These are known as the v r t t i s . The weard stems 
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from the root//rot 'to revolve, w h i r l about 1 and can mean 'mode 
of action, conduct, manner of being' etc. G.H. KOELMAN (1970, 86) 
wrongly equates the term v r t t i with parinama, for the former 
always implies a l o c a l a c t i v i t y whereas the l a t t e r connotes s e r i a l 
change. 
According to aphorism 1.6 there are f i v e modes of functioning 
in which the ordinary mind complex can engage, v i z . v a l i d cognition 
(pramana), misconception (viparvaya). conceptualisation (vikalpa), 
sleep (nidra) and memory ( s m r t i ) . The word v r t t i i s applied to any 
mental content which f a l l s i n t o any of these categories. Used 
altogether ten times i n the Yoga-Sutra ( v i z . 1.2, 4, 5, 10, 41; 11.11, 
15, 50; I I I . 4 3 ; IV.18), v r t t i i s employed both i n a more general sense 
as 'function, mode of being' (e.g. 11.15: guna-vrtti,- 11.50 and I I I . 4 3 ) 
and as a terminus technicus which refers s p e c i f i c a l l y to such mental 
a c t i v i t y as f a l l s into the above f i v e behavioral categories of the 
mind. I n t h i s sense i t i s often used i n the p l u r a l ( v i z . 1,5; 11.11; 
IV.18). I n the l i g h t of t h i s evidence i t i s completely incomprehensible 
why H. JACOBI (1929, 588) writes that " v r t t i i s not a philosophical 
term and hence i s not defined by the commentators". He i s doubly wrong 
here because not only i s v r t t i d e f i n i t e l y a technical designation 
but i t i s also defined by Bhoja on at least two occasions. I n his 
Ra.ja-Martanda ( l . 2 ) he states: "The v r t t i s are forms of modification j o f 
the mind^| with a reciprocal relationship between them" (vrttavah anga-
ajWi-bhava-parinama-rupas-tasam), and elsewhere ( l . 5 ) he says "the 
v r t t i s are part i c u l a r modifications of the mind" (vrttayah cittasya 
parinama- vis'e aah). 
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The f a c t that the term v r t t i i n i t s technical sense refers to 
specific mental events and not, as i s often assumed, to any odd 
mental content, i s clearly borne out by the statement ( l l . 1 l ) that the 
v r t t i s are eliminated i n meditative absorption (dhyana). This important /' : 
sutra has always been glossed over. What i t says i n effect i s that no \ 
v r t t i s whatsoever are carried over into samadhi but that t h e i r ) _ 
complete cessation i s a precondition f o r enstasy t o a r i s e . The factors / 
present i n samadhi are not v r t t i s but pratyayas (e.g. v i t a r k a , vicara etc.) 
From this i t i s also evident that aphorism 1.2 does not represent 
a comprehensive d e f i n i t i o n of Yoga, and as opposed to M. SAHAY (1964) 
I consider i t to be merely a preliminary announcement. M. SAHAY's 
contention that Patanjali meant to p r e f i x sarva to the word v r t t i i s of 
course nonsensical. I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r context, nirodha i s used i n 
a r e s t r i c t e d sense. As w i l l be set f o r t h shortly, the process of 
• r e s t r i c t i o n * comprises several levels of application, and the statement 
of I..2 implies only the lowest degree of r e s t r i c t i o n (nirodha) and not 
saxva-hirodha. 
5. Klesa, k l i s t a - a k l i s t a 
The f i v e kinds of v r t t i can be either k l i s t a or a k l i g t a ( v i z . o 
1.5). These terms were respectively translated with 'painful/non-
pai n f u l ' (R. PRASADA, HJT. DVIVEDI, G. JHA), 'impure/pure1 (M. ELIADE), 
• a f f l i c t e d / n o n - a f f l i c t e d ' (s. DASGUPTA) 'hindered/unhindered 1 ( j . H . WOODS) 
and ,Dranger-behafte ,lt/- nichtbehaftet l (j.W. HAUER). G.M. KOELMAN (1970), 
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surprisingly enough, does not seem to be avrare of these twin 
terms at a l l , though he refers to the concept of klesa. Yet t h i s 
conceptual t r i a d — kles'a, k l i s t a and a k l i s t a — constitutes a 
central aspect of Yoga psychology. A l l three words are derivatives 
of the r o o t V k l i s »to torment, be troubled'. As H. ZIMMER (1953 , 
294) aptly remarks, k l i s t a i s used "as an adjective meaning 'distressed; 
suffering pain or misery; faded, wearied, injured, hurt; worn out, i n bad 
condition, marred, impaired, disordered, dimmed, or made fainti!.". 
He continues: "A garland,, when the flowers are withering, i s k i i l t a 
the splendour of the moon i s k l i s t a (sic}), when obscured by a 
v e i l of clouds; a garment worn out, or spoiled by stains, i s klis'ta 
(sic!); and a human being, when the inborn splendor of his nature has 
been subdued by fa t i g u i n g business a f f a i r s and cumbersome obligations, 
i s k l i s t a (sic/)." 
I n contrast with t h i s general usage of the word k l i s t a , i n the 
Yoga-Sutra klisfra and i t s antonym a k l i s t a are d i s t i n c t l y technical 
terms which must be juxtaposed to the concept of kles'a or 'cause-of-
a f f l i c t i o n 1 denoting, as H. ZIMMER (1953 , 294) puts i t , "anything 
which, adhering to man's nature, r e s t r i c t s or impairs i t s manifestation 
of i t s true essence". G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 127) offers a more precise 
explanation: "Man i s born w i t h certain psychological habits, congenital 
psychical passions that bind him to cosmic conditions. They blin d him, 
prevent him from discovering what his genuine Self i s , make him 
attached to cosmic l i f e and i t s allurements, a f f l i c t his existence 
with an endless chain of woes, enmesh him more and more i n the net of 
conditioned existence, and hinder his l i b e r a t i o n . " 
193 
Patanjali ( l l . 3 ) distinguishes f i v e types of k l e l a ; nescience 
(avidya), *I-am-ness' (aamita), attachment (raga), aversion (dvesa) 
and w i l l - t o - l i v e (abhinivesa). Each category i s car e f u l l y defined, 
and nescience i s explained as the nurturing ground of a l l other types 
of klesa. This doctrine ent a i l s many implications which cannot a l l 
be made e x p l i c i t i n t h i s study. Por the present purposes i t w i l l s u f f i c e 
to make the following observations. The klesa theorem can be said to 
circumscribe the fact that every organism on at t a i n i n g self-consciousness 
finds i t s e l f i n an e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n where i t has become aware of i t s 
own awareness but i s confused as to the true nature of t h i s awareness, 
and the organism i s as i t vrere compelled to act out of a fal s e i d e n t i t y . 
This i s what i s meant by nescience or avidya. I t refers to the peculiar 
cognitive condition of man who f a i l s to recognise that consciousness-of 
( c i t t a ) i s an epiphenomenon of the transcendental Self-Awareness. 
Nonetheless, i t would be misleading to ascribe, as does G.J. LARSON 
(1969), to nescience a cosmogonic function which would be more appropriate 
i n the context of Advaita-Vedanta. He says (p. 191): " I n the Yogasutra 
the reason given f o r the emergence or evolution of the manifest world 
i s avidya ('ignorance 1)* I n this respect there i s a fundamental 
difference between Samkhya and Yoga, f o r the appearance of the manifest 
world i n classical Samkhya i s much more than the result of ignorance. 
I t i s the re s u l t , rather, of the very nature of purusa which must 
become what i t i s not i n order ultimately to become what i t i s . " 
Apart from G.J. LARSON's misapprehension of the precise viewpoint 
of Pa t a n j a l i , one may also question his bold speculation that i n Samkhya 
prakrti-parinama i s due to the impact of purusa. This appears to be 
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a l a t e r theory which i s as yet absent i n Isvara Krsna's formulation •«. 
of Samkhya thought. The recognition of an innate teleology i n p r a k r t i 
does not contradict the simultaneous admission of the autonomous 
evolution of the ta t t v a s . 
At any rate, according to Pataffjali avidya i s merely a cognitive 
d i s t o r t i o n potent from the very moment self-consciousness occurs. 
I n his own words: "Nescience i s the [false] perception of the 
permanent i n the impermanent, of the pure i n the impure, of joyfulness 
i n the sorrowful, of the Self i n the non-self" (anitya-a£u.ci-duhkha-
anatmasu nitya-suci-sukha-atma-ktfyatir-avidya, I I . 5 ) . Coterminous with 
this fundamental error i s the establishment of a false i d e n t i t y : 
"'I-am-hess1 i s the seeming 'one-self-ness' {or i d e n t i t y ] of the 
power of seeing ^ i . e . the Self J and that of vision 1 i . e . the mind!]" 
(dra-dara" ana-saktyor-eka-atmata-iva-asmi t a , I I . 6 ) . This m a l - i d e n t i f i c a t i c 
gives r i s e to emotive reactions of which Patanjali distinguishes two 
basic types, v i z . attachment and aversion. "Attachment i s that which 
dwells on pleasure" (sukha-anu^ayl ragah,' I I . 7 ) and "Aversion i s that 
which dwells on sorrow" (duhkha-anus'ayx dvesah, I I . 8 ) . The remaining 
constituent of t h i s psychological web i s the powerful t h i r s t f o r l i f e , 
eros, the survival i n s t i n c t about which the Yoga-Sutra states: "The 
w i l l - t o - l i v e , flowing on by i t s own nature, i s rooted even i n the sage" 
(sva-rasa-vahi viduso'pi tatha rudho'bhinives'ah, I I . 9 ) . 
The klesas provide the dynamic framework of the phenomenal mind-
complex. They urge the organism to burst i n t o a c t i v i t y , to f e e l , t o 
think. As the basic emotional and motivational forces they l i e a t the 
root of a l l misery, f o r Yoga favours the simple equation anatman = 
duhkha, that i s to say, as long as man l i v e s out of a false i d e n t i t y 
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i n ignorance of his essential nature (which i s the Self, purusa) he 
remains subject to sorrow and suffering. Thus the normal human 
situ a t i o n can be characterised as the product of a cognitive error, 
a positive misconstruction of r e a l i t y , f o r which there i s but one 
remedy: the recovery of the Self as the true i d e n t i t y of man. 
These klesas are thought to have four modes of appearance 
(see I I . 4 ) . They may be late n t (prasupta, l i t . 'asleep'), attenuated 
(tanu, l i t . ' t h i n ' ) , temporarily suppressed (vicchinna, l i t . 'cut o f f ) 
or f u l l y active (udara, l i t . 'coming up*). I t i s the objective of 
kriya-yoga to effe c t t h e i r attenuation (tanukarana) which amounts to 
the c u l t i v a t i o n of enstasy (samadhi-bhavana) (see I I . 2 ) . No dir e c t 
attack on the klesas i s possible, f o r every mental a c t i v i t y xri.th.out 
exception merely increases the concatenations i n the depth-mind. 
'Attenuation' i s achieved by refusing these forces an outlet i n 
the form of consciousness processes. Their power i s p a r t l y checked by 
sensory withdrawal and the accompanying s t i l l i n g of the mind. I n other 
words, the yogin plays the subliminal structures o f f against each 
other. By disallowing them to take e f f e c t i n the conscious mind, 
he i n d i r e c t l y achieves that they annihilate each other. The underlying 
process i s comparable to that of a mill-stone which grinds i t s e l f away 
for lack of grain. When even the last samskara i s exterminated the 
kles*as can be said to.be f u l l y destroyed as w e l l . 
This i n t r i g u i n g doctrine, "which i s r e a l l y the foundation of the 
89 
system of Yoga outlined by Pa t a n j a l i " , i s contained i n nuce i n the 
two terms k l i s t a and a k l i s t a . Quite oorrootly, Vyasa ( l . 5 ) explains 
89 I.K. TAIMNT (1965 2, 130) 
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k l i s t a as 'caused by the kledas' (klesa-hetuka), but t h i s makes 
l i t t l e sense i n view of the f a c t that a k l i s t a would consequently 
have to be understood as 'not caused by the klesas' which i s absurd 
since a l l mental a c t i v i t y i s ex hypothesi engendered by the klesas. 
Hence Vijnana Bhiksu, i n his monumental Yoga-Varttika ( l . 5 ) , proposes 
a d i f f e r e n t interpretation of a k l i s t a paraphrasing i t w i t h 'resulting 
i n aklesa 1 (aklesa-phalika). But what i s the nature of th i s aklesa? 
The answer to this question i s supplied i n the Maniprabha ( l . 5 ) by 
Ramananda where we f i n d the equations k l i s t a = bandha-phala ( i . e . 
having bondage as i t s r e s u l t ) and a k l i s t a = mukti-phala ( i . e . hairing 
l i b e r a t i o n as i t s r e s u l t ) . I n other words, a k l i s t a are those mental 
events which f a c i l i t a t e the yogic process of the self-destruction of 
the kle^as, whereas k l i s t a describes a l l other mental a c t i v i t y which 
merely helps to maintain the potency of the klesas. Thus aklesa 
designates that condition i n which the power of the klesas on the mind 
i s p a r t i a l l y or completely checked. 
4. Samskara. vasana, asaya 
Hidden behind the obverse mental processes l i e s a vast inexhaustible 
pool of s t i m u l i , the so-called subliminal activators or samskaras, which 
power the machinery of consciousness. These are organised i n t o 
configurations, known as vasanas or subliminal t r a i t s , which p a r t l y 
manifest i n the idiosyncracies of the i n d i v i d u a l . This large storehouse 
of dispositional factors i s the dynamic aspect of the deep structure 
of human personality. The aamskaras are formed continuously as a resu l t 
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of the individual's world experience. I n other words, every thought, 
feeling and impulse to action must be regarded as an actualisation 
of the tremendous tension inherent i n the subliminal pool. On the 
other hand, overt mental a c t i v i t y i n turn replenishes the subliminal 
deposit — i n t h i s manner perpetuating the vicious c i r c l e of 
phenomenal existence (samsara). 
The pool of subliminal activators i s conceived as pre-individual. 
This means that although world experience (bhoga) somehow reinforces 
the samskara grids, i t does not originate them. The newly born 
individual i s by no means a tabula rasa. Rather his very b i r t h i s 
the product of the i r r e s i s t i b l e p u l l of the subliminal traces. 
This conception i n a way foreshadows the modern notion of the 
o 
unconscious. However, i t i s far more si m p l i s t i c and, furthermore, 
has been evolved i n response to d i f f e r e n t kind* of questions, namely 
to explain certain occurrences during the process of radical i n t r o -
version and especially during the terminal states of samadhi. 
Unfortunately, Patargali does not develop t h i s theory i n d e t a i l 
but, as with so many other topics, presumes that the reader i s 
acquainted with i t . Nonetheless, i t i s clear from the scanty references 
i n his work that t h i s conception belongs to the core of his system 
of thought, though of course he cannot be hailed as the genius 
behind i t s invention or formulation. 
Having sketched the general idea behind t h i s i n t r i g u i n g theory, 
I v r i l l next look more closely at i t s constituent working parts. To 
begin with the term samskara, this much used Sanskrit word has a wide 
spectrum of meanings. Composed of the pr e f i x sam-s and the ro o t V k r 
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'to do', i t s most general sense i s 'preparation 1, but i n addition 
also conveys the idea of 'embellishment, t r a i n i n g , r i t u a l action' etc. 
I n yogic contexts, i t i s habitually translated with 'impression' 
(J.H. WOODS, G. JHA, S. DASGUPTA). R. PRASADA (1912) opts f o r 
'habituation' which perhaps would be more appropriate i n describing 
the concept of vasana. I prefer to render samskara as 'subliminal-
activator' thus stressing i t s dynamic nature. I t i s f a r from being 
a mere imprint as i s suggested by the common translation with 
'impression 1. This active aspect of the samskaras i s apparent 
especially from I I I . 9 where two vari e t i e s of samskara are distinguished, 
v i z . those which lead to the externalisation (vyutthana) of conscious-
ness and those which induce ' r e s t r i c t i o n ' (nirodha). Similarly, 
i n 1.50 the type of inverted samskara i s mentioned, which appears 
i n the highest form of samadhi and which swallows up or rather 
obstructs a l l other samskaras. 
Then, again, the f a c t that the samskaras are vestiges of previous 
mental a c t i v i t y can be inf e r r e d from I I I . 1 8 which states that by 
means of the immediate apperception (saksatkara) of the samskaras the 
yogin can acquire knowledge of his former embodiments. Samskara i s 
thus an active residuum of experience. This concept i s b e a u t i f u l l y 
captured i n the notion of bi.ja or 'seed* as used i n 1.51 and I I I . 5 0 . 
Patanjali's concept of samskara i s ostensibly a mirror-image 
of the ancient buddhist notion of sankhara signi f y i n g the conative 
factors i n the paticca-samupatta or, more precisely, i t s second nidana. 
I n a way the f i v e klesas of Classical Yoga are comparable to the twelve-
f o l d nidana nexus or at any rate are equivalent to part of t h i s 
schema. However, no direct borrowing from Buddhism need be involved 
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here. Speculations about avidya. duhkha and punar-.janman are pan-Indian 
property, 
i The next term to be considered i s vasana. Although often used 
by the exegetists and the modern interpreters as a synonym of samskara, 
vasana r e a l l y stands f o r a d i f f e r e n t concept. Vasana, which i s a 
derivative of the rootyVvas 'to dwell, abide, remain 1, i s mentioned j 
only twice i n the Yoga-Sutra ( v i z . IV.8, 2 4 ) and i n both instances 
i n the plural.. I t has variously been translated w i t h 'subconscious 
impression 1 ( j . H . WOODS), 'impression' (G.JHA) or 'residual potency' 
(R. PRASADA). J.W. HAUER ( 1 9 5 8 ) renders i t as 'Einwohnung' and correctly 
delineates i t i n his translation from the concept of samskara; however, 
i n a footnote (p. 469, f n . 7 ) contradicts himself by making the 
unwise remark that vasana, samskara and karma-aiaya can be regarded as 
synonyms. He f a i l s t o realise that Patanjali would hardly have introduced 
three d i f f e r e n t terms to express one and the same idea. 
According to aphorism IV.8 the ori g i n a t i o n of the vasanas i s to 
be linked up with the f r u i t i o n (vipaka) of man's a c t i v i t y . Whilst 
the a c t i v i t y of the adept yogin i s thought to be (see IV.7) neither 
'white' nor 'black 1, that of the ordinary mortal is threefold. This 
somewhat recondite aphorism i s explained by the doctrine of moral 
r e t r i b u t i o n as i t has been current i n India ever since the early 
Upanisads i n which i t was announced f i r s t . What Patefffjali appears to 
be saying i s t h i s : Ordinarily every action's f r u i t i o n can be c l a s s i f i e d 
as either 'black' (krsna), i . e . 'non-meritorious' (apunya, see 1.33; 
1 1 . 1 4 ) , or 'white' (sukla). i . e . 'meritorious' (punya), or, I presume, 
as mixed. I n contradistinction the yogin, his mental complex being 
f u l l y inclined towards t o t a l dissolution (pratiprasava), does not 
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generate any action which could he thus t y p i f i e d . By vipaka or 
f r u c t i f i c a t i o n i s not meant the 'outcome' of an act on the empirical 
plane, but i t s 'moral consequence' which i s expressed i n terms of the 
production of corresponding vasana configurations. These vasanas, i n 
t h e i r turn, act as the propelling force f o r the creation of a new 
individual organism af t e r the death of the present subject. They 
must be considered as aspatial/atemporal constellations 'located' 
i n the deep structure of the cosmos. The question as to how these 
subliminal configurations can bridge the gap between two existences 
i s explained i n a rather d i f f i c u l t sutra (lV.9) which reads: 
.jati-des'a-kala-vyavaMtanam-apy-anantar.vam smrti-samskarayor j 
eka-rupatvat. J.H. WOODS (1966^) translates t h i s as follows: 
"There i s an uninterrupted [causal] r e l a t i o n |of sub-conscious-
impressionsj, although remote i n species and point-of-space and 
moment-of-time, by reason of the correspondence between memory and 
subliminal-impressions." 
I n accordance with Vyasa's scholium, J.H. WOODS li n k s up 
anantarya or 'uninterrupted (causal) r e l a t i o n ' with the word 
samskara, yet t h i s lacks i n c l a r i t y . Anantarya, i t seems, refers to 
the causal dependence between the o r i g i n a l input i n t o the vasana pool 
and the resultant re-translation of the vasana code into a specific 
spatio-temporal existence. This homogeneity between cause and effe c t 
i s guaranteed by the 'uniformity' (eka-rupatva) between the subliminal-
activators (samskara) and the depth-memory ( s m r t i ) . Hence I would 
rephrase the above tran s l a t i o n as follows: "Although Jthe resultant 
spatio-temporal existence i s remote i n terms o f ] category, place and 
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time, [there i s nonetheless] a causal-relation Jbetween the ' 
or i g i n a l subliminal input and the resultant existence^] because 
of the uniformity between the subliminal-activators and the depth-
memory." I have rendered the word smrti as 'depth-memory' to / 
indicate that what i s meant here i s not r e a l l y the ordinary 'memory' 
but the vasana concatenations peculiar to a pa r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l . 
Furthermore, I propose that t h i s i s i d e n t i c a l with asmita-matra which 
is said to be (see IV.5) the root of the individual mind-complexes 
or c i t t a s . I suggest that smrti i n 1.43 has the very same meaning, 
since i t cannot stand f o r the ordinary memory — considered to be 
one of the f i v e categories of v r t t i — which i s eliminated i n 
the process of meditative absorption. The above contention i s not 
as f a n c i f u l as i t may seem prima facie, i f one reca l l s that Yoga 
postulates a 'subtle' (suksma) counterpart to the overt r e a l i t y as we 
know i t . 
I n t his connection, IV.10 must be taken i n t o account which 
describes the vasarias as 'beginningless' (anaditva) i n view of the 
perpetuity of the p r i m a l - w i l l ( a ^ i s ) . How could the ordinary memory 
be said to store the entire matrix of vasanas shared by a l l beings? 
I n passing I wish to draw a t t e n t i o n to the word as*is, usually 
translated with 'desire', Patanjali employs t h i s rare term to 
express the primordial drive inherent i n p r a k r t i which, by means of 
the vasana patterns, leads to ever new phenomenalisations. Possibly 
the concept of abhinive^a (see II. 9 ) i s i d e n t i c a l with t h i s notion; 
i t can be regarded as a manifestation of a^is i n the l i f e of a particuli 
e n t i t y . 
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I n order to denote the t o t a l stock of samskaras which have 
"been called i n t o existence by the v o l i t i o n a l a c t i v i t y i n either the 
present incarnation or i n past existences and which are the 
determinative factors of future embodiments, Patanjali introduces 
the concept of asaya. The l i t e r a l meaning of t h i s word, mentioned 
only i n 1.24, i s 'deposit' (from a +,Vs5 'to l i e , r e s t ' ) . 
G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 50, f n . 100) translates the compound 
karma-a^aya with 'moral-value-deposit' explaining i t as "the sum-total 
of merits and demerits". The idea behind the theory of karma or, 
more accurately, karma-vipaka ( ' f r u c t i f i c a t i o n of a c t i o n 1 ) i s t h i s : 
No action, or v o l i t i o n , i s value neutral. Every action has a value 
i n terms of an objective framework of reference. I n other words, 
the cosmic order i s a moral one, and the physical law of causality 
i s extended, mutatis mutandis, to the realm of e t h i c a l behaviour. 
Driven by the klesas the 'deposit' bears f r u i t , v i z . b i r t h , 
l i f e and vrorld-experience. Depending on the nature of the vasanas 
or samskara chains, which may be due to meritorious or demeritorious 
v o l i t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , the world experience (bhoga) i s characterised 
by either delight (hlada) or distress (paritapa) (see 11.14). There 
i s no doubt i n Patanjali's mind that even though there may be 
moments of happiness and even euphoria i n l i f e , a l l joy i s deceptive 
because i t is i n t r i n s i c a l l y transient, and sorrow (duhkha) i s woven 
into the very fab r i c of phenomenal existence. I n his own words ( I I . 1 5 ) 
parinama-tapa-samskara-duhkhair-guna-vrtti-virbdhac-ca duhkham-eva 
sarvam vivekinah, or: "Because of the sorrow i n the ^continual] 
transformation [of the world-ground], IjLnJ the anguish [and i n ] the 
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subliminal-activators and on account of the c o n f l i c t between 
the movements of the gunas — to the discerning jjyogin] a l l i s but 
sorrow". Hence i t i s sorrow which i s to be overcome (see 11.16). The 
means by which duhkha can be surmounted i s the disconnection of 
the 'correlation' (samyoga) between the 'seer' and the 'seen1, that i s 
the r e a l i s a t i o n of the innate Self as being apart from a l l accidental 
or epiphenomenal events of the mind-complex. This brings us back to 
the yogic process i t s e l f , 
5. Nirodha 
Yoga u t i l i s e s a great variety of implements to disrupt the 
continuum of phenomenal existence, to break the incessant revolution 
of p r a k r t i which holds no promise of s t a b i l i t y or security. At the 
bottom of a l l these means l i e s an i d e n t i c a l process, knovm as 
nirodha or ' r e s t r i c t i o n ' . There i s a good deal of misunderstanding 
about t h i s term which has led astray already the classical exegetists. 
I t i s c r u c i a l f o r a f a i r comprehension of the yogic path to c l a r i f y 
t h i s important concept. The source of t h i s confusion i s the fact that 
nirodha designates both the process of r e s t r i c t i o n and the state of 
restrictedness — a d i s t i n c t i o n which Vyasa et a l . have blat a n t l y 
ignored. 
The word i s derived from n i + «/rudh 'to r e s t r a i n ' and i s 
mentioned i n 1.2, 12, 51 and I I I . 9 . I n contrast to Vyasa1s 
conjectures, accepted tout court by his successors, the important 
sutra 1.2 (yoga^-citta-vrtti-nirodhah) does not use nirodha i n the 
sense of 'restrictedness'. Vacaspati Mis'ra's contention that 
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"Yoga i s that p a r t i c u l a r state of the mind-complex i n which 
the fluctuations [such asj -pramana and so f o r t h are r e s t r i c t e d " 
i s d e f i n i t e l y erroneous. Nor can t h i s aphorism be interpreted 
as implying that " jthe goal o f ] Yoga i s the restrictedness of the 
fluctuations' of the mind-complex", since the ultimate destination 
of the yogin i s not the i n h i b i t i o n of the f i v e modes of mental 
a c t i v i t y of the externalised consciousness but kaivalya. Rather 
i t must be concluded that 1.2 gives out a preliminary d e f i n i t i o n 
of Yoga as the process of r e s t r i c t i o n , commencing v/ith the i n h i b i t i o n 
of the v r t t i s . 
This need not necessarily c o n f l i c t with 1.3 where the i n i t i a l 
word tada ('then 1) does not have to imply "immediately upon the 
r e s t r i c t i o n of the v r t t i s " . Also, the phrase drastu sva-rupe'vasthanam 
may not ref e r to kaivalya at a l l but simply to the Self as i t appears 
i n r e l a t i v e p u r i t y i n samadhi: The s t i l l n e s s of the mind-complex 
permits a centralised experiencing i n which, although the l e v e l of 
the transcendental Self has not yet been reached, the purusa*s presence 
i s keenly f e l t as the stable centre with i n the enstatic process. 
As i s borne out by a candid examination of the relevant parts 
of the Yoga-Sutra, the process of r e s t r i c t i o n i s not confined to the 
pentad of fluctuations but i t i s a m u l t i - l e v e l happening which coincides 
with the yogic process of u n i f i c a t i o n per se. This, incidentally, sheds 
new l i g h t also on the concept of abhyasa or 'practice'. I n point of f a c t , 
r e s t r i c t i o n comprises three d i s t i n c t levels of application: 
90 nirudhyante yasmin-pramana-adi-vrttayo 1vastha-vi^ese cittasya so' 
vastha-vi^eso yogah (TaTtva-Vaisaradl, 1.2) " 
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(1) r e s t r i c t i o n of the fluctuations ( v r t t i - n i r o d h a ) 
(2) r e s t r i c t i o n of the presented-ideas (pratyaya-nirodha) 
(3) r e s t r i c t i o n of the subliminal-activators (samskara-nirodha)« 
Nirodha sets i n as soon as the yogin withdraws his senses from 
the external world by means of the technique of pratyahara conducive 
to one-pointed concentration. I n I I I . 9 i t i s stated that with the 
disappearance of the vyutthana-samskaras, the nirodha-samskaras 
emerge. This means that during the normal waking or centrifugal 
condition of consciousness those subliminal-activators are effective 
which lead to wakefulness (vyutthana), whilst the withdrawal of the 
senses involves such subliminal-activators as w i l l countercheck 
the externalising tendency of the mind. Vrtti-nirodha means the 
p a r t i a l as well as the complete (sarva) r e s t r i c t i o n of the f i v e types 
of mental f l u c t u a t i o n , thus covering every phase of sense-withdrawal, 
concentration and meditative absorption. I t i s an on-going process 
with increasingly greater degrees of restrictedness. 
Pramana and viparvaya. both of which are dependent on an 
objective substratum, are the f i r s t to be eliminated i n the i n t e r -
n a lisation procedure. There i s no more contact with the external 
environment once meditative absorption (dhyana) i s established. 
Vikalpa or /predicate-relation', as J.H. WOODS (1966^) translates 
t h i s term, i s also soon r e s t r i c t e d . Par more d i f f i c u l t i s the 
elimination of sleep ( n i d r a ) . I t i s a common experience that during the 
f i r s t attempts of meditative absorption, the mind instead of reaching 
the r e s t r i c t e d (niruddha) state often lapses into sleep. The untrained 
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mind i s unable to sustain the intense concentration required 
f o r more than b r i e f spells only and quickly succumbs to exhaustion.. 
However, the greatest hindrance of a l l i s the powerful human memory 
which constantly populates the consciousness space with thoughts, 
images and moods. I t s complete control can only be achieved a f t e r 
extensive practice of dhyana. 'Memory1 (smrti) refers here to the 
actual process of remembering and not, as i n 1.43, to the depth-
memory, though both are of course int i m a t e l y related. I n passing 
i t may be pointed out that Patanjali's enumeration of the v r t t i s 
i s f a r from being a r b i t r a r y . His arrangement i s according to 
the v r t t i s 1 r e l a t i o n with the external environment, pramana being 
as i t were the outermost and smrti the innermost of the diverse mental 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
o 
Since the stoppage of the fluctuations i s clear l y stated to 
be effected i n dhyana (see 11.11), nirodha cannot possibly be i d e n t i f i e d 
with samadhi, and the classical commentators are d e f i n i t e l y at f a u l t on 
t h i s important point. The essential happening i n the enstatic states 
of consciousness can be described as the gradual r e s t r i c t i o n of the 
pratyayas. As w i l l be shown, these must not be confused with the v r t t i s . 
On a s t i l l deeper level of r e s t r i c t i o n , the very propensities to form 
pratyayas or v r t t i s . as the case may be, are brought under control* 
This i s samskara-nirodha which, when completed successfully, i s known 
as sarva-nirodha or t o t a l restrictedness and i s commensurate with the 
f i n a l breakthrough to kaivalya. I w i l l discuss t h i s phase i n conjunction 
with samadhi. 
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6. Pratyaya 
The word pratyaya (from p r a t i + Jl 'to go') occurs no less 
than ten times i n the Yoga-Sutra (see I.10, 18, 19; 11.20; I I I . 2 , 1 
17, 19, 35 and IV.27), and i t i s an important technical expression. 
This f a c t has not "been recognised by the exegetists who employ 
pratyaya occasionally i n the sense of 'cause' and then again as 
descriptive of some mental content. Neither the Yoga-Bhasya 
nor the Tattva-YaisaradI provides a d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s term 
i n i t s second meaning of 'idea, n o t i o n 1 . When we turn to Bhoja, 
s l i g h t l y more information about the meaning of t h i s concept can be 
obtained. He describes, i n his Ra.ja-Martandaipratyaya as knowledge 
(.jfiana) (see I I I . 2 ) and elsewhere ( l l . 2 0 ) as "knowledge tinctured 
by the object" (visaya-uparaktani jnanani). He thus understands 
i t as knowledge or awareness of something. This appears to be the 
meaning of the term throughout the Yoga-Sutra. Even 1.19 can 
convincingly be interpreted i n this way. I t i s very un l i k e l y that 
Patanjali should have used the word i n more than one sense, and 
I consider i t as belonging to the technical vocabulary of Classical 
Yoga, together with such termini as v r t t i , c i t t a or nirodha etc. 
I n the commentaries pratyaya and v r t t i are frequently used 
synonymously, but t h i s usage i s incorrect i f i t i s intended to 
r e f l e c t Patanjali's viewpoint. For, the presence of a pratyaya 
does not necessarily imply the simultaneous occurrence of a v r t t i . 
This i s evident from the fact that there appear i n samadhi various 
types of awareness u n i t s , e.g. vitar k a , vicara etc., which cannot 
be designated as v r t t i but which pertain to the pratyaya category. 
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I t appears that the term pratyaya i s s p e c i f i c a l l y applied to 
the phenomenon of awareness as i t presents i t s e l f i n a comciousness 
that rests on an object of some kind. The analogue of v r t t i i n the 
enstatic consciousness i s not pratyaya but prajna or gnostic knowing 
i n which the object i s apprehended d i r e c t l y and from withi n i t s e l f 
as i t were. On the basis of these considerations I suggest the 
following taxonomy: 
ipratyaya 
r~_—• 1 , 
prajna v r t t i 
i h i— 1 i 1 r 
v i t a r k a vicara pramana viparyaya vikalpa nidra smrti 
The term prajna f o r the cognitive elements present i n samadhi 
i s i n f e r r e d from i t s usage i n such aphorisms as 11.27 which speaks 
of a sevenfold gnosis, and I I I . 5 which has the phrase prajfla-aloka and, 
above a l l , from the term samprajnata describing a l l modalities of 
samadhi which have an objective 'prop' (alambana). However, there i s 
one single exception to t h i s rule: I n 1.49 prajna has the meaning 
of 'knowledge' usually designated by the Sanskrit word jnana. This 
deviation can be explained from the context from which i t i s apparent 
that the author, f o r the sake of convenience, retained the word 
prajna as used i n the immediately preceding sutra; maybe even a pun 
i s intended which a modern writer would have expressed by means of 
inverted commas. 
A. JANA&K (1957) attempts to show that pratyaya corresponds 
with the Pavlovian concept of 'impulse 1, but already J.W. HADER 
(1958, 464 f n . 6) cast serious doubt on t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , though 
he concedes that i n the f o u r t h pada (which he regards as a l a t e r 
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appendix) the term pratyaya may possibly have the meaning suggested 
by A ' . JANXC'EK. AS concerns the f i r s t three padas, J.W. HAUER's 
tra n s l a t i o n wavers between 'awareness1 and 'cause' as f i t renderings 
of pratyaya. However, i t i s quite unnecessary to assume th i s double 
connotation, as a l l the relevant sutras can s a t i s f a c t o r i l y be 
understood when one gives pratyaya the single meaning of a 
specific noetic fa c t o r . Unlike pra.jna and y r t t i vihich are c l a s s i f i e d 
by t h e i r functional characteristics, pratyaya i s more a r e l a t i o n a l 
concept i n which the content of consciousness i s defined i n i t s 
r e l a t i o n to the transcendental Self as the permanent apperceiver of a l l 
ideation. Hence the most congenial translation of t h i s term i s the 
one proposed by J.H. WOODS ( 1 9 6 6 ^ ) , namely •presented-idea 1. 
This i s accepted, f o r instance, by G.M. KOELMAN ( 1 9 7 0 ) who'is one 
of the few scholars to make an attempt at developing a c r i t i c a l 
vocabulary f o r expressing yogic concepts i n English. S t i l l , he f a i l s 
to recognise the leading significance of t h i s concept i n the psychology 
of Classical Yoga and consequently also does not r e a l i s e that 
'presented-idea 1 i s the constant meaning of the term pratyaya i n 
Patanjali's work. The reason f o r t h i s shortcoming i s his extreme 
reliance on the commentaries. 
To quote but one instance, what does i t mean when G.M. KOELMAN 
( 1 9 7 0 , 1 8 5 ) translates aphorism 1 . 1 0 with "Sleep i s a fl u c t u a t i o n 
supported by the coming to the fore of the absencejpf the waking and 
dreaming states]"? I t seems to me that the compound abhava-pratyaya 
i s f a r more i n t e l l i g i b l y rendered as "the presented-idea of the non-
occurrence [of conscious contents]". Since nidra i s a v r t t i i t must 
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be based on a pratyaya of some kind; hence abhava-pratyaya cannot 
r e a l l y mean "the absence of pratyayas". This i s f u l l y recognised 
by K. BHATTACHARYYA (1956, I , 256) who writes: "Presentation of a 
content that i s known as real i s pramana, of a content that i s known 
as unreal i s viparyaya and of a content that appears real even when 
i t i s known as unreal i s vikalpa; while presentation of a content as 
presented — i . e . presentation of presentation i s smrti and presentation 
of the absence of presentation i s nidra." I n t h i s way nidra 
i s adequately demarcated from nirodha i n which a l l v r t t i s are 
r e s t r i c t e d . This i s i n conformity with Vyasa's exposition of 'sleep'. 
He attempts to demonstrate that there i s mental a c t i v i t y of some kind 
even i n deep sleep by pointing out t h a t when a person awakes he 
usually 'recollects' that he has slept well or badly. 
Likewise, the phrase bhava-pratyaya i n 1.19 need not be 
taken to s i g n i f y "caused by worldly means" as i s the contention of 
the exegetists (see also J.H. WOODS, 1966^). Rather i t must be 
explained i n conjunction with 1.18. These two aphorisms read as follows: 
virama-pratyaya-abhyasa-purvah samskara-s'eso' nyah —- bhava-pratyayo 
videha-prakrti-layanam. 1.18 undoubtedly defines asampra.inata-samadhi, 
and virama-pratyaya must be translated with "presented-idea of 
cessation" and i s not to be counfounded with abhava-pratyaya. 
The "previous practice" (abhyasa-purva) refers to sampra.inata-samadhi 
i n which pratyaya-nirodha i s gradually effected. On the other hand, 
the compound bhava-pratyaya obviously s i g n i f i e s "presented-idea of 
becoming" which describes the contents of consciousness of those who 
have f a i l e d to transcend the realm of p r a k r t i and have l o s t sight of 
the goal of kaivalya. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PRACTICE CONCEPTS 
1. Abhyasa, vairagya 
The yogic path as formulated by Patanjali appears as a 
bi-polar process of gradual i n t e m a l i s a t i o h . A l l techniques are 
formally subsumed under the two categories of abyfoasa and vairagya ' 
respectively. The former may be circumscribed as the actualisation 
of the One and the l a t t e r as the elimination of the Many. I n 
L.A. SINGH's (1970, I , 108) words: "In modem terminology, abhyasa 
may be conceived as the process of canalisation and re-conditioning; 
while vairagya may be seen as a process of de-conditioning. By 
breaking the associations between motives and goals, of lower levels 
of psychological development by a process of de-conditioning and then 
forming new associations between motives and higher goals through a 
process of re-conditioning one gradually rises from lower to higher 
levels of affeeto-motivational development." 
Abhyasa and vairagya are thus the two poles of any form of Yoga 
and, indeed, of any s p i r i t u a l d i s c i p l i n e whatsoever. This point i s 
seldom understood. Vyasa i l l u s t r a t e s the functional interdependence 
of both poles i n a s t r i k i n g simile: c i t t a - n a d l nama-ubhayato vahini 
vahati kalyanaya vahati papaya ca, ya t u kaivalya-pragbhara viveka-
visaya-nimna sa kalyana-vaha, samsara-pragbhara'vivekaTvisaya-nimna 
papa-vaha, ta t r a vairagyena visaya-srotah k h i l l - k r i y a t e viveka-
dars'ana-abhyasena viveka-srota udghathyata ity-ubhaya-adhlhas'-citta-
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v r t t i - n i r o d h a h (l.12), "The stream of consciousness f l o r a i n both 
[directions]]. I t flows to the good, and i t flows to the bad. The one 
commencing with discernment (viveka) and terminating i n kaivalya 
flows t o the good. The one commencing with nonCdiscernment (aviveka) 
and terminating i n conditioned-existence (samsara) flows to the bad. 
Through dispassion (vairagya) the flowing out to the sense-objects i s 
checked, and through the practice (abhvasa) of the v i s i o n of discernment 
the stream of discernment i s l a i d bare. Thus the r e s t r i c t i o n of the 
fluctuations of consciousness i s dependent upon both abhyasa and 
vairagya '.!. 
This bi-polar model of thejyogic path was f i r s t formulated i n 
the Bhagavad-Glta which, i n f a c t , employs the very same terms 
used by Patanjali to designate the two poles, namely abhyasa and 
vairagya, and i t i s as good as certain that he was f u l l y conversant 
with t h i s old Toga scripture. The stanza i n question i s VI.35 which 
reads: asamsayam maha-baho mano dumigraham calam, abhyasena t u 
kaunteya vairagyena ca grhyate, "The mind, o strong-armed. [Arjuna]], 
i s undoubtedly unsteady and d i f f i c u l t to control. Yet through practice 
and dispassion, o son-of-Kuntl, i t can be seized". This dyadic analysis 
of the yogic path has survived i n t o the post-classical period of Yoga, 
as i s evident from the encyclopedic Yoga-Vaa istha, and i t can even be 
met w i t h i n the Slmkhya-Sutra ( i l l . 3 6 ) and certain Vedanta texts 
such as Sankara's Viveka-Cudamani (374). 
Abhyasa (from abhi +//as 'to abide, engage i n 1 ) does not occur 
i n the e a r l i e r s t r a t a of hindu l i t e r a t u r e where i t i s replaced by the 
term srama or 'exertion'. I t s f i r s t mention i s i n the Bhagavad-Glta 
(see VI.35, 44; V I I I . 8 ; XII.9, 10, 12; XVIII.36) and the Svetasvatara-
Upanisad (1.14), and i t i s also widely employed i n the epic. I n i t s 
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non-philosophical usage the word abhyasa has the meaning of ' r e p e t i t i o n , 
habit', and some of t h i s connotation i s carried over i n t o Patanjali's 
concept of 'practice' as i s clear from the aphorisms 1.13 and 1.14: 
t a t r a s t h i t a u yatno 1bhyasah - sa t u dirgha-kala-nairantarya-sa tkara-
when i t j i s cu l t i v a t e d f o r a long time, uninterruptedly land w i t h 
translates i t quite appropriately with 'practice'. To sum up: "'Practice' 
stands f o r the concentrated inner application to the r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
transcendental Being which constitutes the essence of a l l yogic 
operations. I t consists i n the careful discrimination between the real 
and wholesome on the one hand and the transient and a l l that i s 
unworthy of human motivation on the other. I t i s the inwardness and 
91 
u n i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from t h i s enlightened discernment." 
I t may be noted here that i n 1.32 (eka-tattva-abhyasa) and i n 
1.18 (virama-pratyaya-abhyasa), the word abhyasa does not appear to 
be intended i n the above formal sense but probably corresponds with 
the notion of 'exercise' as a specific instance of 'practice' per se. 
Like i t s positive correlative the negative pole, vairagya, pertains 
to the post-vedic vocabulary. I t does not seem to have been i n use p r i o r 
to the Bhagavad-GSta. Patanjali defines t h i s second constituent of the 
path as follows: drsta-anusravika-visaya-vitrsnasya vasTkara-sam.jna 
asevito drdha-bhumih. "Practice i s the [repeated] ef'orrt to s t a b i l i s e // I* 
[the mind-complexj. However, t h i s [practice]][gains] f i r m ground \only 
i t j ruptedly [s  
f u l l ! attent ion". Nonetheless, S. DASGUPTA's (1930, 331) rendering 
of abhyasa as 'habit' i s incorrect, and he i n f a c t elsewhere (p. 61) 
91 G.A.FEUERSTEIN (1974, 35) 
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vairagyam, "Dispassion i s the consciousness of mastery of [the yogin 
who i s ] without t h i r s t f o r seen and revealed objects". Drsta denotes 
the things v i s i b l e , that i s , the ordinary objects of our pleasure 
seeking mind, whereas anusravika (from anu +Jsru. 'to hear 1) refers 
to objects revealed by the sacred t r a d i t i o n , such as the promised 
joys of heaven which are empirically non-verifiable. D i S p a s s i 0 n j as 
understood by Patanjali, i s not so much a specific act of non-attachment 
as a state of mind; i t i s the "consciousness of mastery" accruing 
from the persistent struggle to disengage the mind from everything 
that i s i n i m i c a l to i t s i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n . 
Patanjali knows of two orders of completeness of dispassipn. 
tat-param purusa-khyater-gana-vaitrsnyam, "The superior jform o f ] 
t h i s Jdispassion] i s the non-thirsting f o r the gunas fwhich r e s u l t s ] 
from the v i s i o n of the Self". The o r b i t of the lower degree of 
vairagya embraces every prakrtic e n t i t y or function except the t r i p l e 
primary forces or gunas into which a l l manifest and immaterial objects 
ul t i m a t e l y resolve. But even from these the yogin must dissociate 
himself by r e a l i s i n g the higher degree of dispassion which discloses 
the Self to his enstatic view. This implies the resolution of the 
entire cognitive apparatus and i n the l a s t analysis the complete 
delation of the individual cosmos. 
I t may be conjectured that the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n t o two degrees 
of consummation as regards dispassion may have i t s p a r a l l e l i n abhyasa. 
Tsntative evidence f o r t h i s assumption i s found i n 1.18 where the 
practice of ,'Isamprajnata-samadhi i s styled as "the other" (purva) 
abhyasa, i n contrast to asampra.jnata-samadhi whose essential feature 
i s pratyaya-nirodha. Granted that t h i s i s tenable, the following 
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correlation i s possible: 
ordinary vairagya \ v r t t i - n i r o d h a 
i n combination bring about \ ' 4, 
ordinary abhyasa / pratyaya-nirodha. 
higher vairagya \ samskara-nirodha 
i n combination bring about \ >U 
higher abhyasa / sarva-nirodha 
2. Pratyahara, dharana. dhyana 
The r e s t r i c t i o n of the f i v e modes of v r t t i or mental a c t i v i t y , 
as the f i r s t stage of a protracted process ending i n the t o t a l 
a b o l i t i o n of consciousness, i s effected by means of the combined 
practice of sense-withdrawal (pratyahara), concentration (dharana) 
and meditative-absorption (dhyana). As these form three phases of 
a continuum as i t were, I propose to t r e a t them together. Patanjali 
himself prefers a d i f f e r e n t arrangement insofar as he combines 
dharana, dhyana and samadhi denoting their c o l l e c t i v e practice by the 
concept of samyama. The reason f o r his exclusion of pratyahara would 
appear to be simply that t h i s i s not a purely mental exercise. 
Pratyahara (from p r a t i + a +//hr 'to hold 1) i s defined i n 
11.54 as "the i m i t a t i o n as i t were of the own-form of the mind-complex 
by the senses disuniting jthemselves from] t h e i r jrespective^] objects" 
(sva-visaya-asamprayoge cittasya sva-rupa-anukara-iva-indriyanam 
pratyaharah). This fundamental process has been described i n many 
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.Toga texts, and the favourite metaphor i s that of a tortoise 
withdrawing i t s limbs. There i s l i t t l e ambiguity about t h i s 
technique, and i t can be perfectly understood on the basis of 
the psychology of atte n t i o n . There i s a certain degree of sensory 
i n h i b i t i o n i n every kind of mental concentration. As the focus of 
atte n t i o n narrows to a s t r i c t l y confined locus, awareness of the 
surroundings i s gradually l o s t . I n Yoga, of course, complete 
cessation of a l l sensory a c t i v i t y i s aimed a t . This non-deployment 
of the senses i s to be understood as a positive e f f o r t not to 
engage i n sensory perceptions* as a deliberate attempt to disregard 
sensory s t i m u l i . I n i t i a l l y arousal i s s t i l l possible provided that 
the stimulus i s s u f f i c i e n t l y strong (e^g. a loud noise, a push e t c . ) , 
but as the exercise proceeds control of the afferent functions becomes 
increasingly more perfect, u n t i l t o t a l sensory anaesthesia i s achieved. 
This i s what i s meant by the expression parama-vasyata or 'supreme 
obedience' of the senses (see 11.55). 
Incidentally, t h i s 'generalised i n h i b i t i o n ' i s prepared and 
f a c i l i t a t e d by the muscular control effected through the practice 
of posture or asana and of respiratory stoppage or pranayama. Here 
modern neurophysiology confirms the experiential wisdom of Patanjali 
and his predecessors (see T.R. KULKARNI, 1972, 9 9 f f . ) . 
G.M. KOELMAN.(1970, 175-76),"who singles out four levels of 
yogic i n t e r i o r i s a t i o n , remarks on the practice of pratyahara that 
" i t i s d i f f i c u l t to situate" i n the arrangement proposed by him. 
"Though i t i s i n a sense somatic, inasmuch as physiologically the 
senses no longer react to external s t i m u l i , and i s also e t h i c a l i n 
character to the extent that i t i s aimed at and brought about by 
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the heroic practice of universal detachment, yet we think i t i s 
already the threshold of the; psychological l e v e l . 'Withdrawal 
of the senses' forms the bridge and i s the cumulative r e s u l t of 
the previous practices, and opens the door to one-pointed con-
centration." The four levels distinguished by G.M. KOELMAN 
are 
(1) the somatic l e v e l which has as i t s goal the 
pac i f i c a t i o n of the body; 
(2) the eth i c a l l e v e l intended f o r the p u r i f i c a t i o n 
and s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the mind; 
(3) the psychological level e n t a i l i n g a f r o n t a l attack 
on the empirical mind which i s to be transcended; 
(4) the metaphysical l e v e l which i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h 
kaivalya or emancipation, that i s , the transcendental 
r e a l i s a t i o n of the Self. 
This i s a useful model which i n a way complements Patanjali's 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the 'external members' (bahir-anga) and 'internal . 
members' (antar-anga) of the eightfold path (see I I I . 7 ) . 
Perseverant practice of sense-withdrawal induces concentration 
or dharana, characterised by Patanjali as follows: desa-bandhas'-cittasya 
dharana ( l l l . l ) or "Concentration i s the binding of the mind-complex 
to [a single] locus". This technique consists i n a focusing of 
atten t i o n , a mental zeroing-in on one topic t o the exclusion of a l l 
others. I t i s also referred to i n I.32 as "the practice of a single 
p r i n c i p l e " (eka-tattya-abhyasa). T.R. KULKARNI (1972, 118) aptly 
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describes the underlying process as "a general 'shrinking 1 of the 
mind leaving only a smaller portion of concentrated mental a c t i v i t y " . 
He also suggests that the concept of the 'neuronal model' of sensory 
stimulus, as developed by E.N. S0E0L0V (1963), may possibly be an 
explanation of t h i s phenomenon i n neuro-physiological terms. However, 
i t must be stressed here that however i n s t r u c t i v e these parallels 
are one must not succumb to the reductionist f a l l a c y of taking them 
to be s u f f i c i e n t explanations of what i s essentially a psychological 
happening* 
I n 1.35 the expression "holding the mind i n steadiness" 
(manasah sthiti-nibandhanl) i s found which i n v i t e s comparison with 
the statement of I I I . 1 . Whereas the l a t t e r i s intended as a formal 
description of an actual technique, the former aphorism evidently 
speaks of a result of t h i s concentration, namely nibandhana, the 
'steady' condition of the mind being i n t h i s case the concomitant 
phenomenon* of a yogic experience known as p r a v r t t i or extra-ordinary 
sensory a c t i v i t y . 
The centre of at t e n t i o n , or locus of concentration, can be any 
object whatsoever, as long as i t i s properly 1 i n t e r i o r i s e d * . Preferred 
l o c i are the bodily centres such as the nabhi-cakra ( i l l . 2 9 ) , kantha-
kupa ( i l l . 3 0 ) , kurma-nadl (HI.31), hrdaya ( i l l . 3 4 ) and murdha-jyotis 
( i l l . 3 2 ) . Patanjali, moreover, l i s t s such non-somatic 'topics' as 
surya ( i l l , 2 6 ) , candra ( i l l . 2 7 ) , dhruva ( i l l . 2 8 ) etc., and purely 
conceptual items l i k e m a i t r l ( i l l . 2 3 ) , baia ( i l l . 2 4 ) etc. I n addition 
there i s the r e c i t a t i o n (japa) of the syllable om s i g n i f y i n g Tsvara 
(see 1.27-28) which i s an exercise of no mean significance i n Classical 
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Yoga. Anything at a l l can serve as a 'prop' f o r concentration 
provided i t i s found f i t (see 1.39) to narrow consciousness 
to a spot sustaining i t i n t h i s reduced state over a s u f f i c i e n t 
period of time. An object of some kind seems to be called for i n order 
to avert the ever-present danger of a p l a i n relapse into 
unconsciousness. The reduction of consciousness to a specific pre-selected 
point f o r e s t a l l s i t s premature collapse. I n the l i g h t of these 
considerations one may hypothesise that where there i s no d e f i n i t e 
objective support i n meditation, the ' i n t e r i o r i s e d ' body as a whole 
assumes t h i s essential r o l e . 
Concentration i s the persistent e f f o r t to arrest the natural 
i n c l i n a t i o n of the mind to engage i n desultory a c t i v i t y thereby 
e x t e r i o r i s i n g i t s e l f . Patanjali mentions a series of 'obstacles' 
(antarava) which impede the c u l t i v a t i o n of'inward-mindedness' or 
pratyak-cetana. These impediments are sickness, languor, doubt, 
heedlessness, s l o t h , dissipation, false vision, the non-attainment 
of the stages of Yoga and i n s t a b i l i t y i n these stages. They are 
also known as the 'dispersions' (viksepa) and are said to be 
accompanied by certain physiological conditions, v i z . pain, dejection, 
tremor of the limbs, f a u l t y inhalation and exhalation (see 1,33-34). 
Only by resolute application to single-mindedness can these 
obstacles and t h e i r negative side-effects be overcome (see I.32) . 
Patanjali mentions two synonyms of dharana, v i z . ekagrata 
~~~~~~ 
(HI . 1 1 - 1 2 ) and ekagrya, both meaning 'one-pointedness' (eka 'one' + 
agra ' p o i n t ' ) . M. ELIADE (1973 5 , 70) speculates that ekagrata and" 
dharana d i f f e r from each other insofar as the l a t t e r i s a mental' 
f i x a t i o n f o r the purpose of comprehension which i s absent i n ekagrata. 
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I see no evidence f o r t h i s hypothesis i n the Yoga-Sutra i t s e l f , 
though M. ELIADE's suggestion i s not without interest. As a 
formal constituent of the eightfold path, dharana i s essentially 
a technique which can be said to have as i t s characteristic 
feature the one-poLntedness of the mind. 
We now come to meditative-absorption or dhyana which, by way 
of contrast, i s defined i n I I I . 2 as "the one-flowness of the 
presented-ideas"; t h i s i s a l i t e r a l rendering of the Sanskrit 
compound pratyaya-ekatanata. I m p l i c i t i n t h i s technical expression 
i s the fa c t that dhyana i s so to speak a linear continuation of 
ekagrata as achieved by the technique of dharana. Yet although 
meditative-absorption devolves from dharana, i t i s nevertheless 
a mental state with i t s own d i s t i n c t properties. As T.R. KULKARHI 
(1972, 119) puts i t : "While i n dharana the mind remains bound up, as 
i t were, i n a r e s t r i c t e d space, i t s continuation i n that bound up 
state i n such a way that the experiential state corresponding to i t 
remains uniformly and homogeneously the same despite variations i n 
the i n t e r n a l or external perceptual s i t u a t i o n , constitutes dhyana 
(...) I n the state of dhyana. the indeterminateness of perception 
disappears w i t h the mind remaining unaffected by d i s t r a c t i n g s t i m u l i . " 
J.W. BAUER ( 1 9 5 8 , 322), who i s known to have personally experimented 
w i t h Yoga, offers t h i s i n s i g h t f u l description of the nature of 
meditative-absorption: "[phyanaJ i s a deepened and creative dharana, 
i n which the inner object i s illumined mentally. The s t r i c t 
concentration on one object of consciousness i s now supplemented with 
a searching-pensive contemplation of i t s actual nature. The object i s , 
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so to speak, placed Before the contemplative consciousness i n 
• a l l i t s aspects and i s apperceived as a whole. I t s various 
characteristics are examined t i l l i t s very essence i s understood 
and becomes transparent (,..) This i s accompanied by a ce r t a i n 
emotive disposition. Although the reasoning f a c u l t y functions acutely 
and c l e a r l y , i t would be wrong to understand dhyana merely as a l o g i c a l 
r a t i o n a l process: the contemplator must penetrate his object with 
a l l his heart, since he i s a f t e r a l l primarily interested i n a 
s p i r i t u a l experience which i s to lead him to ontic p a r t i c i p a t i o n and 
the emancipation'from a l l c o n s t r i c t i n g and binding hindrances." 
Dhyana, i n other words, adds depth to dharana. Hence G.M. 
KOELMAN's (1970) rendering of the term with 'attention' i s 
po s i t i v e l y inadequate. Dhyana i s not jus t a prolonged dharana. 
I t must be caref u l l y demarcated from concentration by reason of 
i t s utmost and continuous c l a r i t y of consciousness, the r e l a t i v e 
voidness of the inner space, the looming large of the single object, 
the adjustment of a l l emergent noetic acts to the one object of 
consciousness, the slow-down of a l l cognitive and emotive processes 
and not least because of the underpinning of overwhelming peacefulness. 
5. Samadhi 
I n dhyana a restructuring of consciousness takes place the most 
92 See C. ALERECHT (1951) 
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conspicuous c r i t e r i o n of which i s the increasing proximity between 
the meditating subject and the object f i l l i n g the consciousness space. 
This monoideism brings the yogin to a natural threshold where 
suddenly and unpredictably consciousness undergoes a fu r t h e r radical 
reconstitution. This i s samadhi, the symphysis of subject and object. 
The word samadhi, composed of sam + a + */dha 'to put, place 1, l i t e r a l l y 
means (putting together'. This does not always come across i n the 
many renderings suggested f o r t h i s term, such as 'trance' (M.N. DVIVEDI 
R. PRASIDA), 'meditation' (M. MULLER, G. JHA), 'concentration' 
(S. DASGUPTA, S. RADHAKRISMAN, J.H. WOODS), 'absorption' (H. ZIMMER, 
G.M. KOELMAN) or 'Versenkung' ( B . FRAUWALINER) and 'Einfaltung' 
(j.W. HAUER). With the possible exception of the last-mentioned 
term these t r a n s c r i p t i o n are either too narrow or too vague to be 
acceptable. Hence M. ELIADE (1973 ) borrows from the Greek language 
the word 'enstasis' or 'enstasy' which has the advantage of not 
being loaded with the same kind of unwanted associations that force 
one to reject the above-mentioned alternatives. For some inexplicable 
reason t h i s useful coinage has not so f a r been assimilated i n t o the 
general technical vocabulary of indologists, and the terminological 
confusion continues unabatedly. J. GONDA (1960, I , 204) suggests 
• i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ' as a possible alternative to M. ELIADE's unfashionable 
coinage. But the word 'enstasy' has the additional advantage of 
c l e a r l y demarcating the phenomenon of samadhi from that of 'ecstasy' 
with which i t i s not infrequently confused. Enstasy, as R.C. ZAEHNER 
(1969, 143) observes, " i s the exact reverse of ecstasy which means to 
get outside oneself and which i s often characterized by a breaking 
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down of the h a r r i e r s between the individual subject and the universe 
around him". 
Dhyana i s a necessary though not a s u f f i c i e n t condition for 
samadhi to ensue. This all-important point i s apodictic from the fa c t 
that no genuine v o l i t i o n a l acts are possible i n meditative-absorption 
without i n s t a n t l y disrupting the meticulously b u i l t up mental continuum. 
What M. ELIADE (1973^, 80) says of the higher form of enstasy, i . e . 
asamprajnata-samadhi, i s i n p r i n c i p l e also true of any of the lower 
forms of samadhi: "... i t comes without being summoned, without 
being provoked, without special preparation for i t . That i s whyyit can 
be c a l l e d a 'raptus'". Samadhi occurs, or rather may occur, when the 
mind has reached a state of r e l a t i v e equilibrium, that i s , when the 
f i v e types of v r t t i are perfectly r e s t r i c t e d (see 11.11). The Yoga-Sutra 
i s quite unequivocal on t h i s , and yet the exegetists have i n many ways 
profoundly upset the conceptual and terminological neatness which makes 
Pa t a n j a l i ' s work such a valuable and appealing document. These 
distortions are so obtrusive and so symptomatic of the general 
u n r e l i a b i l i t y of the exegetical l i t e r a t u r e that I s h a l l for the 
present purpose abandon my o r i g i n a l strategy of ignoring the commentaries 
altogether. I t seems more rewarding to proceed on the basis of a c r i t i q u e 
of the interpretations or, more precisely, misinterpretations of the 
c l a s s i c a l commentators. 
Aphorism I I I . 3 seems an opportune starting-point. Here samadhi 
i s characterised i n the following way: tad-eva-artha-matra-nirbhasam 
sva-rupa-sunyam-iva samadhih, or: "{when] nothing but the object i s 
shining forth [in] that Jmeditative-absorption], H and when the mind i s 
as i t were void of I i t s l own-form , I t h i s i s known a s j e n s t a s y " . [ ] 
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Vyasa, to be sure, understands t h i s sutra quite d i f f e r e n t l y : 
dhyanam-eva•dhyeya-akara-nirbhasam pratyaya-atmakena sva-rupena 
sunyam-iva yada bhavati dhyeya-sva-bhava-avesat-tada samadhir-ity-
ucyate t or: "When meditative-absorption shines f o r t h i n the form 
of the meditated-object (dhyeya), as i f void of [ i t s ] own-form 
and being bodied-forth i n presented-ideas, then, on account of 
[ i t s ] fusing with the own-being of the meditated-object, i t i s 
called enstasy" (Yoga-Bhasya I I I . 3 ) . Vyasa ostensibly relates 
the words nirbhasa and sva-rupa-sunya to meditative-absorption and 
not as would seem more l o g i c a l to the intended object and the 
mind respectively. But i n what sense can dhyana be said to shine 
f o r t h as the object? And how i s one to envisage the loss of i t s 
own-form (sva-rupa)? 
Although Vyasa1s int e r p r e t a t i o n requires the minimum of 
f i l l - i n s inasmuch as he follows tenaciously the overt grammatical 
structure of the aphorism i n question, t h i s i s nevertheless, achieved 
at the cost of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . Hence rather than t r a n s l a t i n g 
"that [meditative-absorption^ shining f o r t h as the object only", 
I suggest a reversal, namely "the object only shining f o r t h [ i n ^ j 
that ^meditative-absorption]". Similarly, i t would seem to be 
more cogent to speak of the mind instead of dhyana as being void 
of i t s oun-form, i n view of the f a c t that i n the enstatic condition 
consciousness, which normally i s founded on the dichotomy between 
subject and object, i s deprived of t h i s characteristic dualism.• 
Only i n a very loose way could the same be said of dhyana. 
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G. OBERHAMMER. (1965, 104, f n . 11) makes the curious comment 
that the f o u r t h stage of sampra.jnata-samadhi. by which he means 
asmita-sajnadhi, cannot be determined as artha-matra and sva-rupa-
^unya since i t s content i s the unity-consciousness of I-am-ness. 
F i r s t of a l l , as I have shown there i s no such stage of enstasy, 
and consequently his c r i t i c i s m i s unfounded. But even i f there 
were an enstatic state i n which a l l contents of consciousness 
except the f e e l i n g of ' I am1 are f u l l y abrogated,, s t i l l the very 
fa c t of the presence of asmita would j u s t i f y one to describe 
t h i s samadhi as artha-matra, for to the apperceiving Self (as 
drastr) asmita c e r t a i n l y represents an intended object or artha. 
Furthermore, G. OBERHAMMER's conjecture that saroapatti and 
samyama pertain to a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system which i s d i f f e r e n t 
from that which operates with the concepts of nirodha and 
samprajnata/asamprajnata-samadhi i s equally untenable. Samapatti 
i s defined i n 1.41 as follows: ksina-vrtterr-abhi.iatasya-iva maner-
grahitr-grahana-grahyesu tat-stha-tad-an.janata samapattih, or: 
" [ i n the case of the mind whose] fluctuations have dwindled [and 
which has become^ l i k e a precious [transparent] jewel, [there r e s u l t s ^ 
[ j l n regard t o j the 'grasper*, the 'grasping' and the 'grasped', 
£a state o f ] coincidence with that on which jthe mind] abides and 
by which [the mind] i s 'anointed'". This sutra describes the basic 
mechanism of any form of enstasy other than asamprajnata-samadhi. 
Again, I would content that samapatti i s descriptive of the underlying 
process of enstasy whereas samadhi i s a formal category denoting 
a technique. In other words, the r e l a t i o n between these two terms 
i s analogous to the r e l a t i o n between ekagrata and dharana and between 
226 
ekatanata and dhyana. 
There are four types of samapatti or 'coincidence': t a t r a 
s'abda-artha-jnana-vikalpaih samkirna savitarka samapattih, smrti-
parisuddhau sva-ruTja-sunya-iva-artha-matra-nir'bhasa n i r v i t a r k a , 
etaya-eva savicara nirvicara ca suksma-visaya vyakhyata (1.42-44), 
"[As long as there i s j conceptual knowledge {based onj the intent 
of words i n t h i s [samapattij, [ i t i s c a l l e d ] coincidence interspersed 
with 'deliberation'. - With the p u r i f i c a t i o n of the memory jTi.e. 
the t r a n q u i l i s a t i o n of t h i n k i n g ] » (when the mind i s ] as i t were 
void of [ i t s ] own-form (and when] the object only shines f o r t h , 
(this i s known as the coincidence*] 1 without'deliberation'• - By 
these" [two .types of samapatti](the other two kinds of coincidence], 
with ' r e f l e c t i o n ' and without ' r e f l e c t i o n ' [which have] subtle 
objects [as t h e i r meditative support] are explained". 
The cognitive factors present i n v i t a r k a - and vicara-samapatti 
represent a category of mental a c t i v i t y sui generis and must not 
be confused with the v r t t i s . As i s incontestably stated i n 1.41 
samapatti ensues a f t e r the v r t t i s have dwindled. Vitarka and vicara 
are specific to the transmuted consciousness of enstasy. They 
belong to the category of prajna or supra-cognition, i . e . gnostic 
knowledge. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 199) aptly remarks i n regard to 
vitarka-aamadhi; "We should not think, however, that a discursive 
reasoning i s going on while one i s i n the state of 'cogitative 
coarse i n t e n t i o n a l i d e n t i t y 1 (...) Were i t so, there would be no 
state of absorption, no yogic i n h i b i t i o n of mental a c t i v i t y . Such 
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mental fluctuations are absent, but the immobile in t e n t i o n a l identity-
i s i n terms of and expressed i n r a t i o n a l i z i n g and conceptualizing 
signs". This applies mutatis mutandis also to the vicara type of 
enstatic r e a l i s a t i o n . 
Whilst vi t a r k a s i g n i f i e s a supra-cognition i n r e l a t i o n to a 
'coarse' (sthula) object, that i s , anything pertaining to the 
surface structure of p r a k r t i (such as one of the somatic centres 
mentioned by Patanjali or any other micro- ox macro-structure 
of the tangible universe), vicara denotes a supra-cognition i n 
r e l a t i o n to a 'subtle' (suksma) object which can be any phenomenon 
ranging from the tanmatras (provided Patanjali recognised these 
'potentials') up to the transcendental core of the knowable world, 
i.e. the undifferentiate ( a l i n g a ) . I n nirvitarka-and n i r v i c a r a -
samapatti the respective supra-cognitions are f u l l y dispersed 
and what remains i s a consciousness which, l i k e a highly polished 
mirror, r e f l e c t s the intended object with a modicum of r e f r a c t i o n . 
I n 1.47 i t i s implied that nirvicara-samapatti i s i n fact the highest 
stage of t h i s series which suggests the following hierarchic 
organisation: 
A nirvicara-samapat t i 
vicara-samapatti 
nirvitarka-samapat t i 
vitarka-samapatti 
There i s no mention df any ananda-samadhi or asmita-samadhi 
i n the Yoga-Sutra which wouid validate the hypothetical models put 
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forward "by Vyasa, Vacaspati Misra and t h e i r successors. The 
Yoga-Bhasya (1.17) contains t h i s important passage: vitarkas'-
cittasya-alambane sthula abhogah, suksmo vicarah, anando hladah 
eka-atmika samvid-asmita, t a t r a prathamas'-catustaya-anugatah 
samadhih savitarkah, d v i t i y o vitarka-vikalah savicarah, trtTyo 
vicara-vikalah sa-anandah, caturthas-tad-vikalo'smitl-matra-iti, . . * —•— • * 
sarva ete sa-alambanah samadhayah, or: "'Deliberation 1 jjneansj 
the mind's coarse experience of a jcoarse] support; 're f l e c t i o n ' 
i s [the mind'sj subtle [experience of a subtle o b j e c t ] ; 'joy' 
[means^J gladness; 'I-am-ness' i s the f e e l i n g |pertaining] to oneself. 
Of these [four types] the f i r s t , having jall ^ J four associated 
together i s the enstasy with 'deliberation'. The second lacking 
'deliberation' i s [the enstasy] with ' r e f l e c t i o n 1 . The t h i r d 
lacking'reflection' i s [the enstasy] w i t h 'joy'. The f o u r t h lacking 
that ['joy'] i s [the enstasy] with jthe f e e l ing of] 'I-am-ness'. 
A l l these are w i t h supports [ i . e . intended objects]". Arranged 
i n a systematic fashion t h i s looks as follows: 
asmita-samadhi = asmita 
ananda-samadhi = ananda + asmita 
vicara-samadhi = vicara + ananda + asmita 
v i t arka-samadhi = vit a r k a + vicara + ananda + asmita 
This i s a be a u t i f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n of the sat-karya axiom according 
to which the e f f e c t i s pre-existent i n i t s cause. I n this p a r t i c u l a r 
case the lowest degree of enstatic r e a l i s a t i o n contains i n posse 
the supra-cognitive elements t y p i c a l of the higher forms of enstasy. 
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Thus Vyasa assumes ananda and asmita to constitute the contents of 
separate stages of samadhi. I t i s unclear how he envisages the 
correlation between these postulated four types and the four 
v a r i e t i e s of samapatti as c i t e d in.1.42-44. Does he take ananda-
and asmita-samadhi to be instances of nirvicara-samapatti? And 
what sort of experiences do they stand for? Vacaspati Misra 
t r i e s to disentangle these knotty problems. 
I n his Tattva-Vaisaradl (l.17) we f i n d t h i s explanation: 
ananda i t i indriye sthula-alambane cittasya-abhoga ahladah, prakasa-
s l l a t - t a y a khalu sattva-pradlianad-ahanltarM-indriyany-utpannani, 
sattvam sukham-iti tany-api sukhani-iti tasminn-abhoga a h l a d a - i t i 
(...) asmita-prabhavani-indriyani, tena-esam-asmita suksmam rupam, 
sa ca-atmana grahitra saha buddhir-eka-atmika samvid-iti, or: "Joy 
i s the mind's gladdening experience [when directed towards^] a 
sense-organ [which i s to be understood as ajcoarse support. The 
sense-organs of course arise from the 1-maker' [insofar as they 
have] a disposition to enlighten because of the pre-eminence of 
sattva [ i n them] . [AS] sattva [mani-f ests^ pleasure, these [sense-organs] 
too are pleasurable. Experience i s thus gladdening [when directed 
towards] those [sense-organs] ... The sense-organs are produced 
from 'I-am-ness', [consequently] t h i s 'I-am-ness' i s t h e i r subtle 
form, and t h i s ['I-am-ness'] together with the grasper 1 i s [known 
as] buddhi, [uel] the feeling [pertaining] to oneself". 
These remarks, not p a r t i c u l a r l y enlightening i n themselves, 
make more sense when viewed i n conjunction w i t h Vacaspati Misra's 
proposed model of eight types of samapatti. He states ( l . 4 6 ) : 
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tena grahye catasrah samapattayo grahZCtr-grahariayos'-ca catasra i t y -
astau te b h a v a n t i - i t i , "Thus {with regard] to the 'grasped1 there 
are four coincidences, [and there are a further] four j i n respect 
t o ] the 'grasper'and 'grasping'. Thus there are eight of these 
[coincidences]". Diagrammatically t h i s looks as follows: 
objective prop: 
nir-asmita-samapatti 
1I-am-ness1 
asmita-samapatti } 
nir-ananda-samapat t i 
_ _ sense-organs 
ananda-samapatti 
nir-vicara-samapatti 
subtle objects 
vicara-samapatti 
nir-vitarka-samapatti 
coarse objects 
v i tarka-samapat t i 
} 
} 
} 
These conjectural stages of enstatic experience have been admirably 
analysed by G.M. KOELMAW (1970, 198ff.). However, whatever explanatory 
value they may be credited with they cannot be reckoned to be 
representative of Patanjali's viewpoint as i t can be reconstructed 
from the evidence i n the Yoga-Sutra i t s e l f . At any rate the 
profound disagreements between the various exegetists on t h i s 
c r u c i a l issue su f f i c e f o r us not to accept any of t h e i r explanations 
p r e c i p i t a t e l y . While Vacaspati Mis'ra boldly doubles Vyasa's perhaps 
more convincing quartet of enstatic types, Vijnana Bhiksu i n his 
Yoga-Varttika (l.46) comes up with a six stage model. He e x p l i c i t l y 
rejects Vacaspati Mis'ra's view according to which the object of 
231 
v i t a r k a - and vieara-samadhi i s grahya, of ananda-samadhi grahana 
and of asmita-samadhi the category of g r a h i t r . Instead he regards 
ananda as a product of extreme vicara-samapatti:' which then 
i s made the objective prop of the next higher form of enstasy. 
Asmita-samapatti. again, i s explained "by him as kevala-purusa-akara-
samvit, that i s , the feeling vrhich takes the shape of the transcendental 
Self. VijKana Bhiksu adamantly denies that there i s a nir-ananda-
or a nir-asmita-samadhi. 
G.M. KOELMAN (1970) opts f o r Vacaspati Misra's interpretation 
which he seeks to vindicate i n what must be considered the most 
penetrating analysis of t h i s whole problem complex hi t h e r t o . 
Hovrever, he i s sadly mistaken when he pleads that these eight 
types of samapatti as delineated i n the Tattva-Vais'aradi "are 
the core of Patanjala mental d i s c i p l i n e " (p. 223)• They are indeed 
"a magnificent piece of psychology" ( i b i d } , but i t remains an open 
question t o what degree t h i s theoretical model i s founded on 
experiential information. As I have pointed out at the outset of 
t h i s study, Vacaspati Misra was no doubt a conscientious and 
extremely erudite scholar, but hardly an i n i t i a t e d yogin who could 
speak a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y about such recondite phenomena as these 
enstatic states. I n point of f a c t , as a close inspection of the 
Yoga-Sutra i t s e l f bears out neither Vacaspati Misra nor Vijnana Bhikfeu 
are r e l i a b l e guides i n t h i s complicated matter. 
Patanjali's own view seems to be that he takes nirvicara-samapatti 
as the highest form of samprajnata-samadhi. He states: n i r v i c a r a -
vaisaradye'dhyatma-prasadah, rtam-bhara t a t r a prajna (I.47-43), or: 
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"When [there i s ] autumnal-lucidity i n nirvicara [-samapatti], Ithen';1-
t l i i s i s called] the c l a r i t y of the inner-being. - I n t h i s 
[state of] autumnal-lucidity knowledge is truth-bearing". 
Vyasa (l.47) paraphrases t h i s enstatic condition with 
bhuta-artha-visayah krama-ananurodhl sphuta-prajna-alokah or "the 
f l a s h i n g - f o r t h of full-blown (sphuta) gnosis, not conforming 
to [the law o f ] sequence [and having as i t s ] objects the 
things themselves". At t h i s culmination of the enstatic process 
of i n v o l u t i o n no specific pratyayas or 1 presented-ideas' remain. 
There i s merely a generic awareness of the essence of the intended 
object. A l l noetic acts of the supra-cognitive type (e.g. vitarka etc.) 
are suspended. Patanjali does not even mention the presence of 
ananda (meta-bliss) or asmita (meta-subjectivity) i n t h i s state, 
though t h i s does not count as a proof of t h e i r actualiabsence. 
The gnostic i l l u m i n a t i o n which occurs at t h i s culminant stage i s 
said to be without development. I t i s , as Vacaspati Misra (l.47) 
observes, 'simultaneous' (yugapad), an atemporal knowing which 
Ms as.its essential characteristic that i t i s 'truth-bearing' 
(rtam-bhara), that i s , i f one r e c a l l s the archaic overtones of the 
concept of r t a , r e f l e c t i v e of the universal order and harmony. 
This elevated enstatic state i s likened to the c l a r i t y of the autumnal 
sky so t y p i c a l of northern India. 
I n t h i s connection Vyasa (l.47) cites a stanza of unknown 
o r i g i n but i d e n t i f i e d by Vacaspati Mi^ra as a parama-rsx gatha. 
I t reads: prajna-prasadam-aruhya as"ocyah socato janan, bhumi-sthan-iva 
saila-sthah sarvan prajno'nupasyati, or: "Having ascended to the fa 
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t r a n q u i l l i t y of gnosis, g r i e f l e s s , he beholds, l i k e [a person] 
standing on the mountain j j-top] [and looking down upon^ the 
valley-dwellers, a l l g r i e f - s t r i c k e n creatures". This i s a popular 
metaphor which can be met with i n the Mahabharata (Calc. ed. 
XII.17.20; 151.11) and the Dhammapada (28). 
This non-sequential gnosis i s further explained i n 1.49: s'ruta-
anumana-pra.iTiabhyam-anya-visaya visesa-arthatvat, or: "The scope 
£of this gnosis] i s d i s t i n c t from the 'knowledge' [derived from] 
t r a d i t i o n or inference because of [ i t s ] p a r t i c u l a r purposefulness". 
J.H. WOODS (1966^) translates t h i s sutra d i f f e r e n t l y : "Has an object 
other than the insight r e s u l t i n g from things heard or from inferences 
inasmuch as i t s object i s a p a r t i c u l a r . " Although t h i s rendering 
i s true to Vyasa's dict i o n , who argues that w h i l s t sabda and anumana 
deal with generic objects only, samadhi discloses the p a r t i c u l a r , 
nevertheless a f a r less sophisticated i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s possible 
and also preferable. J.W. HATJER (1958, 337), f o r instance, understands 
the phrase vi^esa-arthatvat as "weil sein Zweck ein anderer i s t " 
explaining t h i s purpose to be that of l i b e r a t i o n . I f i n d the 
si m p l i c i t y of t h i s solution convincing and therefore propose to 
translate the above phrase w i t h "particular purposefulness". 
The gnostic f l a s h or prajna-aloka spoken of i n the Yoga-Bhasya 
(l.47) and i n the Yoga-Sutra ( I I I . . 5 ) can te n t a t i v e l y be understood 
as the climax of the sevenfold gnosis (sapta-dha prajna) mentioned i n 
— — — — CR 
aphorism 11.27 (tasya sapta-dha pranta-bhumih prajna) and described 
as arising from viveka-khyati (see 11.26). A possible elucidation of 
93 According to Vyasa the word tasya refers to the yogin who has attained 
to the 'vision of discernment', but with Vijnana Bhiksu I prefer to 
relate i t back to the compound hana-upaya of 11.26. 
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what might be entailed i n t h i s 'sevenfold gnosis' can be found 
i n the Yoga-Bhasya ( I I . 2 7 ) : saptadha-iti asuddhy-avarana-mala-
apagamac|/cittasya pratyaya-antara-anutpade s a t i sapta-prakara-eva 
\ 
pra.jna vivekino bhavati, tad-yatha^pari.jnatam heyam na-asya punah 
pari.ineyam-^asti, ksina heya-hetavo na punar-yetesam ksetavyam/asti, 
saksat-krtam nirodha-samadhina hanam, bhavito viveka-khyati-rupo 
hana-upayah ity-/esa catustayi karyya vimuktih pra.jnayah, c i t t a -
vimuktis^tu t r a y i carita-adhikara buddhih gun^ giri-^ikhara-kuta-
cyuta iva gravano niravasthanah, sva-karane pralaya-abhimukhffii saha 
tena-astam gacchanti. na ca-esam pravillnanam punar^asty^utpadah 
prayo.jana-abhavadj/iti, etasyam-^avasthayam guna-sambandha-atitah 
sva-rupa-matra-.iyotiryamalah k e v a l l purusah, or: "'Sevenfold 1 [means 
t h a t ] through the disappearance of the defilements from the cover-
of-impurity, when no other presented-idea i s produced by the mind, the 
gnosis of the discerner (vivekin) i s of seven kinds, [ v i z i ] ( i ) 
that-which-is-to-be-escaped (heya) [ i . e . a l l future s u f f e r i n g ] i s 
full-comprehended; i t need not be full-comprehended again; ( i i ) the 
causes of that-which-is-to-be-escaped have dwindled [namely the 
corr e l a t i o n between 'seer* and 'seen' e t c . ] ; they need not dwindle 
again; ( i i i ) through the enstasy of r e s t r i c t i o n the [ t o t a l ] cessation 
(hana) i s realised; ( i v ) the means of cessation i n the form of the 
vision of discernment has become manifested; t h i s i s the f o u r f o l d 
release of the gnosis to be effected; however, the release of the mind 
[as such] i s t r i p l e : (v) the sovereignty of buddhi i s obtained; ( v i ) 
the gunas, l i k e rocks [which have] f a l l e n from the edge of a mountain-peak, 
are without support [and] of t h e i r own accord i n c l i n e towards 
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dissolution, [and] they go to r e s t with that buddhi; and. once 
these ^gunasJ are dissolved, there i s no new origination [for them], 
because of the absence of the cause ^ v i z . avidya or 'nescience']; 
( v i i ) i n t h i s state the Self has transcended the connection with 
the gunas [and i s established a s ] the l i g h t of nought but [ i t s ] 
own-form, undefiled [and] alone". 
Viveka-khyati i s the expedient by which the cessation (nana) 
of the ominous correlation between S e l f and non-self i s brought 
about (see 11.26). I t i s also known as viveka-,ja-,jnana or 'gnosis bom 
of discernment 1 (see I I I . 5 2 , 5 4 ) ^ - Aphorism I I I . 5 2 i s of s p e c i a l 
i n t e r e s t since i t prescribes a method by which t h i s non-sequential 
gnosis can be effected most d i r e c t l y : ksana-tat-kramayoh samyamad-
viveka-.jam .jnanam, or: "By constraint on the moments-of-time and 
the i r sequence [the yogin gains^J discernment-born gnosis". The topic 
of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r exercise i s the structure of time thought to 
c o n s i s t of smallest i n t e r v a l s of duration (ksana). In other words, 
time i s made the meditative support by which the atemporal r e a l i t y 
i s to be actualised. 
I n I I I . 5 4 t h i s gnostic revelation i s described as the 'deliverer' 
(taraka) owing to i t s power which transports the yogin across the 
ocean of phenomenal existence into the Unconditioned. This gnosis 
i s 1omni-objective' (sarva-visaya) and 'omni-temporal' (sarvatha-visaya) 
and 'non-sequential' (akrama) (see I I I . 5 4 ) . The quintessence of t h i s 
v i s i o n of discernment i s the abolition of the empirical ego. As 
P a t a n j a l i (lV.25) declares: visesa-dars'ina atma-bhava-bhavana-vinivrttih, 
or: "For the seer of the d i s t i n c t i o n [between S e l f and non-self][there 
94 J.H. WOODS' (1966^) index l i s t s viveka-.jam dhyanam at I I I . 5 2 which must 
be a s l i p since his t r a n s l a t i o n c l e a r l y presupposes °- jnanam. 
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ensues]) the discontinuance of the projection of the s e l f ' s s t a t e " . 
The decisive phrase atma-bhava-bhavana, here converted into "the 
projection of the s e l f ' s s t a t e " , i s a problematic one as i s witnessed 
by the existing t r a n s l a t i o n s . R. PRASADA (1912), for instance, takes 
i t to mean "the c u r i o s i t y as to the nature-and-relations of the S e l f " 
and G. JHA (1907) has "thought of the nature of s e l f " , whilst 
J.H. WOODS (1966 ) prefers to translate i t with "pondering upon his 
own states-of-being". However, I submit that these various renderings 
disregard the active component i n bhavana which i s c l o s e l y a l l i e d to 
bhavana meaning 'effecting, r e a l i s i n g , c u l t i v a t i n g ' . I therefore 
propose to translate i t with 'projection' which best conveys the 
element of 'mental construction'. Supportive evidence for t h i s 
interpretation i s found in Buddhism where bhavana i s usually given 
the meaning of 'meditation' or ' v i s u a l i s a t i o n ' though, as EL.SNELLGROVE 
(1959, I , 134) points out, " i n the s p e c i a l sense of mental production 
or thought-creation". These considerations apply naturally also to 
aphorism 1.33 which i s the only other instance i n which the word 
bhavana (as bhavanatah) occurs. This sutra i s of considerable i n t e r e s t 
insofar as i t speaks of "the projecting of friendship, compassion, 
gladness and i m p a r t i a l i t y " (maitrl-karuna-mudita-upeksanam ... bhavanatah) 
which establishes an immediate l i n k with Buddhism i n which this set 
of four mental attitudes i s w e l l known. 
The term atma-bhava, again, denotes the empirical s e l f complex 
which i s abolished as soon as nirvicara-vaisaradya sets i n , thus 
giving way to a state which Vyasa circumscribes as ''sheer existing' 5 
or satta-matra. The act of 'discernment' (viveka) which characterises 
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t h i s enstatic elevation Iprasamkhyana) i s not an ordinary i n t e l l e c t u a l 
exercise of 'differentiation' or 'comparison'. Rather i t i s an 
immediate knowing (innehaben) of the d i s t i n c t i o n between S e l f and s e l f . 
This explains why. the expedient by which the yogin propels himself 
into the next higher stage of enstasy, v i z . asampra.jnata-samadhi, 
i s not su much a noetic act as a conative one i n the form of 
a t o t a l and irrevocable turning away from p r a k r t i c r e a l i t y . I am 
refe r r i n g of course to para-vairagya or 'higher dispassion 1 (see I I I . 5 0 ; 
1.16) as the only means of entering into asamprajnata-samadhi. 
G.M. KOEIMAN (1970, 237) displays a considerable degree of 
empathic understanding when examining t h i s recondite phenomenon. 
Trying to determine the nature of this f i n a l v o l i t i o n to disengage 
e n t i r e l y from pr a k r t i as such, he writes: "The r e j e c t i o n , however, 
should not be a violent e f f o r t , s i n c e this would impair peace of 
mind. There should be a tranquil suave disinterestedness, a peaceful 
refraining from thinking, rather than a r e j e c t i o n of the thought 
of inadequacy or of the thought of otherness, a constant refu s a l of 
consciousness and a sinking away into Awareness. The highest state 
of concentration -(flic/) i s , therefore, an eff o r t of the w i l l rather 
than an a c t i v i t y of the mind." 
What happens once the vi s i o n of discernment has ceded? The 
answer i s simple: When a l l conscious contents have been cleared 
and even the awareness of pure existing i s no longer present, 
consciousness undergoes a t o t a l collapse. There i s a gradual emptying 
of consciousness i n the course of the enstatic journey, and then 
comes the c r i t i c a l point at which 'implosion 1 occurs owing to the 
extreme evacuation of the mind. This i s asamprajnata-samadhi which 
95 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I f 424) wrongly equates prasamlchyana with dhyana 
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coincides with pratyaya-nirodha. 
However, t h i s absence of consciousness does not mean that 
asampra.jnata-samadhi i s equivalent to a state of unconsciousness 
as ordinarily understood. Such an interpretation i s not defensible 
on any count, since Yoga i s careful to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between 
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consciousness and Awareness ( c i t ) . For this reason one 
must also r e j e c t G. JHA's (1907) translation of the term asampra.jnata 
with 'unconscious'. A somewhat more appropriate renderings:-would 
appear to be 'ultra-cognitive' as suggested by M.N. DVTVEDI (1934 ) . 
As S. DASGUPTA (1924, 124) comments: "This state, l i k e the other 
previous states of the samprajnata type, i s a positive state of the 
mind and not a mere state of vacuity of objects or negativity. I n 
t h i s state, a l l determinate character of the states disappears and 
t h e i r potencies only remain a l i v e " . G.H. KOELMAN (1970, 239), 
more punctiliously perhaps, puts i t thus: "Concentration ( s i c ? ) without 
objective consciousness should not be conceived as t o t a l absence 
of knowledge; only knowledge by objectivation i s absent". 
This rather elusive condition i s also c a l l e d nirodha-parinama 
i n I I I . 9 : vyutthana-nirodha-samskarayor-abhibhava-pradur-bhavau nirodha-
ksana-citta-anvayo hirodha-parinamah, or: "[when there is]] subjugation 
of the subliminal-activators of emergence and the manifestation ^of the 
subliminal-activators] of r e s t r i c t i o n ^this i s known as] the r e s t r i c t i o n -
transmutation [or] the connection of the mind with the moment of r e s t r i c t i o n " 
The immediately succeeding aphorism ( i I I . I O ) complements t h i s 
statement: tasya prasanta-vahita samskarat, or: " I t s calm flow |]is 
96 For some useful observations on the interpretation of the nature 
of t h i s type of enstatic experience, see J . MARfCHAL (1964 , 186ff.). 
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effectedj by a subliminal-activator". The specialness of 
nirodha-parinama i s brought out by the aphorisms III.11—12 which 
define the other non-ordinary 'transmutations' (parinama) of the 
mind: sainra-arthata-ekagratayoh ksaya-udayau c i t t a s y a samadhi-
•parinamah, tatah punah santa-uditau tulya-pratyayau c i t t a s y a 
ekagrata-parinamah, or: "The dwindling of all-object-ness and the 
up r i s a l of one-pointedness i s the enstasy-transmutation of the mind. -
Then again, when the quiescent and the uprisen'presented-ideas are 
similar, jjthis i s j the one-pointedness-transmutation of the mind". 
Whereas I I I . 1 2 i s seemingly a description of the underlying process 
of the techniques of dharana and dhyana, I I I . 1 1 refers to the 
central happening in enstasy. The term sarva-arthata, which occurs 
only i n 111.11, i s decisive. Contrary to the contention of the c l a s s i c a l 
exegetists who equate t h i s expression with visaya or external object, 
arthata must be taken to denote 'intended object*. Nor can I 
accept S. DASGUPTA's (1924, 155) iiHUiUMi interpretation of I I I . 9 
that "jVJven when the mind i s i n the samprajnata state i t i s sa i d to 
be i n vyutthana (phenomenal) i n comparison with the nirodha state, j u s t 
as the ordinary conscious states are c a l l e d vyutthana i n comparison 
with the samprajnata s t a t e " . He evidently reads s l i g h t l y more into 
t h i s aphorism than i s a c t u a l l y there. I t seems to me that the term 
vyutthana merely q u a l i f i e s the term samskara and i s not applied to the 
enstatic condition as such. 
From the viewpoint of the empirical consciousness, asamprajnata-
samadhi i s but a mass of subliminal-activators (see 1.18) which devour 
each other step by step because they are prevented from conscious 
thematisation and also because there i s no further feedback from 
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consciousness. This state i s also designated as 'seedless' ( n i r - b l i j a , 
I I I . 8 ) i n contrast to the sa-bi.ja forms of samapatti. The word 
bi.ja or 'seed' i n a l l probability r e f e r s to the 'support' (alambana) 
or the intended object. 
I n i t i a l l y , asamprajnata-samadhi i s only a f l e e t i n g experience 
i n t e r c a l a t i n g i t s e l f into the general enstatic continuum on the l e v e l 
of samprajnata-samadhi. For by dint of the subliminal tensions 
the yogin reverts again and again to the lower forms of e n s t a t i c 
experience (see IV.27). Nonetheless, once the utmost boundary of 
nirvicara-samapatti i s reached, he i s carr i e d as i f by a powerful 
current towards kaivalya (see IV.26). This i s so because despite 
of the innumerable vasanas, prakrti ultimately serves the end of the 
S e l f (see IV.24). 
I n conclusion I s h a l l b r i e f l y glance at the terminal stage of 
the entire enstatic process of involution, namely the phenomenon 
of dliarma-megha-samadhi. This concept makes i t s appearance i n a single 
aphorism, namely IV.29, which reads as f ollows: prasamlchyane1 py-
akusidas.ya sarvatha viveka-khyater-dharma-meghah samadhih, or: "For 
\the yogin who i s ] always non-usurious (a-ku-sida) even i n |the state 
of~[ elevated-insight (prasamkhyana) jthere follows] from the vision 
of discernment the enstasy ^known asj the cloud of dharma". The 
word akusida describes the adept who applies himself to para-vairagya 
by which asampra.inata-samadhi i s r e a l i s e d . The term dharma-megha-
samadhi i s used here either as a straightforward synonym of asampra.jnata 
samadhi or els e i t r e f e r s to the consummate phase of t h i s highest 
type of enstasy. I s h a l l argue i n favour of the second al t e r n a t i v e . 
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This important concept i s surrounded by a certain enigma 
which the c l a s s i c a l commentators have f a i l e d to illuminate 
as i s c l e a r l y evinced by t h e i r contradictory and occasionally 
even self-contradictory interpretations of the precise 
location of dharma-megha-samadhi within the whole s e r i e s of 
enstatic experiences. I n his Yoga-Bhasya ( l . 2 ) Vyasa makes the 
following statement: tad-eva ra.io-les'a-mala-apetam sva-rupa-pratistham 
sattva-purusa-anyata-khyati-matram dharma-megha-dhyana-upagam bhavati, 
tat-par am prasamkhyanam-ity-acaksate dhyayinah, or: "[When] the 
defilement of the vestiges of ra.jas i s removed from that [ s t a t e ] 
of sattva [and when e i t t a ^ j i s grounded i n j i t s ] own-form jand i s ] 
nothing but the v i s i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n between S e l f and sattva, 
[then] i t tends towards the absorption [known as] the cloud of dharma; 
that ^sattva s t a t e ] i s designated as the supreme elevated-insight by 
the meditators". 
Vijnana Bhiksu, i n h i s Yoga-Varttika ( l . 2 ) explains t h i s passage 
thus: dharma-megha-dhyanam kim-ity^akanksa-ayam-aha tatyparam-iti / ^ / / M 
tad-/dliarma-megha-ali^m dhyanam paramam prasamkhyanam tattva-.iri.anam /ilA 
viveka-khyater-^eva, or: "What i s the absorption [known as ] the cloud / ^ 
of dharma? Anticipating t h i s query ^Vyasa] says: 'that i s the supreme 
[elevated-insight] '. That absorption c a l l e d the 'cloud of -dharma' i s 
the supreme elevated-insight, true knowledge jborn of] the v i s i o n of 
discernment". Clearly, t h i s i s a gross misconstruction of Vyasa's 
stance. As i s evident from subsequent statements i n the Yoga-Bhasya 
(see 1.15; I I . 2 ; IV.29) the author does not identify prasamkhyana 
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with dha rma-me gha- samadhi and consequently the wo I'd t a t or 'that' 
i n the l a s t sentence of the above quotation does not r e f e r to 
— — 97 — 
dharma-megha-dhyana (= °— samadhi), as Vijnana Bhiksu maintains, but 
to the state of unpolluted sattva. (v> 
G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 234) regards dharma-megha-samadhi as the 
"passage from the state of Sublime Insight to the state of Re s t r i c t i o n " , 
that i s , from prasamkhyana to asamprajrata-samadhi. He contends 
(p. 235) that the'enstasy of the cloud of dharma' " i s the stage 
where there i s absolutely uninterrupted discriminate i n t u i t i o n , at 
once apprehended and generously s a c r i f i c e d , an uninterrupted experience 
of the f a c t that i n our present state we do not square with our true 
S e l f . . . " . But t h i s i s neither the view of Pat a n j a l i nor that of Vyasa. 
G.M. KOELMAN (1970) t r i e s to vindicate h i s interpretation by c i t i n g 
Vacaspati Misra ( l . 1 8 ) : dharma-megha-samadhir-eva hi n i t a n t a - v i g a l i t a -
ra.ias-tamo-malat-sattvad-upa.jatas-tat-tad-visaya-atikramena pravarttamano' 
nanto visaya-avadyadar3i samasta-visaya-parityagac-ca sva-rupa-pratisthah 
san-niralambanah samskara-matra-s'esasya niralambanasya samadheh karanam-
upapadyate sarupscad, or: "\fhen sattva i s e n t i r e l y freed from the d e f i l e -
ments of ra.jas and tamas, the dlaarma-megha enstasy i s effected. I t s 
a c t i v i t y i s transcendent to any object, { i t i s ] unbounded, beholding 
[ a l l ] objects and on account of [the mind's] shunning of al l - objects 
[jLt remains] grounded i n [ i t s ] own-form, being without support. I t 
acts as the cause of the enstasy [which has] onlj'' a vestige of subliminal-
activators [and which i s ] without support owing to f i t s ] homogeneity". 
This exposition goes, probably unintentionally, against a l l the evidence 
i n the Yoga-Sutra and against the authority of Vyasa. For instance, 
97 This substitution of, samadhi by dhyana i s most unwonted, but there 
can be no doubt that dharma-megha-dhyana i s i n fac t the same as 
dliarma-megha-samadhi. 
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i n IV.30 i t i s stated that "thence | i£. as a resul t of dharma-megha-
samadhi] jcomes about} the cessation of ( a l l ] c a u s e s-of-affliction 
and of karman" (tatah kles'a-karma-nivrttih). This interpretation 
i s reinforced by the whole context of t lie concluding sutras i n which 
the concept of dharma-megha-samadhi i s f i r s t introduced. Accordingly, 
one i s forced to conclude that the dharma-megha enstasy forms the 
terminal stage of asampr a.inata-samadhi and that i t coincides with 
the yogin 1s exit from the prakrtic realm i n toto. For t h i s reason 
one must also discard the equation, proposed i n the Fatan.jala-Rahasya 
(lV.29), of dharma-megha-samadhi with para-vairagya. As has been shown, 
para-vairagya serves as the means to asamprajnata-samadhi. 
Having c l a r i f i e d the position of t h i s puzzling phenomenon 
on the enstatic s c a l a , i t remains for us to ascertain the meaning 
of the concept of dharma i n dharma-megha. The older generation of 
ihdologists have focused on the eth i c a l connotation of t h i s f l e x i b l e 
word and invariable' translated i t with 'virtue' (G. JHA, R. PRASADA, / 
H. ITULLBR) or 'merit' (M.N. DVIVEDl). More recent researchers have 
found these renderings unsatisfactory and t a c i t l y or openly queried 
that dharma in the present context has a moral sense. Thus S. 
RADHAKRISHNAN (1951 6) renders i t with ' t r u t h 1 , G.M. KOELMAN (1970) 
with 'essence' and J.H. WOODS (1966^) suggests ' (knowable) thing', 
whilst J.W. HAUER (1958) taking h i s cue from buddhist contexts 
understands i t as 'tragende Urmacht'. Explaining t h i s unexpected 
paraphrase, J.W.HAUER (1958, 470, fn. 22) writes: "The. meditator 
i s i n t h i s state enveloped by the supporting prime power jjtragende 
Urmacht] of the wdrld; he has become a dharmakaya l i k e the 'great 
Muni 1. This i s an expression for Buddha who has entered Nirvana". 
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I find t h i s interpretation persuasive. For, the concept of 
dharma-megha does not appear to be mentioned by any hindu 
authority prior to P a t a n j a l i , though i t i s evidently an integral 
part of the technical nomenclature of early Mahayana Buddhism. 
There i t figures' as the tenth bhumi or 'stage* of the bodhisattva's 
path to perfection, as can be seen, for example, from the 
Pancavimsati-Sahasrika (p. 230, ed. by N. DUTT, 1934). I consider 
t h i s to be the o r i g i n a l usage of the concept of dharma-megha. 
whatever other shades of meaning i t may have acquired i n subsequent 
periods. And i t must be i n pr e c i s e l y t h i s sense that P a t a S j a l i 
knew and probably also used the term. This r a i s e s anew the vexed 
question, broached by previous scholars (e.g. L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, 
1936/37), of the r e l a t i o n between C l a s s i c a l Yoga and Buddhism. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PATANJ ALA-YOGA AND CLASSICAL SAMKHYA 
Of the plethora of misinterpretations of Pa t a n j a l i ' s 
darsana. both by foreign and indigenous scholars, none proved 
more inveterate and damaging than the claim that C l a s s i c a l Yoga 
i s but a S p i e l a r t of Samkhya. This i n f e l i c i t o u s assumption was 
f i r s t proposed by fi.T. C0LEBR00KE i n his now c l a s s i c a l essay on 
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Yoga . According to him there i s but a single difference between 
Yoga and Samkhya, namely the presence of the doctrine of lsVara 
i n the former and i t s denial i n the l a t t e r school of thought. 
''In l e s s momentous matters they d i f f e r , not upon points of 
doctrine, but i n the degree i n which the exterior exercises, or 
abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as r e q u i s i t e 
99 
preparations of absorbed contemplation." This mistaken view 
was destined to be echoed and re-echoed throughout the next 
century* The following statements, culled almost at random from 
the indological l i t e r a t u r e , are symptomatic of t h i s fundamental 
misapprehension, and even i n quite recent publications can t h i s 
antiquated idea be found to ghost about. 
I n the same vein as H . t . COLEBROOKE, R. MITRA (1883, x v i i i ) 
98 H.T. COLEBROOKE (1873» i ) 
99 op. c i t . . p. 265 
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writes: "The Yoga Sutra takes for granted the twenty-five categories 
of the Sankhya as the basis of i t s doctrine, and copies some of i t s 
aphorisms almost verbatim". S i m i l a r l y , M.N. DVIVEDI (1890, 1934^, x v i i i ) 
"The Yoga subscribes to the Samkhya theory i n toto". M. MONIER-
WILLIAMS (1894, 200), again, writes: "The Yoga, founded by P a t a n j a l i 
and regarded as a branch of the Sankhya, i s scarcely worthy of the 
name of a separate system of philosophy. Yet i s has undoubted charms 
for the naturally contemplative and a s c e t i c a l Hindu..." 
Although correcting some of the mistaken notions about Yoga and 
displaying a f a r more liberal-minded attitude towards i t than did 
h i s predecessors, M. MULLER (1916*, 312) nonetheless follows s u i t 
when he states: "... i t may be quite true that, a f t e r we have once 
understood the position of the Samkhya-philosophy towards the great 
problem of the world, we s h a l l not glean many new metaphysical or 
psychological ideas from a study of the Yoga". R„ GARBE (1917, 148), 
well known f o r h i s pioneer work on Samkhya, makes no concessions 
to Yoga at a l l : " A l l Samkhya teachings about cosmology, physiology 
and psychology were simply taken over into the Yoga system. Even 
the doctrine of salvation i s the same ..." S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1927, 
1951 , I I , 342) expresses a more moderate but s t i l l not affirmative 
enough view: "P a t a n j a l i systematised the conceptions of the Yoga and 
set them f o r t h on the background of the metaphysics of the Samkhya, 
which he assumes with s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n s " . 
The f i r s t scholar to come to the defence of C l a s s i c a l Yoga and 
vigorously affirm i t s doctrinal autonomy i s S. DASGUPTA (1930, 2) who, 
seeking to r e c t i f y past misinterpretations and sweeping generalisations, 
remarks: " I t i s true that Yoga owes much to the Sankhya philosophy, but 
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i t i s doubtful whether the obligation i s due to the Kapila 
Sankhya as we have i t now. My supposition i s that we have l o s t the 
o r i g i n a l Sankhya texts, whereas the systems that pass now by the 
name of Sankhya and Yoga represent two schools of philosophy which 
evolved through the modifications of the original Sankhya school; 
Yoga did not borrow i t s material from Kapila Sankhya (. •.) though 
the Yoga and the Kapila Sankhya are fundamentally the same i n 
t h e i r general metaphysical positions, yet they hold quite 
different views on many points of philosophical, e t h i c a l and 
p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t " . M. ELIADE (1973^, 7 ) , a former student 
of S. DASGUPTA, blurs t h i s f i n e d i s t i n c t i o n again when he 
writes: "As to the theoretical framework and the metaphysical 
foundation that P a t a n j a l i provides for these practices, h i s 
personal contribution i s of the smallest. He merely rehandles 
the Samkhya philosophy i n i t s broad outlines, adapting i t to a 
rather s u p e r f i c i a l theism i n which he exalts the p r a c t i c a l value of 
meditation. The Yoga and Samkhya systems are so much a l i k e that 
most of the affirmations made by the one are v a l i d for the other". 
F. CATALINA (1968, 19) i s f a r more discerning: " I n the main, 
the two systems are very much a l i k e . However, there are some 
si g n i f i c a n t differences which warrant our c a l l i n g Yoga a separate 
system of philosophy". This enlightened view has unfortunately 
not become as widely prevalent as one would wish'* /Too often Yoga 
i s s t i l l being reduced to Samkhya, with.perhaps a few unimportant 
appendages of i t s own. For instance, CH. SHARMA (1960, 169) makes 
th i s woolfy comment: "Yoga i s intimately a l l i e d to Sankhya. The Glta 
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c a l l s them one. Yoga means s p i r i t u a l action and Sankhya means 
knowledge. Sankhya i s theory; Yoga i s practice. For a l l p r a c t i c a l 
purposes, Sankhya and Yoga may be treated as the theoretical 
and the p r a c t i c a l sides of the same system"• 
However, as a perusal of the l i t e r a t u r e evinces not only 
Indian scholars are g u i l t y of t h i s kind of reductionism and over-
generalisation. N. SMART (1968, 26), for example, writes: "The 
Samkhya system can hardly by i t s e l f be treated as a method of 
l i b e r a t i o n , though i t lays claims to being such, which i s a main 
reason why i t i s coupled, and has been coupled over a very long 
period, with the Yoga system. The l a t t e r borrows i t s main features, 
with c e r t a i n adaptations, from the Samkhya, so that i t i s not 
too misleading to treat Samkhya as the theoretical exposition and 
Yoga the p r a c t i c a l account of how to achieve that c l a r i t y of 
consciousness which brings l i b e r a t i o n from the round of r e b i r t h 
and the suffering of the world", 
•Such inept statements could be multiplied almost ad libitum. 
They a l l betray a t o t a l lack of h i s t o r i c a l perspective which, i n 
turn, i s responsible for an almost incredible conceptual haziness. 
I t i s f u t i l e to attempt a comparison between two items which have not 
been c l e a r l y defined to begin with. Thus, i n the above quotations 
Samkhya i s obviously used i n a v a r i e t y of meanings. Properly speaking, 
a v a l i d comparison i s possible only between C l a s s i c a l Yoga and 
C l a s s i c a l Samkhya insofar as both have the status of a philosophical 
darsana. And i n t h i s sense, there can be no j u s t i f i c a t i o n whatsoever 
for deriving C l a s s i c a l Yoga from C l a s s i c a l Samkhya. 
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Recent research into the complex history of the Yoga and 
Samkhya t r a d i t i o n has brought to l i g h t ample material to vindicate 
S. DASGUPTA's (1930) conclusion that P a t a n j a l i ' s Yoga i s a s p e c i f i c 
type of Samkhya-Yoga j u s t as the system of C l a s s i c a l Samkhya 
i t so be regarded as a separate l i n e of development of the same 
common ideological ground. As K.B.R. RAO (1966, 9) puts i t 
succinctly: "We must guard against another obsession which has taken 
deep roots i n our minds. I t r e f e r s to the equation that i s 
generally made of ' a t h e i s t i c Samkhya• expounded i n the Samkhya 
Karika, with the one expounded i n the Yoga Sutras of P a t a n j a l i , 
with the exception of Isv a r a i n the l a t t e r . I t i s an error of 
judgement to place the Samkhya Karika and the Yoga Sutras or Kapila 
and P a t a n j a l i , i n juxtaposition and t r e a t them as preaching 
Atheism and Theism respectively (.••) The Yoga Sutras have Samkhyan 
elements as Vedanta i t s e l f has, but i t s difference with the 
c l a s s i c a l Samkhya i s as great as the difference between Vedanta and 
the c l a s s i c a l Samkhya. The Yoga-Sutra-Samkhva i s not simply c l a s s i c a l 
Samkhya plus God, nor the c l a s s i c a l Samkhya of the Samkhya Karika i s 
Yoga-Sutra-Samkhya minus God. They are fundamentally different i n 
so many main p r i n c i p l e s " . 
Now, the precise nature of these differences has never been 
ascertained i n any appreciable d e t a i l . The reason for t h i s i s 
obvious: the absence of an unprejudiced study of the Yoga-Sutra 
preceded by a c r i t i c a l appraisal of the exegetical l i t e r a t u r e . 
However, on the basis of the purged reading of the Yoga-Sutra, 
rendered f e a s i b l e by the present study, we are .now i n a position 
to re-examine these 'differences and undertake a comprehensive 
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comparison between the Yoga-Sutra and the•Samkhya-Karika. Such 
a formidable task, though,lies outside the compass of this 
investigation, and I must defer a detailed treatment of this 
promising line of research. For the present, I merely wish to 
point out the major divergencies between these two schools of 
thought as they have become apparent i n the course of this study, 
1 must emphasise at this point that I have certain misgivings 
about current interpretations of the Samkhya-Karika as well, 
and that before any exhaustive comparison could be undertaken 
this text would have to be examined both from a textual and a 
semantic point of view, so that we may arrive at a sterling 
understanding of this important scripture unobscured by a l l later 
interpretations and l i k e l y distortions. Until then one has to 
remain content with the rough identification of three areas of 
contrast between Classical Samkhya and Patanjala-Yoga, viz. 
(1) methodology 
(2) doctrinal framework 
(3) terminology 
I t i s my contention that the different methodological approach 
of Classical Yoga is responsible for many of i t s conceptual and 
doctrinal as well as terminological idiosyncrasies. I therefore 
commence this review with a brief examination of the methodological 
aspect. The importance of the distinct approach of Patanjali is 
pertinently emphasised by M. ELIADB (1973^, 7): "... whereas, 
according to Samkhya, the only path to salvation is that of 
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metaphysical knowledge, Yoga accords marked importance to 
techniques of meditation". Elsewhere (p. 36) he remarks: "Patanjali 
takes over the Samkhya dialectic almost i n i t s entirety, but he 
does not believe that metaphysical knowledge can, by i t s e l f , lead 
man to f i n a l liberation* Gnosis, in his view, only prepares the 
ground for the acquisition ( s i c I ) of freedom (mukti). Emancipation 
must, so to speak, be conquered by sheer force, specifically by 
means of an ascetic technique and a method of contemplation, which, 
taken together, constitute nothing less than the yoga-darsana". 
In a nutshell, whereas Classical Samkhya relies heavily on 
the power of ratiocination and discernment, Classical Yoga like any 
other yogic tradition is founded on a philosophy which encourages 
personal experimentation and direct 'mystical' verification. This 
basic difference is anticipated i n a well-known stanza i n the 
Mahabharata (XII.289.7): pratyaksa-hetavo yogah samkhyah lastra-
viniscayah, ubhe ca-ete tattve tata yudhisthira, or: "The Samkhya-
followers depend on [their] scriptures, [whilst] the Yoga-followers 
rely on direct-experience (pratyaksa) ..." Even though on other 
occasions the unity of Yoga and Samkhya is vigorously asserted, 
the above statement which i s by no means unique clearly foreshadows 
the later bifurcation of both schools of thought into a 'rationalistic 
and a 'mystical* system. 
I t is this experimental and experiential approach of Yoga, as 
opposed to the more traditionalist Samkhya, which can be said to 
have been the great underlying stimulus i n the doctrinal innovations 
and the creation of new schools within Hinduism as much as vrithin 
Buddhism. The classical example of the seeker after truth who 
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discards a l l theory i n order to probe the depths of r e a l i t y 
by means of his own one-pointed mind, is the founder of Buddhism 
himself. After having pursued his search with the help of existing 
'models', of a Samkhya and Yoga type, which he found of no avail, 
the Buddha abandoned himself completely to a course of personal 
meditative exploration of his own device, which ultimately resulted 
i n his sambodhi and i n the formulation of one of India's most 
prodigous schools of thought. 
The highly formalistic and rationalistic basis of Classical 
Samkhya is borne out quite clearly by the opening stanzas of the 
Samkhya-Karika which read: duhkha-traya-abhighata.i-.ii.jnasa tad-
abhighatake hetau, drste sa-apartha cen-na-eka-anta-atyantato' 
bhava^jft; drsfravad-anusravikah sa hy-avisuddhi-ksaya-atisaya-yuktah, 
tad-viparltah Erevan-vyakta-avyakta-.ina-vi.inanat. or: "Owing to 
the tribulation [stemming from the] threefold suffering [there 
arises] the desire;-to-know the means of i t s removal. I f | i t be 
argued that] this [inquiry] is f u t i l e because visible [means of 
removal are available], [we reply that this is].not fthe case] since 
jthe visible remedies] are not f i n a l or abiding. - The revealed 
[cure for this tribulation] i s like the visible jcure]jin the last 
analysis ineffective] , \tor i t i s also] connected with impurity, 
destruction and excess; different and superior to that is the 
discriminative-knowledge {by which is differentiated^] the manifest, 
the unmanifest and the knower [ i . e . the"Self]". 
Thus the central expedient by which the termination of suffering 
(duhkha) is effected i s vi.jnana or the careful holding apart of 
the three essential ontological categories postulated by Samkhya. 
The technical terms vyakta, avyakta and .ink are explained in stanza 3 
254 
as the evolutes of the world-ground, the world-ground i t s e l f and 
purusa respectively, and they are further defined i n stanzas 10-11* 
I n stanza 64, whose importance is generally overlooked, vi.-ffiana 
occurs by the technical name of tattva-abhyasa or the 'practice 
affirming (the truth) as taught by Samkhya'. We also hear what 
this truth consists i n . I c i t e the entire verse: evam tattva-abhyasan-
na-asmi na me na-aham-ity-aparii-sesam, aviparyayad-visuddham kevalam-
utpadyate jnanam, or: "Thus, on account of the practice of the 
truth [that] ' I am not', 'nothing i s mine*, ' I am not' [there 
arises] jthatj knowledge jwhichj is complete, pure and solitary 
because [ i t i s ] free from error". Tattva-abhyasa, which i s applied 
vi.inana, represents the effort to disrupt the habit of the 
empirical ego of identifying with the phenomenal contents of conscious-
ness* so as to re-locate man's true identity i n the transcendental 
Self. For, man is essentially purusa, and i n order to reach authenticity 
he must divest himself of a l l phenomenal accretions, such as mind, 
body, external property or social relations. 
That this intellectual distancing is not enough in i t s e l f i s 
evident from the fact that IsVara Krsna also acknowledges the merit 
of moral purification, (see 44). Moreover, as emerges from stanza 
45, vi.inana must be accompanied by an act of renunciation of every-
thing that reason - in keeping with tradition - has revealed to be 
•non-self. The verse i n question reads: vairagyat-prakrt i-layah 
samsaro bhavati ra.iasad-ragat..., or: "From dispassion [comes] 
the dissolution \of the evolutes back into] the world-ground; from 
attachment [which i s ] passionate [comes] phenomenal-existence..." 
Here prakrti-laya does not, as i n the Yoga-Sutra, denote a sinking 
away into the world-ground by the human personality, but laya 
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must be taken to refer to the dissolution of the evolutes coinciding 
with the recovery of the Self's authenticity. Any other reading 
would make no sense in the face of the fact that the avowed goal 
of Classical tyki- Samkhya is the reinstallment of the Self i n i t s 
untainted splendour of kaivalya. G.J. LARSON'S (1969) rendering of 
the phrase vairagyat-prakrti-layah as "from non-attachment [comes^] 
dissolution i n prakrti" i s not specific enough to avoid confusion 
with the peculiar usage of the term prakrti-laya i n Patanjali's work. 
The sole interest of the follower of Classical Samkhya i s the 
disentanglement of purusa and prakrti. This objective is shared not 
only by the antecedent Samkhya-Yoga schools but also by Classical 
Yoga. Yet one cannot avoid the impression that the Samkhya method 
of holding apart the primary categories of Self and non-self (= prakrti) 
i s executed on a level entirely different from that recommended by 
the more meditation-oriented schools. For i n the l a t t e r the 
confusion between Self and mind (as a product of inesentient nature), 
i s held to be removable only by means of a controlled:, introversion 
and transformation of consciousness. This does not appear to be the 
way of Classical Samkhya. Vi.inana is by no means synonymous with 
pra.ina or gnostic insight as acquired i n samadhi; rather i t is an 
intellectual act of continuously reminding oneself that one i s not 
this body, this particular sensation, feeling, or thought. This i s 
the famous neti-neti procedure of the upanisadic sages applied i n 
the most rationalistic manner possible. In later Vedanta the same 
technique i s known under the technical designation of apavada or 
— 100 
the 'annulment* of 'erroneous predication' (adhyaropa) . This 
intellectualistic refashioning of an essentially introspective-
meditative practice compelled J.N. MUKERJI (1930, 8) to exclaim that 
100 See e.g. Vedanta-Sara (33) 
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"the point of view of Samkhya is logical and not psychological", 
which i s probably a far too one-sided interpretation. 
Moreover, i t is feasible that a perpetual distancing of oneself 
from the contents of consciousness might sooner or later induce 
altered states of awareness, nor i s i t entirely impossible that 
this was f u l l y accepted and perhaps even intended by Isvara Krsna 
and his disciples. The question is whether the approach of 
Classical Samkhya i s , i n the last analysis, adequate for realising 
the postulated goal of Self authenticity. This is t a c i t l y denied 
by the adherents of Yoga who feel that the re-conditioning of the 
cognitive apparatus as achieved by the method recommended in 
Classical Samkhya is not conducive to that complete rupture with 
the phenomenal which alone is capable of securing emancipation. 
As the Yoga authorities are quick to point out, there are powerful 
traces i n the depth-mind which no amount of re-habituation w i l l wipe 
out. ^hese subliminal-activators (samskara) must be rendered 
sterile by a restructuring of consciousness i t s e l f , which i s 
achieved through disciplined introspection leading to samadhi. 
Hence in Yoga the Samkhya vijnana becomes viveka-khyati or the 
gnostic vision of discernment. Similarly, vairagva acquires a second 
dimension. On the ordinary level i t is simply a l e t t i n g go of 
externals, but i n samadhi a second degree of detachment i s called for 
which represents an act of w i l l , subsequently leading to the much 
coveted asampra.jnata-samadhi i n which a l l subliminal-activators become 
obliterated. One may well speculate with K.B.R. HA00(1966, 43.2) that 
i t i s the accentuated rationalism of Classical Samkhya which must be 
held responsible for the fact that this school of thought never 
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actually acquired the same ^ recognition and prestige as the other 
darsanas. Be this as i t may, for the present purpose i t is v i t a l 
to realise that the methodological differences between Classical 
Samkhya and Classical Yoga as outlined above in i t i a t e d important 
conceptual and doctrinal divergencies which further enhanced 
the chasm between both schools of thought. 
There are three major points i n the doctrinal structure of 
Classical Yoga which separate i t from Classical Samkhya, viz. 
theology, ontology and psychology. A fourth point occasionally 
suggested i s the so-called sphota doctrine which Patanjali i s 
held to subscribe to, but as I w i l l show wrongly so. 
The single most striking conceptual difference between both 
dars'anas concerns their respective interpretation or attitude towards 
theological r e a l i t y . Whilst Classical Samkhya i s said to be 
nir-TsVara or •atheistic 1, Classical Yoga (as apparently a l l forms 
of hindu Yoga) is most emphatically sa-isVara or •theistic'. 
This assertion is somewhat misleading. Although i t is perfectly 
correct that Classical Yoga is i n t r i n s i c a l l y 'theistic', Classical 
Samkhya cannot simply be styled 'atheistic 1. The fact is that IsVara 
Krsna, rather l i k e the Buddha, does not mention or make any statement 
about God at a l l . This can mean either of two things. He may 
outright deny the existence of such a supreme being, or else he 
may merely not lend any significance to this question or postpone his 
judgement about i t . In view of the absence of any positive denial of 
the existence of God and considering the evidence of the Samkhya-
Sutra, I would rather conjecture that Isvara Krsna assumed a 
typical agnostic stance. Ostensibly, i f there be a God he can have 
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l i t t l e or nothing to do with the actual path of salvation as 
envisaged i n Classical Samkhya. 
This indifference to theological matters is clearly out of tune 
with Classical Yoga which is definitely theistic i n nature* As I 
have suggested above and counter to B. HEIMANN (1930, 90), there 
may possibly be an experiential basis for the concept of Isvara. 
though I do not thereby wish to say anything affirmative about either 
the re a l i t y of the experience or the authenticity of the interpretations 
attached to i t . I f this argument is valid, the methodological factor 
can j u s t l y be said to be the cause of this most conspicuous 
difference between both darsanas. 
The pre-eminently practical orientation of Yoga and i t s f u l l 
reliance on pratyaksa rather than on traditional knowledge of a 
rationalistic slant is moreover responsible for subtle but 
nonetheless crucial divergencies i n the ontological conceptions 
of the two systems. As I have tackled this question already there 
is no need here to repeat myself. Rather what I am interested i n 
at this point is the question as to how to account for these 
differences. The ontogenetic models were originally and primarily 
maps for meditative introspection, intended to guide the yogin 
i n his explorations of the terra incognita of the mind. Thus these 
models served a very practical psychological purpose. This hypothesis 
helps to explain why so many of these models, as given out i n the 
Mahabharata and other early texts, are without apparent logical 
coherence. These 'maps' are records of internal experiences rather 
than purely theoretical constructions. They are descriptive rather 
than explanatory. 
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The 'map' character of the ontogenetic model of Classical 
Yoga is beyond question. The prakrtic multi-level edifice 
is an eminently practical ad hoc conception which helps the yogin 
to 'program* his enstatic journey, to sign-post his inward odyssey 
so to speak and to orientate himself properly so as not to 
depart from his original trajectory. Thus the levels of cosmogenetic 
evolution are simultaneously the levels of psychogenetic involution. 
Each subsequently 'deeper* layer within the prakrtic organism 
becomes a target for the conscious involutionary programme of the 
yogin, u n t i l a l l levels of manifestation of the world-ground, 
and even the world-ground i t s e l f , are completely traversed. 
This, however, i s not a mere intellectual act. The process of samadhi 
with i t s various degrees of completeness cannot be equated with 
the technique, u t i l i s e d in Classical Samkhya, of discriminating 
Self from non-self on the basis of prefabricated categories of 
differentiation. Yoga demands more than that. Overt conceptual 
discrimination or vi.jnana is not enough. The categories of 
what represents the 'non-self must become the object of direct 
experience. The ultimate destination i s of course the Self, as 
the experiencer behind a l l manifest contents of consciousness. 
In Classical Samkhya, on the other hand, the ontogenetic model 
has lost this 'map' character i n a way and appears as a highly 
formalised structure typical of the extreme rationalistic position 
of this school of thought. 
The rigorous meditative introspective discipline of Yoga, or 
as J.W. HAUER (1958) puts i t , i t s "experienced metaphysics" is 
furthermore responsible for the distinct h o l i s t i c approach displayed 
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"by this tradition which finds congenial expression i n Patanjali's 
conception of mind. Whereas Isvara Kr§na i s mainly concerned with 
showing the various constituents of the inner world separately and 
i n their evolutionary dependence, Patanjali emphasises the homogeneity 
of the human personality complex. This i s clearly evinced "by his 
. 1 0 1 
concept of c i t t a . Isvara Krsna's parallel term li&ga (or karana), 
used to denote the c o l l e c t i v i t y of the thirteen evolutes (viz. 
buddhi, ahamkara. manas and the ten indriyas), is by no means 
synonymous with Pataffjali's c i t t a . I t somehow lacks the unifying 
and integrating strength of the latter concept. Whereas c i t t a is 
expressive of the dynamic interaction between the psychic structures 
- and thus is essentially a psychological concept -, linga f a i l s to 
convey any sense of dynamism or functional unity; i t i s primarily 
a static, analytical concept* 
The last point adduced as a specific feature of the conceptual 
102 
framework of Classical Yoga is the so-called sphota doctrine. This 
teaching, which originated among the early Sanskrit grammarians, 
contains the simple idea that a word is more than the sum to t a l of 
i t s component letters. Sphota, derived from Vsphut 'to burst open1, is 
conceived as eternal and as manifesting i t s e l f i n the spoken word. 
I t represents the concept, brought to expression i n a configuration 
of letters. Neither each separate sound nor the total sound of a word 
is considered as being capable of evoking a particular concept. Therefore, 
the sphota-vadins conclude, there must be something more that inheres 
101 On the meaning of the term linga and i t s significance see R. GARBE 
(1894, 323ff . ) . See also E.A. WELDEN (19H, 32-51). 
102 See e^. S. DASGUPTA (19635, I , 238, f n . l ) : "The most important point 
i n favour of this identification ^between the grammarian Patanjali 
and the author of the Yoga-Sutra 1 seems to be that both Patafijalis 
(ctd.) 
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in a word which, when the word is heard, 'bursts f o r t h 1 as meaning. 
On hearing the f i r s t sound we have a dark notion which becomes 
103 
clearer as the word i s uttered. However, as E. ABEGG (1914, 188ff.) 
has shown, sphota has a strong metaphysical ingredient which is 
absent in our standard notion of 'concept', wherefore a straightforward 
equation of sphofra with 'concept' cannot be made. For, sphota is 
ultimately the plenum, brahman, and i t is this aspect of the doctrine 
which was of cardinal importance to the Indians. As brahman is 
bodied forth i n a l l contingent beings, so the concept of brahman 
is thought to be the root of a l l other concepts. 
Now, i f a definite reference to this recondite doctrine could 
be found i n the Yoga-Sutra, this would be a significant factor 
i n support of the traditional claim that the author of the Yoga-Sutra 
is identical with his namesake the grammarian. However, this does 
not seem to be the case. Patanjali himself nowhere mentions the 
word sphota. and a l l later discussions about i t are based on a single 
aphorism, namely III. 1 7 which runs as follows: saMa-arbha-pratyayanam-
itara-itara-adJxvasat-samkaras-tat-pravibhaga-saiayamat sarva-bhuta-ruta-
jnanam, which may be rendered thus: "Word, meaning and presented-idea 
of the corresponding object are [usually] present in a state of mixture 
because of their being each identified with each other. Through constraint 
(samyama) [on the distinction between] them, insight into the utterances 
of a l l beings i s gained". 
As I understand i t , this simply means that by nature sabda, artha 
(fn . 102 ctd.) 
as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of spho^a which 
was denied even by SSmkhya". 
103 See also K.K. RAJA (1956, 84-116) 
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and pratyaya are experienced as one. A sound uttered by a l i v i n g 
being i s always the bearer of meaning. I t i s also accompanied by 
an image i n the mind of the percipient. I f the sound is unknown, 
i t can be understood by directly perceiving the idea i n the mind of 
the sender. To achieve this direct perception or saksatlcara of the 
idea i n the sender's consciousness, the yogin must make the 
distinction between word, meaning and image the subject of 
his meditative absorption and enstasy. This seems to be the 
message of the above sutra. There is no need here to assume that i t 
contains any reference to sphota. Considering the context i n which 
i t appears, i t probably merely relates to the very practical matter 
of reading another person's mind which i s a generally recognised 
yogic feat. The explanations of Vacaspati Mis'ra and others 
must be rejected as too far-fetched. Interestingly, Vyasa makes 
no mention of the term sphota at a l l . According to him the matching 
of sounds with objects is purely conventional (samketa), and the act 
of recognising the meaning of words is a question of memory. Thus 
the blame for this whole confusion must be put on Vacaspati Mis'ra. 
I t i s but natural that out of these methodological and conceptual 
divergencies there should also arise differences i n the terminology 
adopted by Classical Yoga and Classical Samkhya respectively. The 
preceding pages contain numerous examples which document this fact, 
and hence there i s no need for duplication here. I merely wish to 
remind the reader of such specific yogic terms as alinga, linga-matra, 
asmita-matra. avis'esa, visesa, c i t t a , v r t t i and pratyaya which either 
are absent i n the Samkhya-Karika or, else, have an entirely different 
connotation. The autonomy of the technical vocabulary of Classical Yoga 
i s , I think, indisputable. 
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To sum up: As i s apparent from a c r i t i c a l examination of the Yoga-
Sutra, far from being a mere imitation of Classical Samkhya, 
Patanjala-Yoga has a l l the characteristic marks of a thoroughly 
independent philosophical school of thought. Patanjali, or whoever 
may have been responsible for the composition of the Yoga-Sutra» 
emerges as a striking personality who must be counted among the 
most creative minds of India. I t would be almosjs frivolous to 
deny that he was intimately connected with the Yoga tradition 
and that he himself must have been a yogin of considerable attainment. 
He shows an unparalleled insight into yogic processes and, contrary 
to H.T. COLEBROOKE's (1873» I» 265) biased opinion, was not- "more 
mystic and fanatical" than Kapila who "makes a nearer approach to 
philosophical disquisition". He had l i t t l e sectarian inclination, 
i f any. He showed a healthy respect for tradition but not at the 
expense of the immediacy of personal verification. Far from 
burdening his epigones with unintelligible mumbo4jumbo, he 
produced a work of fine texture and remarkable insight which compares 
favourably with the philosophical creations of his contemporaries, 
and which has deservedly inspired countless generations of yogins 
of a l l denominations* 
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